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ABSTRACT
"The Appellate Question: A Comparative Analysis
of Supreme Courts of Appeal
in Virginia and Louisiana, 1776-1840 11
This dissertation examines the processes that created
supreme courts of appeal in Virginia and Louisiana and
challenges the traditional view of Louisiana as an anomaly
in the American judicial system. Comparison of the
development of the Supreme Court of Louisiana to that of
Virginia reveals important similarities in judicial
practices and procedures, legal theory, and the role the
courts played in the early political development of each
state. In every area, the two states shared important
intellectual and historical experiences.
In order to investigate the creation of these
jurisdictions, this dissertation examines the political
climate cf both 3tates; the background, education, and
politics of the judges; the rules of court which they
developed; and the jurisprudence that defined the structure
and operation of the courts. Accordingly, the judicial
history of both states reflects the political changes which
governed the era. The study of the development of the
jurisdictions, moreover, chronicles the structural changes
that influenced a pronounced shift from "moral" or
"republican" principles of law to a more pragmatic and
activist approach to justice in nineteenth-century America.
Finally, the profound influence of the common law and AngloAmerican patterns of judicature on Louisiana's legal
institutions sugges·ts a reconsideration of the state's place
in the mainstream of American legal history.
Mark Frederick Fernandez
Department of History
College of William and Mary in Virginia
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Chapter One
Introduction:
Judicial History and the Early Republic
Law and society bond in an intricate dance.

Law courts

provide the stage while litigants, lawyers, judges, and
politicians perform, each to his or her own capabilities, a
dazzling array of gestures and poses.

Sometimes the

performance is graceful and consistent, at other times,
abstract and avant garde.

The result, no matter how

brilliant or amateurish, mirrors the essence of society
because the manner in which individuals and corporations
resolve their disputes speaks to the very nature of
civilization.
Every known human community has either written its
own laws or relied on the collective memory of its
inhabitants to define the limits and regulations of its
society.

But laws alone do not illustrate much about a

particular culture.

statutes remain on the books long after

their particular usefulness has disappeared, customary
conventions influence legal commentary merely because they
concerned a previous generation of thinkers, and legal
principles by themselves are stationary without devices to
prime their evolution.

Courts and jurisprudence provide the

instruments needed to interpret the workaday problems and
solutions which underscore the rhythms of the dance between
law and society.
2
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Scholars have applied numerous devices to interpret the
dance.

Investigation of jurisprudence and judicial

institutions, however, has not been one that they have
pursued vigorously.

Although many outstanding studies of

the Supreme Court of the United States and federal courts
are available, little is known of the origins and
development of early state tribunals.
paid

~cant

Indeed, scholars have

attention to the development of state governments

in the early national period.
One promising approach to the study of early state
government is to incorporate law and legal culture into the
general scheme of state politics.

The role of the judiciary

comprises a major segment of the study of the origin and
development of state government.

Courts not only represent

a central feature of the American political system, the men
and women who sit on those courts and argue before them also
often use their legal background as a point of entry onto
the avenues of power.

Moreover, courts represent the arena

where ordinary individuals realize their most important
contacts with the state.

An examination of the role and

development of state courts, accordingly, provides something
much more important than a mere history of the law.

Through

the study of courts and their accompanying culture, the
subtle contest between competing and complementary elites
may be approached at the most elementary level.

Creation of

courts within states, subsequent practice and procedure, and
the role of the bench in defining a given state's legal
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culture offer a rich fund of sources for interpretation.

If

two or more states are considered in a controlled
comparison, a sweeping analysis of law, society, culture,
politics, conflict, and consensus becomes possible.
Choosing elements of comparison, however, presents an
important problem.

Analysis of all the courts of early

American states poses insurmountable difficulties because of
the sheer volume of documentation and the lack of a
sufficient support network of secondary literature.l
Regional development looms as the most promising venue.

Yet

even a regional focus represents a tedious and unmanageable
research problem.

An effective scheme for such analysis

lies in the choice of two comparative jurisdictions.

For

the south, one strategic pairing is Virginia and Louisiana.
Virginia is an obvious choice because of the influence
the Old Dominion had in the development of the nation's
judicial system.

Virginia's lawyers, judges, and legal

scholars pioneered professional techniques and often
migrated to neighboring states seeking fortune and fame.
Within those communities, Virginians frequently assumed
prominent positions among the elite.

Thus as politicians,

litigants, judges, and lawyers, the sons of the Old Dominion
played important roles in creating the legal culture of
their adopted states.

The court structures and legal

lHistorians have yet to provide students with a sound
analysis of judicial development, the rise of the bar, and
the relationship between courts and society even in a
regional context.

---------------
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procedures first fleshed out in Virginia became the
foundations upon which the southern legal system was built.2
Louisiana, however, may seem an odd choice.

Its

diverse creole culture and civilian heritage have led
historians to conclude that Louisiana 1 s legal system
represents an anachronism in American law.

Home-grown

historians have reveled in the minutiae of its uniqueness,
and mainstream American legal scholars have shied away from
studying Louisiana because of its civil law traditions.
Even scholars of codification in America have shunned the
study of Louisiana, arguing that its civilian legal system
differs too much from the marriage of codes and common law
that typified American practice elsewhere in the nineteenth
century.3

But these scholars misinterpret the origins of

Louisiana's legal system.
~ihen

the French prefect, Pierre Clement de Laussat,

arrived in Louisiana to receive the colony from Spain in
1803, he suspended all of the offices of the Spanish
government.

Laussat's actions are inexplicable since the

2A. G. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates and Republican
Lawyers: Creators of Virginia Legal Culture, 1680-1810,
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press in
Association with the American Society for Legal History,
1981), 258.
3Lawrence Friedman has recently stated that Louisiana
has no common law heritage, Lawrence Friedman, American_Law:
An Introduction, (New York: w. w. Norton & Company, 1984),
44. Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement: A
Study of Antebellum Legal Reform, (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1981), argued that Louisiana's codification
movement was ancillary to the movement in America's common
law states, "it occurred in its own very special milieu,
quite independent of law reforms elsewhere," x.
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purpose of his mission required him to receive the colony
merely for the purpose of transferring it to the Americans.
since he did not have time to restructure the legal system
before the transfer, the United States acquired a territory
totally devoid of official laws and legal institutions.
Thus, American authorities inherited a major jurisdictional
problem: the legal vacuum would have to be filled under the
watchful eyes of a cautious and distrustful anciene
population that feared the suspension of its traditional
legal customs at the moment of transfer would lead to
confusion, disfranchisement, and dispossession.
At the same time, Louisiana's entry into the United
states required the extension of certain constitutional
guarantees, some of them firmly rooted in the Anglo-American
tradition of justice.

President Thomas Jefferson and the

men he chose as territorial officials wanted to impose a
representative American system of law and justice on the new
territory, hoping that conformity in the

le~al

speed up the Americanization of Louisiana.

arena would

Jefferson,

however, was a practical man who understood that the
wholesale destruction of the civilian system might spark
resistance to the American administration.

He accordingly

advised his officials to pursue a cautious policy which
ensured basic American liberties and encouraged the
reception of American judicial principles, yet allowed the
ancienne population to retain many of its familiar legal
traditions.
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on the whole, Jefferson's policy succeeded largely
through the efforts of a bench and bar. that was dominated by
Americans, especially on the high appellate level.

The

study of Louisiana's law courts and legal culture in the
early national period chronicles the success of Jefferson's
policy.

Comparison of Louisiana to Virginia, which may be

considered a representative model of an Anglo-American
comm,::>n law jtlrisdiction, will illustrate that the two states
derived their legal systems from remarkably similar
experiences.
The question of how to study these two seemingly
disparate systems raises difficult research problems.
Parish and county records are far from complete and offer
more to social historians than to legal or political
scholars, since the lower courts' records mainly reflect
local considerations.

Although local legal concerns are

useful tools in uncovering the intricacies of the legal
system, the role of the judiciary in the development of the
states' higher courts of appeal is a more attractive
subject.

In those courts, judges defined their

jurisdictions, set standards of practice and education for
the bar, and articulated time and again the role of the
judiciary within the limits of their respective
constitutions.

As yet, the history of these early

jurisdictions has attracted the attention of few scholars.
General studies of Virginia legal institutions have
been written.

A. G. Roeber's Faithful Magistrates and
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Republican Lawyers offers the most consistent treatment from
the revolutionary through the early national period.

After

describing the Old Dominion's legal system from the
beginning through the American Revolution, Roeber argues
that the republican ideology of the era assisted Virginians
in a major effort to transform their jurisdiction into a
forward-looking model of Ainerican justice.

By the early

nineteenth century, Virginians recreated their courts, law,
and bar into modern, American institutions, creating a
wholly new jurisdiction for the Old Dominion.4

Roeber,

however, is concerned with an ideological investigation of
the legal system as a whole and does not deal with specific
courts in detail.
Two older institutional studies probe the history of
Virginia's courts.

Unfortunately, Oliver P. Chitwood and

George Lewis Chumbley ended their investigations with the
American Revolution.5

Hugh Rankin's study of criminal

proceedings before the General Court also stopped short of

4Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, passim. Roeber's
critics have accused him of overstating the dynamic aspects
of Virginia's revision its courts and legal system. J.
Thomas Wren, has even argued that Roeber has not only
misunderstood the ideology at work in the Virginia
commonwealth, but also weakened his analysis by employing
Morton Horwitz's transformation thesis.
5oliver P. Chitwood, Justice in Colonial Virginia,
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1905);
George Lewis Chumbley, Colonial Justice in Virginia: The
Development of a Judicial System, Typical Laws and Cases of
the Period, (Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1938).
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the early national period.6
Thomas R. Morris's, The Virginia supreme court: An
Institutional and Political Analysis, offers a substantial
treatment of Virginia's appellate system; however, Morris
focuses on analyzing the modern court.

Consequently, he

offers only a bare-bones institutional description of the
early court, a list of its judges, and a brief treatment of
the conception of judicial review.7
John Thomas Wren's critical legal study "Republican
Jurisprudence: Virginia Law and the New Order, 1776-1830 11
presents a detailed analysis of the jurisprudence of the
court of Appeals. 8

Wren argues that the decisions of the

court placsd a "conservative gloss" on the republican
settlement of the Revolution in Virginia.

Judges adhered to

the ideals of the Revolution, but in a pragmatic and
conservative way, usually deferring to the legislative will.
Wren's investigation represents the only detailed discussion
of the jurisprudence of Virginia's Supreme Court; however,
it does not deal closely with the men who sat on the bench
or the procedures they developed.
Study of Virginia's judges and its bar are scarce.
6Hugh F. Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings in the
General Court of Colonial Virginia, (Williamsburg: Colonial
Williamsburg, 1965).
7Thomas Robbins Morris, The Virginia supreme Court: An
Institutional and Political Analysis, (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1975).
8John Thomas Wren, "Republican Jurisprudence: Virginia
Law and the New Order, 1776-1830, 11 (Ph. D. diss., College of
William and Mary, 1988).
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Biographies of St. George Tucker, Spencer Roane, and Edmund
Pendleton9 focus on their roles as shapers of the Old
Dominion's political tradition rather than their
contributions as appellate court judges.

Of these, Charles

T. Cullen in "St. George Tucker and the Law, 11 presents

th~

only real glimpse of how a judge in the post-Revolutionary
period influenced the growth of the state's legal system.
Most of the literature on Virginia's early lawyers and
judges is relegated to brief, antiquarian (and largely
unreliable) memorials and sketches in nineteenth-century bar
journals.

Much of the scholarship in the bar journals,

however, was executed by reporters who, quite often, were
relatives, friends, or students of the subjects.
No procedural studies of the early court exist.
Specialized studies of court rules, the relationship between
the bench and the bar, and the use of judicial decisions a.nd
statutes are desperately needed.

One asp8ct of the

relationship between the bench and bar, however, has been
studied--legal education.
subject,

w.

In the best analysis of the

Hamilton Bryson employs a biographical study of

9Mary Haldane Coleman, st. George Tucker, Citizen of No
Mean city, (Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1938); Charles T.
Cullen, 11 St. George Tucker and the Law in Virginia, 17721804,11 (Ph. D. diss., University of Virginia, 1971); Rex
Beach, "Judge Spencer Roane, A Champion of States' Rights,"
(M. A. thesis. University of Virginia, 1941); Clyde c.
Gelbach, " Spencer Roane of Virginia, 1762-1822, A Judicial
Advocate of states Rights," (Ph. D. diss., University of
Pittsburgh, 1955); Margaret E. Horsnell, "Spencer Roane:
Judicial Advocate of Jeffersonian Principles," (Ph. D.
diss., University of Minnesota, 1967); David J. Mays, Edmund
.Pendleton, 1721-1803: A Biographv, (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), 2 vols.
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every major Virginia law professor from George Wythe (17261806) to Ralph Tunnicliff Catterall (1897-1978), but he

doe~

not investigate the role of the court in policing the
standards of legal education in the Old Dominion.10
Nonetheless, sketches provided by Charles Cullen, E. Lee
Shepard, George Curtis, and Bryson himself offer an
excellent overview of the impact of individual professors on
the study of law in the Old Dominion.

Work in progress by

E. Lee Shepard promises an even more comprehensive approach.
Thus the history of the appellate courts in the Old
Dominion presents an intriguing topic for historical
analysis.

Basic intellectual and institutional questions as

well as the history of the state's jurisdiction remain to be
considered.

Their coverage will offer a vibrant

illustration of the inner workings of the judicial aspects
of early American state-building.
Louisiana's high court of appeals presents an even more
challenging topic.

So little has been written about this

state's early courts that even the most humble contribution
will provide valuable insight.

Most of Louisiana's legal

history consists of specialized studies of the fine points
of civil law in legal publications.

Since this literature

is so prevalent and so specialized, it has caused historians
to interpret Louisiana as a unique, almost mystical
jurisdiction, whose study is open only to civil law experts.
lOw. Hamilton Bryson, Legal Education in Virginia,l7791979: A Biographical Approach, (Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 1982).
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Moreover, the emphasis on the subtleties of the civilian
jurisdiction have obscured contributions of the common law
to Louisiana's legal heritage.

One exception to this,

however, may be glimpsed in warren Billings' bibliographical
study "The Sources of Louisiana's Legal History," which
provides not only a solid analysis of both primary and
secondary sources but compelling suggestions on the
opportunities for research in the fie1d.11
The best general studies of Louisiana's legal system in
the early national and antebellum eras follow this standard
interpretation.

Despite their overemphasis on Louisiana's

civil heritage, these works offer informative glimpses into
the origins of the state's legal system.

In "Louisiana Law:

Its Development in the First Quarter Century of American
Rule," Samuel Groner traces the transition from territory to
state.

Groner's overarching thesis, however, centers on the

conflict between Louisiana's ancienne

populat~on

and its new

American citizens (a clash that Groner and subsequent
critics misnamed the "creole-American conflict") over the
nature of the jurisdiction.l2

Groner analyzes the motives

11warren M. Billings, "Louisiana Legal History and its
Sources: Needs, Opportunities, and Approaches," in Edward F.
Haas, ed., Louisiana's Legal Heritage, (New Orleans: The
Perdido Bay Press, 1983), 189-202.
12Groner defines "Creoles," as the various native
inhabitants of New Orleans. American-born newcomers such as
Edward Livingston, however, were allied with the 'creole'
faction, and the many members of the group which constituted
Louisiana's anciene population allied themselves with the
so-called 'American' faction of the struggle. Moreover, the
term is problematical since outside of Louisiana, all
American born inhabitants of the Atlantic coast are referred

-------Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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behind the so-called Code of 1808 and views the creation of
the legal system as a triumph for the civilian oriented
members of the ancienne population.l3
Elizabeth Gaspar Brown's "Legal Systems in Conflict:
1804-1812 11 and "Law and Government in the Louisiana
purchase: 1803-1804" offer fine legal analyses of the
territorial period.

Brown, like Groner, portrays the

ancienne population and American groups in an adversarial
relationship which culminates in the adoption of the Digest
of 1808, again seen as a triumph for the civilians.
Consequently, Brown does not consider the role of English
and American judicial and legal traditions in creating the
state's mixed jurisdiction.l4
Following the traditions established by Groner and
Brown, George Dargo also focuses on the •creole-American
conflict' in his Jefferson's Louisiana.

Dargo, like his

intellectual predecessors, places most of his emphasis on
the compilation of the Digest of 1808 and on the celebrated
batture case which involved the ascendancy of certain
aspects of civil law as the basis for r.ouisiana' s private
to as "creoles," therefore, many of the so-called
"Americans" in this conflict could technically be considered
"creole."
13samuel B. Groner, "Louisiana Law: Its Development in
the First Quarter Century of American Rule," Louisiana Law
Review, (January 1948), 350-382.
14Elizabeth Gaspar Brown "Legal Systems in Conflict:
Orleans Territory, 1804-1812, 11 American Journal of Legal
History, (1957), 35-75; "Law and Government in the Louisiana
Purchase: 1803-1804 1 11 Wayne Law Review, 2 (1956), 169-189.
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law.

Although buried inside Dargo's analysis (which is

aptly subtitled the "Clash of Legal Traditions") is the
crucial statement tha'c. the civilian emphasis of Louisiana 1 s
legal tradition applies only to specific areas of private
law, the overarching tone and exposition of Dargo's study
obscures that telling admission.15

By emphasizing the

batture controversy, Dargo leaves room for a broader
interpretation of the role that the territorial appellate
courts played in creating Louisiana's mixed jurisdiction.16
Richard H. Kilbourne, Jr.'s A History of the Louisiana
civil Code: The Formative Years. 1803-1839 follows in the
tradition of Groner, Brown, and Dargo,17 but takes on added
jurisprudential sophistication.

By analyzing the social,

political, and legal conditions which led to the drafting of
the Digest of 1808 and the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825,
Kilbourne presents a thoughtful analysis of the development
of Spanish legal conventions in Louisiana.

He rightly

15George Dargo, Jefferson's Louisian~: Politics and the
Clash of Legal Traditions, (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1975), 171.
16:r.ruch of what Dargo left out may be gleaned from an
investigation of the records of the Superior Court for the
Territory of Orleans and from Lewis Kerr's An Exposition of
the criminal Laws of the Territory of Orleans, (New Orleans:
Published in Pursuance of an Act of the Legislature of the
Territory, Entitled, 11 An Act for the Punishment of Crimes
and Misdemeanors," (sect. 48), Passed May 4, 1805; rept. Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., 1986).
17Richard H. Kilbourne, Jr., A History of the Louisiana
civil Code: The F~ ·mative Years. 1803-1839, (Baton Rouge:
The Center of civll Law studies, published by The
Publications Institute Paul M. Hebert Law Center Louisiana
state University, 1987).
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concludes that the early codes of Louisiana drew much more
from the Spanish legal tradition than from the French.
Also, via a selective analysis of the jurisprudence of the
Superior Court for the Territory of Orleans and the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, Kilbourne reveals the existence of a
strong common law tradition in Louisiana--a tradition based
on Spanish civil law!

English and American principles of

law and jurisprudence do not concern Kilbourne's study.
Elizabeth Gaspard's "Rise of the Louisiana Bar" presents a
fine starting point for a history of the state's bar.
Although her work focuses on the period from 1813 to 1840
and does not consider the territorial period, it offers
revealing evidence about the state's early legal culture.
Most important, Gaspard chronicles the doininance of American
attorneys, pointing out that only 13% of the state's
attorneys could boast Creole origins.18
On legal education, Warren M. Billings's "A Course of
Study" explores the requirements that the early judges set
for prospective members of the bar.

His study identifies

the law books assigned by the judges and assesses the
profound impact of those works on the state's law and
jurisprudence, however, a large-scale attempt at defining
the role of the court in ministering to the modernization of

18Elizabeth Gaspard, "Rise of the Louisiana Bar,"
Louisiana History, (Spring 1987), 183-197; Gaspard is
currently at work on a dissertation which will present a
larger scale history of the bar during this period.
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legal education in Louisiana remains untried.l9
Louisiana's judicial history is almost non-existent.
Although specialized studies of the role of the judge in
Louisiana in the modern period hint that aspects of the
common law principle of stare decisis20 owe their origins to
Louisiana's early courts, they do not follow up that insight
into the state's legal history.

The best of these studies

is Joseph Dainow's The Role of Judicial Decisions and
Doctrine which probes into various differences between the
mixed jurisdictions of Quebec, Louisiana, South Africa,
France, Germany, Scotland, and Israel.

Jean Baudouin•s

analysis of the impact of common law on the legal syste1:ts of
Louisiana and Quebec presents the most useful investigation
of Louisiana's courts.

Baudouin points out that Quebec's

present-day judges adhere to doctrine much more closely than
th~ir

counterparts in Louisiana, who must mingle stare

d~ci~is

into their decisions (this requirement is still

evident after the civilian renaissance of the 1940s).
Albert Tate, Jr., further builds on Baudouin's distinctions
as he analyzes the differences between civilian judges
France and Louisiana.

~n

Tate argues persuasively that

Louisiana's judges are trained to practice in an entirely
different milieu from those in civilian jurisdictions.
Although both of these studies concentrate on the role of
19warren M. Billings, "A Course of studies: Books that
Shaped Louisiana Law," in Billings, ed., A Law Unto Itself:
Essays in the History of Louisiana Law, (forthcoming).
2Dsee appendix I.
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the judge in modern Louisiana, it is important to recognize
that the judicial procedures that they discuss grew out of
the experiences of the superior court and supreme court
justices of the early national period.21
Recent efforts to investigate the history of
Louisiana's ten constitutions also shed light on the Supreme
Court's early history.
Billings's discussion of

Of special interest is Warren
th~ ~onstitutional

convention of

1813 which tempers the conventional analysis of the 'CreoleAmerican' conflict.

In the section on the judiciary

article, Billings argues that Louisiana's ancienne
population was basically content with its "victory" in
compiling the Digest of 1808.

He points out that the

ancienne population's primary concern in the 1813 convention
was to secure equal apportionment in the legislature.
Billings's minimizes the role of the 'creole-American
conflict' on the creation of the judicial system and
suggests that the clash became subsumed by a larger contest
raging between urban and rural constituencies.22
Individual studies of the Superior Court for the
21Jean Baudouin, "The Impact of the Common Law on the
Civilian Systems of Louisiana and Quebec," Albert Tate,
Jr., "The Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The
Louisiana Experience," in Joseph Dainow, ed., The Role of
Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil Law and in Mixed
Jurisdictions, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1974), 1-23, 23-38.
22warren M. Billings, "From This Seed: The Louisiana
Constitution of 1812, 11 in Billings and Edward F. Haas, eus.,
In Search of Fundamental Law: Louisiana's Constitutions,
1812-1874, (forthcoming).
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Territory of Orleans and the Supreme Court of Louisiana are
even more scarce.

Henry Plauche Dart sketches, in the form

of an extended outline, the basic institutional structure of
the court.

Dart's study, however, is wholly narrative, and

offers no interpretation.2 3

Richard Kilbourne's assessment

of the working of the territorial court in "An overview of
the Work of the Territorial Court, 1804-1808, A Missing
Chapter in the Development of the Louisiana Civil Code,"
like his book length study of the code, centers on the
reception of Spanish legal conventions.24
Robert B. Fisher, Jr.'s, "The Louisiana Supreme Court,
1812-1846: strangers in a Strange Land" presents an
especially problematic interpretation to the legal scholar.
Fisher's analytical framework, previewed by his use of
Robert Heinlan's title, is too simplistic.

He argues that

Louisiana's early justices, a group of men whose background
and selection are not covered in the essay, were common
lawyers who simply did not understand the finer points of
the civil law.

Thus, Fisher surmises, the judges fleshed

out a bastardized jurisdiction in which they marshalled
familiar tenets of the common law any time the civilian
23Henry Plauche Dart, "The History of the Supreme Court
of L011isiana," speech at the centenary of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, Louisiana Annual Reports, v. 133, (St. Paul:
West Publishing, Co., 1914}, xxx-lxi.
24Richard H. Kilbourne, Jr., "An Overview of the Work
of the Territorial Court, 1804-1808}, A Missing Chapter in
the Development of the Louisiana Civil Code," in Edward F.
Haas, ed., Louisiana's Legal Heritage, (Pensacola: The
Perdido Bay Press, published for the Louisiana State Museum,
Studies in Louisiana Culture Series, 1983}, 107-129.
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authorities stranded them.

Furthermore, Fisher suggests

that these practices marked only a temporary detour in the
court's inevitable evolution into a pure civilian
jurisdiction.25

This interpretation, while quite

understandable as a logical assumption, ignores basic
political, historical, and historiographical evidence.

The

court defined its jurisdiction in order to impose an AngloAmerican court system upon a traditionally civilian
territory.

Louisiana's early judges were hardly well-

intentioned boobs who failed to understand the civil law.
Rather, they were learned legal scholars who sought to use
their institutional positions to move their state ever
closer to a representative model of American justice.
Warren M. Billings's The Historic Rules of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana presents a wealth of information on the
origins of the early jurisdiction, but is a. documentary
edition in which Billings deliberately refrains from
analyzing his documents for the user.26

My ot..rn "From Chaos

to continuity," chronicles the important period after the
court's first constitutioual revision.
that

th~

Although I argue

court, following the 1845 constitution,

deliberately set about to mold itself into a more
25Robert B. Fisher, Jr.f "The Louisiana Supreme Court,
1812-1846: Strangers in a Strange Land," Tulane Civil Law
Forum, ( 1973) , 1-42.
26warren M. Billings, The Historic Rules of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, 1813-1879, (Lafayette, Louisiana:
Univer~ity of Southwestern Louisiana Press, published for
the Center for Louisiana Studies, u. s. L. History Series
no. 15, 1985).
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representative organ of American jurisprudence, I pay scant
attention to the formative years of Louisiana's judicial
system.

Hence I offer only tentative conclusions to explain

the mid-century objective, and I do not connect the argument
to the profound contributions of the earlier court.27
These few attempts at writing the Louisiana
court's history, as in the case of Virginia's high court,
hardly present a cogent framework for systematic historical
analysis.

Any history of either state's high appellate

courts must involve broader judicial history.

Such an

attempt must begin with an analysis of court organization
and procedure, since any interpretation of jurisprudence
loses important contextual references without attention to
practice.
Thus the comparison of Louisiana and Virginia's
appellate systems in the early national period offers
important clues not only to the origins of state government
in the two states, but to judicial development as well.

In

order to execute such a study, however, two important
questions must be considered.
The first question is what the study of such apparently
different jurisdictions can do to forward an understanding
of the legal history of the American South?

To answer that

question, it is necessary to look at the similarities in
both systems.

At the same time, both states grew out of

27Mark F. Fernandez, "From Chaos to Continuity: Early
Reforms of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1845-1852,"
Louisiana History, (winter 1987), 19-41.
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colonial settlements which, for different reasons, ended
rather abruptly, leaving the door open for legal revolution.
In both cases, and in varying degrees, the states adopted
judicial organs which allowed for sweeping changes in their
legal systems.

Both states also retained important

traditional aspects of their colonial legal orders.

The

resulting legal cultures, accordingly, reflected both
revolutionary and conservative elements of legal evolution.
In stable societies, law, of both civilian and common
law origin, is a traditional and conservative force.

Change

occurs slowly and is usually initiated by a legal and
constitutional order that is controlled by a conservative,
lawyer-dominated segment of soci2ty.

But revolutions in law

are frequent, if not prevalent, events in history.

Scholars

of comparative law posit four sets of occasions which
encourage revolutionary change: when tradition has made the
law "cumbrous and remote from social realities"; when there
is a "realistic possibility" of borrowing from foreign
systems; when there has been political and social
revolution; and when a forceful ruling elite uses law as its
instrument for a revolutionary reshaping of society. 28
The creation of judicial institutions in Virginia and
Louisiana produced both traditional and revolutionary
changes in the realm of law and legal institutions.
Traditional influences, namely the common law in Virginia
28These conditions are discussed thoroughly in Alan
Watson, The Evolution of Law, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1985) see especially pp. 110-114.
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and the civil law in Lousiana, remained strong throughout
the revolutionary phases of these early states' legal and
constitutional history.

Not only were these influences

prevalent among members of the legal community, but they
remained strong among the multifarious groups which formed
the states' social, political, and economic fabric.
conditions reflecting each precondition for
revolutionary change also existed in both states in the
early national period.

In post-Revolutionary Virginia,

centuries of practice had made the laws cumbersome and, in
some instances such as aspects of the law dealing with the
primacy of the crown, remote from social realities.

The

prospect of borrowing from foreign systems also presented
itselff hence the attraction of the civil law gained ground
in the Old Dominion.

Revolutionary ideas, both political

and social, also reared their heads, a necessary feature in
any society born of a violent revolutionary struggle.
Finally, certain factions of Virginia's ruling elite meant
to use the law as a tool to reshape society according to the
principles of the American Revolution.29
Louisiana's legal history following the Purchase
reveals a similar experience.

Traditional forces encouraged

the retention of many civilian aspects of private law.

But

cumbrous practices, especially in the area of judicial
administration offered openings for common law intrusions.

29This aspect will be discussed more thoroughly in
chapter two.
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Attention to changing social realities also informed the
reception of certain common law devices.

American

constitutional guarantees of trial by jury and habeas
corpus, for instance, necessitated the adaptation of legal
principles revolutionary to Louisiana.

Borrowing from

American and English legal structures became not only
possible but practical as American trained lawyers and
judges gained control of Louisiana's bar.

A sense of

political and social revolution emerged when Jefferson
purchased the territory from France, Congress provided for
American forms of government and representation, and when
immigrants from American dominions began pouring into
Louisiana at ever-increasing rates.

Finally, both

territorial officials and leading members of Louisiana's
legal elite desired to use the law as a tool to shape the
state into a representative model of American justice.30
Thus the comparison of Virginia and Louisiana offers
much in the way of studying legal stability and change in
the early republic.

Moreover, the resulting legal orders in

both states bear many striking procedural and substantative
similarities.

For Louisiana such similarities suggest a

revision of contemporary notions of the state's role in the
American legal system.

30That they sought to do so cautiously and in moderate
terms reflects Jefferson's eagerness to provide for a smooth
assimilation of Louisiana into the United States. But the
caution and conciliation of Jefferson and his territorial
appointees should not hide the fact that they eventually
hoped to turn Louisiana into a model of American justice.
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The second question necessary to a comparison of
Virginia and Louisiana appellate systems is what the
contrast can reveal about each jurisdiction.

For Virginia

an in-depth analysis of the judicial settlement which
followed the American Revolution will illustrate--within the
boundaries of the legal community--the effect of the
Revolution on the state's laws and legal institutions.
Carrying the argument into the early national and antebellum
periods will test the resiliency, or lack thereof, of. the
revolutionary settlement.

In the case of Louisiana, the

comparison with Virginia will question whether or not
Louisiana's legal order should be viewed as an anomaly in
the American judicial system.
Questions of legal history notwithstanding, the
comparative investigation of the two jurisdictions will shed
light on important and overlooked aspacts of the political,
intellectual, economic, and social character of each
community.

Since courts constitute the most active arena in

which citizens and state interact, the history of judicial
bodies--especially in regard to constitutional, ideological,
and mundane forms of litigation--illustrates not only the
challenges faced by growing communities, but the
intellectual and pragmatic ways in which the communties seek
to resolve the problems.
For both states it is vital to recognize that courts
are political creations: judges are either elected officials
or they owe their appointments to them; lawyers depend on
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the leadership of judges to regulate professional
associations, to police ethical standards, and to establish
and to enforce procedure.

The legal establishment itself

often produces the politicians who direct the legal system
from state and national capitals.

Consequently, the

background, education, and ideological allegiance of the
judges of each state form a major part of the investigation.
As John c. Calhoun pointed out in the nineteenth
century, law serves a universal purpose in society--to
protect the individual from the community and vice versa.31
From this standpoint, it matters not whether a particular
society adopts a specific legal system.

All that matters is

that some accepted form of regulation is employed to direct
individual and corporate relationships.

Consequently,

application of civilian or common law principles is really
unimportant to the development of social stability.

on the

other hand, the choice of one system over another speaks
directly to the character of a particular society--whether
it allows its legal community to interpret and to innovate
upon its law via the courts through the consistent use of
precedent, or whether it binds its lawyers and

~udges

by an

inflexible series of codes.32
31John c. Calhoun, "Disquisition on Government," Works
of John c. Calhoun, (New York: 1863), 4 vols., 15, 16, 25;
this is analyzed carefully in James Willard Hurst, The
Growth of American Law: the Lawmakers, (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1950), 439-447.
32For a detailed examination of both forms of law, see
appendix I.

-------
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In Virginia, nearly two centuries of settlement had
established the ascendency of common law.

But in the late

eighteenth century, the civil law gained respectability and
attractiveness in the Old Dominion.

By the early nineteenth

century, calls for a uniform code began to echo in the
state's halls of justice.

Louisiana's judicial history on

the other hand began with civilian precepts, until in the
nineteenth century American and English precedents began to
inform its judicial discourse.

The attraction of the civil

law remained prominent, especially among Louisiana's creoles
and their political allies.

The initial stages of this

comparison, accordingly, reveal two systems moving ever
closer to the conception of a mixed jurisdiction, though
from opposite directions.

That Louisiana arrived at that

juncture earlier in its history than other states merely
reflects the break with tradition orchestrated by the
Purchase.

The Virginia example reveals that the common law

jurisdictions of the new nation were not far behind the
example at the mouth of the Mississippi.
Such profound legal changes have less to do with
communal attitudes and ideologies than with the role of
lawmakers in their respective societies.

The judges,

lawyers, and politicians of any particular community
determine the extent to which the law is written, applied,
and interpreted.

Thus, in the legal realm of society,

change moves usually from the "top down."

Members of

society's elite read and apply the law and inform their

- - - - - - - - ----·-
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readings by ideological and environmental world-views.33
In comparing the judicial organization of Louisiana and
Virginia, therefore, the historian must attend to the battle
for cultural hegemony that is reflected in the ideologies of
the members of the bench and bar.

The study of these elites

in competition allows for the incorporation of both
ideological and environmental considerations.34

Thus the

nineteenth-century movement from "moral" or republican legal
principles to more practical applications may be glimpsed in
its social context by examining the institutional
development of Virginia and Louisiana's appellate bodies.35
Any story reads best when begun at the beginning.
Unfortunately! to investigate the long and diverse colonial
backgrounds of these two systems in great detail would prove
3 3A strong case for this interpretation of change in
the law is in Arthur A. Leff, "Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection," Yale Law Journal,
(November 1970) 1 1-46. Nonetheless, it is evident that
social conditions may also force changes in the law from the
"bottom up" as ·the courts respond to various upheavals in
society. Excellent examples are in Eugene D. Genovese, Roll
Jordan Roll, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975)i and E. P.
Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act,
(Ne~1 York: Pantheon Books, 1975).
34The flexibility of the cultural hegemony model is
hailed in T. J. Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural
Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," American Historical
Review, (June 1985), 567-594; and the usefulness of using
the model for a "top down" approach is considered in John
Patrick Diggins, "The Misuses of Gramsci," Journal of
American History, (June 1988) 141-145.
35An excellent example of this type of analysis in
Kentucky's Federal District Courts is Sandra F. VanBurkleo,
"'That Our Pure Republican Principles Might not Whither•:
Kentucky's Relief Crisis and the Pursuit of 'Moral Justice,'
1818-1826," (Ph. D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1988).

- - - - - - - - - --·-
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to be an onerous and largely unnecessary task.

Therefore,

the narrative will begin from the moment each dominion
entered the Union--Virginia in 1776 and Louisiana in 1803.
Chapters two and three are concerned with the establishment
of the two jurisdictions and their structural foundations.
Chapters four and five investigate the structure and
jurisprudence of the two systems and the contribution of
their judges in the courts• developmental phases.

Chapter

six examines and compares the judiciary of both states at
the time they reached full maturity near the end of the
Jacksonian era and draws basic conclusions about how the
judicial settlements influenced antebellum justice.

At the

center of the study is the question of how Anglo-American
principles became part of Louisiana's legal heritage.

The

comparison of Louisiana with the Old Dominion, therefore,
centers on illustrating

~he

similarities between the two

systems as well as how Virginia natives influenced the
development of Louisiana's legal culture.

The impact of

Anglo-American legal principles on Louisiana and of civilian
precepts on American jurisdictions began during the early
national period.

Louisiana was the first jurisdiction to

confront American jurists with the problem of integrating
two systems of law, but the confrontation continued
throughout the United states in the nineteenth century.
Comparison of Louisiana's legal system with Virginia's,
considered by many the proto-typical southern jurisdiction,
therefore, will provide a useful frame of reference for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29
scholars interested in the development of law and justice in
the American South and West.

-----··-- -
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Chapter Two
Revolution and Reform
The Americanan Revolution wrought great changes in the
Old Dominion.

Once Virginians rejected the rule of England,

they found themselves not only in the midst of a military
engagement but also facing the responsibility of creating a
new government.

Leaders of the resistance assumed the ta::.k

of building a new political order armed only with their
experiences in colonial government and the loose ideological
principles which orchestrated their break from the mother
country.

Thus when Virginia's republicans faced their first

major test--to construct an effective government based on
institutions dedicated to ensuring the new-found treasures
of American liberty--they responded in an ambivalent
fashion, mingling truly revolutionary reforms with
traditional British ideals of law and justice.
Revolutionary activities interrupted the operation of
Virginia's governing bodies.

Early in the

c~isis,

the

courts of the Old Dominion were closed to British creditors,
effectively suspending judicial operations and making them
an important hostage in the resistance.1

Since the colony's

governing institutions received their authority from Great
Britain, the formal break with mother country in 1776
1warren M. Billings, John E. Selby, and Thad w. Tate,
Colonial Virginia: A History, (White Plains, New York: KTO
Press, 1986), 330.
30
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required Virginians to create a new governmental
establishment.
Just six days prior to the signing of the Declaration
of Independence, Virginia's revolutionary convention adopted
a new constitution and plan of governnment.

Under the

constitution, drafted largely by George Mason, Virginia was
endowed with a powerful legislative assembly embodied in a
strong House of Delegates and a moderate Senate, a weak
executive division consisting of a governor and a coordinate
council, and a judiciary department, including a high court
of appeals.

Mason, however, merely sketched out guidelines

for the judiciary department, leaving it poorly defined and
charging the legislature with the task of creating the
courts.

The convention elected Patrick Henry as the Old

Dominion's first state governor on the day after the
constitution was passed, and he was sworn in a week later.
Henry governed with advice of council until the fall, when
the first assembly convened.

Since the constitution vested

the legislative branch with the power to define the
judiciary, the creation of the judicial branch had to wait
until the legislature drafted the necessary bills to
establish courts of justice.2
When the legislature convened for the fall session of
1776, pressing wartime concerns and the multitude of details
inherent in creating a new government occupied most of the
2John E. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 1775-1783,
(Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1988),
119-121.
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assembly's schedule.

Accordingly, the fall assembly quickly

divided up according to political and personal allegiances
and animosities.

Old feuds raged between Richard Henry Lee

on one side and Benjamin Harrison and Carter Braxton on the
other.

Conservatives and radicals argued about the course

the new government should take.

Amid the fractious swirl of

Virginia politics, however, a new and revolutionary movement
began, one that would cross over the petty divisions of the
delegates and enable Virginia to take the lead in the
creation of a new brand of state government.

That the

movement began and persisted in a friendly fashion within
the tempestuous atmosphere of revolution rests largely on
the shoulders of a practical redhaired delegate from
Albemarle County.3
By the fall of 1776, Thomas Jefferson was eager to
repair the damage he perceived had resulted from the fact
that his draft of the Virginia constitution had arrived
late, forcing the convention to adopt George Mason's more
conservative document.

Moreover, Jefferson feared that

conservatives within the legislature would block efforts to
achieve a truly revolutionary settlement.

Turning down an

appointment to serve as commissioner to France, Jefferson
accepted a seat in the House of Delegates.

He used the seat

to begin a campaign to re-shape the Old Dominion into what
he perceived to be a representative republican commonwealth.
3selby, Revolution in Virginia; Dumas Malone, Jefferson
and his Time: Jefferson the Virginian, (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1948) v. 1, 247-257.

---------
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Luckily, enthusiasm for the war had not faded since the
fateful events of May 1776, nor had conservative members of
the movement yet realized their distrust of more radical
revolutionaries.

Consequently, Jefferson was able to

marshall support for his vision of Virginia from
conservatives such as Carter Braxton, Robert carter
Nicholas, and Edmund Pendleton.4

The basis for this

diverse coalition rested in the quest to equip the Old
Dominion with a judiciary, a workable system of laws, and
clear policies regarding western lands and religion.5

In

order to revamp Virginia's legal system, two things needed
to be done.

Virginia's laws had to be revised and stripped

of their monarchical vestiges and the courts had to be
recreated and opened.

Two major obstacles impeded the

speedy recreation of the legal system--the financial
implications inherent in opening the courts to British
creditors,6 and the questionable nature of the new
government's authority.?
4selby, Revolution in Virginia, 138-140.
5The questions regarding western lands and religion,
however, are of little concern to this investigation.
6selby, Revolution in Virginia, 148; Emory G. Evans,
"Planter Indebtedness and the Coming of the Revolution in
Virginia," WMQ, 3rd ser., 19 (1962), 511-533;
,
"Private Indebtedness and the Revolution in Virginia, 17761796," WMO, 3rd ser., 28 (1971), 354-374.
?That is, once a shadow government had been set up to
replace the king's governing hand. The American attachment
to jurisdictio, the problems it presented to
revolutionaries, and the manner in which it influenced the
development of the American constitution, and by inference
the constitutions of the states, is ably sketched in Stanley
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The financial implication of opening the courts was
simple.

Tidewater planters built their society on tobacco.

Marketing the leaf, however, posed significant problems.
Mercantile selling strategies and the pressures of
overproduction left most of Virginia's gentry susceptible to
the boom and bust cycles of a staple economy.

This economic

situation influenced the creation of a social structure in
which status increasingly came to be judged according to
land ownership and the accoutrements of English gentry life.
The symbols for Virginia's "golden age" became great
Georgian plantation houses and lavish displays of wealth and
luxury, thus an enormous amount of capital was expended
merely to keep up appearances.

Cyclical expansion of the

tobacco economy, however, curtailed the availablility of
currency and forced the planters to become more and more
dependent upon "next year's crop," and the availability of
foreign credit.

In addition to consumption, the extension

of capital through informal networks throughout the
Chesapeake forced the planters, both large and small, to
become tangled in a complicated web of credit alliances.
Neighbor owed neighbor, planters owed foreign creditors, and
credit alliances had become the central feature of the
regional economy.

These tendencies created a tobacco

N. Katz, "The American Constitution: A Revolutionary
Interpretation," in Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and
Edwin c. Carter II, eds., Beyond confederation: Origins of
the Constitution and American National Identity, (Chapel
Hill: University of North carolina Press, published for the
Institute of Early American History and Culture,
Williamsburg, Virginia, 1987,), 35-37.
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culture mentality that embraced debt as the central feature
of its ideology.8
8Although Jefferson estimated that the preRevolutionary British debt amounted to L2,000,000 sterling,
and other contemporary estimates rated it at nearly
L2,700,000, recent scholars have emphasized the fact that
smaller, less formal debts actually comprised the bulk of
the Chesapeake debt Evans, "Planter Indebtedness," 5lln;
Jacob Price, France_and the Chesapeake: A History of the
French Tobacco Monopoly. 1674-1791. and of Its Relationship
to the British and American Tobacco Trades, v. 2 (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1973);
, Capital and
Credit in the British Overseas Trade: The View from the
Chesapeake,l700-1776, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1980);
, "Economic Growth of the
Chesapeake and the European Market, 1697-1775, 11 Journal of
Economic History, XXIV (December 1964), 496-511; Timothy
Breen, Tobacco Culture: The Mentality of the Great Tidewater
Planters on the Eve of Revolution, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985), passim; Robert A. East, "The
Business Entrepreneur in a Changing Colonial Economy, 17631795," Journal of Economic History, VI (1966 supplement),
16-28; Myra L. Rich, "Speculations on the Significance of
Debt: Virginia, 1781-1789, 11 VMHB, LXXVI (1968), 301-317;
Louis Morton, Robert Carter of Nomini Hall: A Virginia
Tobacco Planter of the Eighteenth Century, Williamsburg:
Colonial Williamsburg, Inc., 1945), 203; John J. McCusker
and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British North America,
1607-1789: Needs and Opprotunities for study, (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, published for the
Institute of Early American History and Culture,
Williamasburg, Virginia, 1985), 138-139. An important
feature of this system is that planters often became
creditors to their neighbors as well, increasing the role of
credit in the Chesapeake economy, Aubrey c. Land, "Economic
Behavior in a Planting Society: The Eighteenth Century
Chesapeake," The Journal of Southern History, XXXIII
, "Economic Base and
(November 1967), 471, 478-479;
Social Structure: The Northern Chesapeake in the Eighteenth
Century," Journal of Economic History, XXV (December, 1965),
649. These relationships affected debtors and creditors
alike, Samuel M. Rosenblatt, "The Significance of Credit in
the Tobacco Consignment Trade: A Study of John Norton &
Sons, 1768-1775," WMO 3rd ser. XIX (July 1962), 386, 399.
For a good overview of how these economic relationships
influenced the revolutionary character of Virginia see Marc
Egnal and Joseph A. Ernst, "An Economic Interpretation of
the American Revolution," WMO, 3rd ser., XXIX (1972), 1-32;
Marc Egnal, A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American
Revolution (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1988) .
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Virginians of the revolutionary era were no strangers
to the pressures which dependency on British capital could
place on their liberty.9

Increasing disagreements between

the provinces and the metropolitan government over colonial
policies following

~he

Seven Years' War, and the failure of

Scottish lending institutions led to the curtailment of
British loans and ushered in a credit crisis in 1772.
Because of their reliance upon British credit, Virginians
suffered greatly in the affair.

As consignment merchants

such as John Norton & Sons stopped extending credit to their
clients in the colonies, planters were forced to seek
alternative measures to finance their activities.

Some of

these alternatives, such as th.e substitution of English with
Scottish lenders, alleviated the problems to a certain
extent, but the

plante~s

remained in difficult straits

throughout the crisis.10
Those troubled times were a vivid memory for the
revolutionaries who met and argued about which course the
new Virginia government would likely take.

Heaped on top of

those remembrances were the pressing needs of a nation at
war.

In Virginia, as in the other colonies, the war once

again interrupted credit, creating a monetary crisis which
impeded the capitalization of both old and new ventures.
Virginians worried that opening the courts to British
9Egnal and Ernst, "Economic Interpretation," 1-32.
10Richard B. Sheridan, "The British Credit Crisis of
1772 and the American Colonies," The Journal of Economic
History, 20 (June 1960), 175-177, 185.
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investors would severely threaten their monetary reserves.ll
Accordingly, their consternation over opening the courts
combined with legislative battles over law reform and legal
independence to delay the creation of the court system.
Even after the General Assembly created new courts they
remained closed to British merchants until 1793.12
The obstacle of debt collection, however, was not the
only restriction on the establishment of Virginia's legal
system.

As Virginia's revolutionaries set about one of

their first tasks--revising the Old Dominion's laws--they
brooded, as did their colleagues in the other rebellious
provinces, that their newly elected representatives lacked
the erudition and the authority needed to curb legislative
excess.

Although out of step with contemporary British

ideas of constitutional theory, anglicized colonists
ew~raced

revolution to combat what they perceived as

parliamentary violations of fundamental law and applied the
same restraint to their own legislation.

Many of the

influential revolutionaries who embraced such radical whig
ideas were lawyers trained in the common law tradition.
Their reverence for law and custom, strongly influenced by
the seventeenth-century writings of Sir Edward Coke and
llwil1iam H. Seiner, "Economic Development in
Revolutionary Virginia, 1750-1810, 11 unpublished doctoral
dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1982.
12The issue was dealt with in Jones v. Walker, w. A.
Low, "Merchant and Planter Relations in Post-Revolutionary
Virginia, 1783-1789, 11 VMHB 61 (1953), 308-318. For a
thorough edition of Jones v. Walker, see Hobson et al., The
Papers of John Marshall, v. 5, 264-295.
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reinforced in their own century by sir William Blackstone,
made the revolutionaries rely on their legal traditions as
checks on the excesses of government.

such reliance

influenced them to retain much that was British as they
shaped their revolutionary order.

At the same time, the

revolutionaries bowed to a new fascination with the
legislative will.l3

Once these lawyers joined in the

creation of a new republic and turned to the task of
organizing state governments, a dual reliance on tradition
and legislative innovation, with its inherent paradoxes,
dominated debates over jurisdiction in the state houses.
The dual reliance influenced Virginia's revolutionary
settlement by tempering the reform impulses of Jefferson and
his cohorts with a conservative resolve to retain as much
British legal influence as possible.
In Virginia, the attempt to reorganize the legal
system reflects the paradoxical nature of early American
assemblies.

Although manned by revolutionaries, these

assemblies often adopted conservative measures to solve
their governmental problems.

The twin quest to revise the

Old Dominion's laws and to create a state court system
illustrates how Virginia's statesmen grappled with their
constitutional paradoxes.
Revising the laws of Virginia proved to be a difficult
task, one that illustrated the ambivalent nature of the Old
Dominion's revolutionary settlement.

Although law revisals

13stanley Katz, "The American Constitution," 35.
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are usually routine endeavors (Virginia for instance had
revised its laws seven times between 1619 and 1776), the
Revolutionary revisal was fraught with legal, political, and
practical problems.
Legally, the revisors had to sift through a morass of
problems related to the state's break with the mother
country.

Virginia's constitution and Declaration of Rights,

along with the American Declaration of Independence,
effectively severed the Old Dominion's ties with Britain,
creating a legal vacuum as British and colonial statutes
were essentially negated.

In order to fill the vacuum, the

Virginia assembly passed a reception statute in 1776 making
the British common law and statutes passed before 1607 valid
in the state.

Many delegates, led by Thomas Jefferson,

agreed that the reception statute alone would not suffice,
as it excluded post-1607 statutory improvements.

Common

sense and the Anglo-American dependence on custom and
tradition dictated inclusion of those statutes as well as
other recent improvements in British and American procedure.
Accordingly, Jefferson spearheaded a drive for a wholesale
revisal of the Old Dominion's legal system.
In 1776, and for the duration of the revisal, the main
legal questions facing the revisors were: which statutes
enacted after 1607 would remain in force?

How should post-

1607 British common law set precedent in the Old Dominion?
Which Virginia statutes passed between 1619 and 1776 should
remain in force?

And how far should the revisal go in
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reforming existing rights vis-a-vis property (private law),
crime and punishment (public law), religion, and individual
rights?
Politically, the revision was influenced by two
competing factions within the General Assembly.

On the one

hand, delegates such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
viewed the revision as an opportunity for sweeping legal and
judicial reforms.

on the other hand, conservatives such as

Edmund Pendleton and Carter Braxton advocated a
reimplementation of the old colonial system and a
continuation of the status quo.

Because these factions

exerted their influence with some success on different
occasions throughout the revisal, the final product bears an
ambivalent stamp--at different times being reformist and
conservative in nature.
As if such weighty political and legal matters were
not enough, practical problems also hampered the revisal of
the laws.

The first problem stemmed from the sorry fact

that no one in the state possessed a complete, authoritative
copy of the laws in force.

Collecting those laws proved to

be a time-consuming, and in the end, impossible task.
Jefferson's insistence on a comprehensive restructuring of
both the laws and the legal system complicated matters
further as a total revision required the construction of
many bills, each subject to debate and emendation.

In

practice, then, Jefferson's influence ensured that the
process of revising the laws would take a long time.
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Finally, the lengthy nature of the revision wrought problems
of its own--the business of revamping the legal system
combined with other difficult legislative exercises related
to the Revolution and the creation of a new government for
the Old Dominion.

All of these problems lengthened the

duration of the revisal, and each was further complicated by
the state's changing political climate and the demanding
schedules of various revisors.
These legal, political, and practical problems
combined to complicate and muddle the already difficult task
of revising the laws.

Nonetheless, three distinct phases of

the revisal may be identified.

The first phase (1777-1779)

can only be described as Jeffersonian, as Jefferson
dominated the committee to revise the laws and personally
drafted much of the legislation..

Phase two (1783-1785)

centers on the Chancellors' Revisal, strongly influenced by
the conservative Edmund Pendleton, although many of the
Jeffersonian reforms of the first phase were eventually
included in the Chancellors' Revisal thanks to the political
maneuvering of James Madison.

Finally, the last phase

(1785-1792) created an ambivalent settlement as politics,
sticky technical difficulties, and personnel problems
combined to interupt deliberations in the assembly.
The first phase of the revisal, which bears Jefferson's
signature as prominently as does Monticello or the
University of Virginia, began in 1776, after the assembly
passed the reception statute that legitimated all of the
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English statutes passed prior to 1607.

Jefferson found this

measure less than adequate since all of the post-1607
improvements on British statutory legislation were excluded.
Thus in 1776, at Jefferson's insistence, the legislators
appointed him along with George Wythe, Edmund Pendleton,
Thomas Ludwell Lee, and George Mason a committee to revise
the Virginia code.14

At first, the most difficult task of

the committee consisted of identifying and collecting all of
Virginia's laws-in-force, as no one in the state possessed a
complete copy.

Once a suitable, but nonetheless incomplete,

compilation was collected, the committee agreed on revisions
and presented their report on 13 January 1777.

After

debating and amending the plan, the revisors submitted the
report on 18 June 1779.

Although there was no formal text

of the proposal, it is clear that it included a catalogue of
bills prepared by the committee, a bill declaring when laws
would go into force, Jefferson's notes on British statutes,
his musings on Acts of the Assembly (October 1777-May 1778),
an outline for a Crimes Bill, and his memorandum on future
bills to be drafted.15

Jefferson intended the revi~ion to

stamp out all vestiges of aristocratic and monarchic
14Albert Ellery Bergh, ed., The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson, Library edition, (Washington D. c.: The Thomas
Jefferson Memorial Foundation of the United States, 1903) v.
I, 62. Accordingly, the plan left the common law alone,
seeking only a revisal of statute law, Notes on Virginia,
137.
15charles T. Cullen, "Completing the Revisal of the
Laws in Post-Revolutionary Virginia," VMHB, (January 1974),
84-85; Boyd, PTJ, v. II, 305-307, 310.
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principles and to provide Virginia with a republican legal
system.

Notable innovations in the revisions were the

repeal of the laws of entail, the abolition of primogeniture
and the introduction of partible inheritance, the
establishment religious freedom and toleration of
dissenters, and a provision for general education which
would allow all citizens to acquire the knowledge necessary
for them to understand their rights and privileges as
citizens of the republic.16

Wartime concerns, however,

prohibited the successful debate of the committee's report,
and most of it was tabled in 1779, not to be taken up again
until military victory was apparent.
When the House of Delegates turned its attention to
revising the laws for the second time in 1783, they ignored
the 1779 report and created a new committee to compile all
the laws passed since the last full revisal in 1769 (a task
that the Jefferson committee had failed to accomplish in
1779).

The compilation was to be checked and amended by any

two judges of the chancery court.

The chancellors published

their revisal and presented it to the November 1785 session
of the

G~neral

Assembly.

Initially, the Chancellors'

Revisal was extremely conservative, closely resembling
colonial regulations and falling far short of legal reform.
Aware of the conservatism of the chancellors' revisal, James
Madison, wishing to preserve as much as he could of
Jefferson's earlier, more revolutionary revisal, directed
16Boyd, PTJ, v. II, 305-09.
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the report through the legislature and managed to
incorporate into it many of the reforms proposed by
Jefferson in 1779.

Madison was unable to complete the task

before the end of the session.

Since he was about to depart

for Congress, Madison engineered a bill to appoint a
committee of three to complete the revision in the next
session, ushering in the first of three committees which
oversaw the final phase of the revisal.17
John Blair, Edmund Pendleton, and George Wythe made up
the first committee that oversaw the final phase of the law
revisal.

By 1787, however, it became apparent that the

committee was not going to complete its work.

Wythe tired

of the task and refused to work on the revisal.

Pendleton

and Blair simply did not have time to complete their duties,
though Pendleton desperately wanted to finish the revisal
and urged Edmund Randolph to assume the responsibility.
Reluctant at first, because he considered many of the
revisions defective, Randolph took up the chore in 1789.

On

20 October 1789, Randolph recommended that the Assembly
appoint a new commission to revise the laws.

The old laws,

he argued, were so confused that the legislature should
forget them, collect all the acts on particular subjects,
then draft a blanket statute repealing old laws and
confirming the best features of the collected acts.l8
The Assembly listened to Randolph and appointed a new
17cullen, "Revisal," 85.
18cullen, "Revisal," 85-87.
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commission in November 1789.

Eight "revisors," Randolph,

James Innes, James Mercer, Henry Tazewell, Joseph Prentis,
st. George Tucker, John Taylor, and John Marshall were
approved on 18 November.

Under Randolph's direction, the

committee, relying on John Purvis's A Complete Collection of
All the Laws of Virginia Now in Force . . . (London, 1684),
a few extant copies of laws passed between the 1705 and 1733
revisions, Pendleton's copies of laws compiled in the 1748
revisal, personal papers of Virginia lawyers pertaining to
the 1769 revision, and the circulating copies of
Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary acts, authored a final
report which was presented to Governor Beverley Randolph on
9 October 1790.

In the final report, written by Edmund

Randolph and Joseph Prentis, the revisors pointed out that
much work still needed to be done before a complete revisal
could get underway.19
Edmund Randolph prepared a draft of a bill to repeal
all acts of the assembly not included in the revisor's
report and forwarded the bill and the report to the
assembly.

Governor Randolph submitted the report to the

House of Delegates.

Heartened at the prospect of finally

bringing the lengthy exercise to completion, but wary of the
complicated technical nature of the revisal, the delegates
appointed a nineteen-man commission, led by John Marshall,
to study the proposed revisions before final passage.

The

committee recommended an act appointing a panel of legal
19cullen, "Revisal," 87-89.
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scholars and giving them authority to complete the revision.
Under the act, which passed in December 1790, Edmund
Pendleton, Henry Tazewell, St. George Tucker, Joseph
Prentis, Arthur Lee, and William Nelson, Jr., comprised the
pane1.20
On 21 February 1791, the panel, minus Pendleton, who
declined his commission because he was swamped with work as
chief judge of the Court of Appeals, received their
appointments.

In June, 1791 the Assembly appointed James

Monroe to take Pendleton's place.

Meeting in the capital,

the revisors spent two weeks considering the provisions of
the Randolph-Prentis report.

They listed the laws prepared

in 1789, decided which post-1607 statutes deserved
retention, and after much haggling, turned their attention
to the consideration of new bills.

But the work of the

committee faltered as the members could not fit regular
meetings into their busy schedules.

When it became apparent

that the panel would fail in its assignment, Henry Tazewell
proposed a new plan of attack.

Fighting off illness,

Tazewell compiled tables demonstrating the committee's
actions and wrote a report for the legislature.

He turned

the report over to Prentis and Nelson for review, but the
twosome weakened in their task.

Tucker and Lee proposed

that the committee not report to the current session.
Rather they asked the legislature for assistance in defining
their responsibilities and for suggestions on how they might
20cullen, "Revisal," 89-90.
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present the report to the next session.

Agreeably, the

assembly authorized them to compile a new edition of the
laws, and not to create a revised code.

The legislators

also provided for the printing of 250 copies of the new
edition to be distributed to the legislature prior to the
1792 session, and they appointed John Rind as clerk to the
committee.2 1
In Spring 1792 the committee met in Williamsburg and
hammered out their edition.

After some argument over who

would oversee the draft, the committee turned the manuscript
over to John Rind to publish the revisal.

The first part of

the edition consisting of forty-four bills was printed in
July and the final thirty-seven bills were submitted to the
governor on 18 August 1792.

When the Assembly convened in

October, copies of both sections of the edition were
distributed for the perusal of the legislators.

The

legislators adopted all but five of the ninety-one bills
suggested in the committee's compilation.

After drafting

ten additional bills, the legislature ordered the revisal to
be published and distributed.

Augustine Davis printed the

work including the laws passed by the 1793 assembly, and
published the Revised code in 1794.22
The 1792 revision represented a conservative
compilation of laws rather than a new code.

The new laws,

now stripped of monarchical vestiges, contained
2lcullen, "Revisal," 90-96.
22cullen, "Revisal," 96-99.
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revolutionary principles mainly because Madison pushed
Jefferson's 1779 draft in 1785 and 1786.

Through the

efforts of Jefferson and Madison, the republican principles
which informed revolutionary ideology joined with more
conservative efforts to define Virginia's laws, such as the
first version of the Chancellors's Report of 1785, to form
the Old Dominion's legal foundation.23
The final revision covered a variety of legal issues
including constitutional matters such as apportionment,
election of public officials, habeas corpus, executive,
legislative, judicial, and military affairs; estates and
descents; levying public monies on both the state and local
level; laws dealing with maritime measures such as piracy
and confiscation; regulation of public facilities;
citizenship; slavery and servitude; punishment of crimes and
misdemeanors; supression of riots and insurrections;
ambassadorship; the College of William and Mary; public
health; livestock and breeding; education; and religious
freedom.

Since the revisal proved to be such a difficult

and unfocused exercise, it led many prominent members of the
legal community, such as st. George Tucker, to embrace the
notion of codification as an alternative to the loose

23cullen, "Revisal," 85; Edmund Pendleton to James
Madison, 19 December 1786, in David John Mays, ed., The
Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1734-1803,
hereinafter cited as PEP, 2 vols., (Charlottesville,
University Press of Virginia, published for the Virginia
Historical Society, 1967), v. II 491-492.
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application of common law and statute law.24

Because few of

Virginia's lawmakers agreed upon the philosphical, legal,
and jurisdictional issues involved in the revisal; because
the pre-1776 statutes of the Old Dominion were scattered and
difficult to compile; because the process of compiling and
revising the laws was extremely complicated and took place
amid a rapidly changing political milieu; and because the
various revisors had to fit their duties into hectic
schedules, the law revisal took a long time to complete and
its final expression fell far short of true legal reform.
As a result, the revisal provides a telling example of the
ambivalence that characterized Virginia's revolutionary
settlement.
In the end, the revisal fell well short of legal
revolution.

Nevertheless, the Jeffersonians on the various

committees did manage to influence the revisal in the four
critical areas of private law, public law, religious
freedom, and educationo

Their efforts, however, did not

succeed totally as certain revolutionary views were tempered
by conservative emendations in the assembly.

In terms of

private law, Jefferson's attack on primogeniture and entail
remained intact.

Despite strong opposition from

conservatives such as Pendleton, the statutes of descent
passed between 1777 and 1792 effectively ensured a
commitment to partible inheritance.

The attack on

24Boyd, PTJ, v. II, "Catalogue of Bills Prepared by the
Committee of Revisors," 329-335; Wood, creation of the
American Republic, 302.
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primogeniture and entail, however, must not be viewed as a
strict revolutionary reform.

American lawyers and jurists

had long abandoned tbe notion of primogeniture, although few
colonies or new states had actually prohibited the practice.
On the one hand, Jefferson's posturing in favor of partible
inheritance did little more thun confirm pre-Revolutionary
practice.

On the other hand, Jefferson's attack on British

standards of private law marked a defeat for conservative
forces within the assembly, gave the pre-Revolutionary
movement toward partible inheritance statutory protection,
and opened up new opportunities for land ownership and
political participation to future generations of Virginians.
Moreover, the abandonment of British practices regarding
descents forecast a movement within the American system of
law toward a more civilian-oriented view of private law, a
view which would be cemented in the next century during the
codification movement as Americans looked away from
Blackstone and toward civilian authorities such as Pothier
and Domat for direction in the realm of private law.25
Another aspect of the revisal that fell short of true
legal reform had to do with public law.

The crimes bills

provide a remarkable illustration of how even Jefferson's
own liberalism was tempered by strict adherence to British
tradition and custom.

Jefferson intended for the crimes

bills to produce a more humane and enlightened penal code.

• , 11

25van Burkleo, "That our Pure Republican Principles . .
passim.
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But the final drafts "did little more than restate generally
accepted practices concerning capital offenses.n26

Even

Jefferson himself realized that the penal code failed to
reform criminal punishments.

In his autobiography, the Sage

praised the abolition of capital punishment, save in cases
of treason or murder.

Although Jefferson commended the

revisal for substituting hard labor in favor of the death
penalty, he described his revulsion at the retention of the
ancient principal of Lex talionis in some cases.27

But the

failure to reform the criminal code into a more enlightened
expression of the law weighed heavily on Jefferson's mind.
By his own admission, it was the reverence for British
tradition which stayed the hand of Jefferson and the other
revisors on the issue of penal reform.

According to

Jefferson,
I thought it material not to vary the diction of the
ancient statutes by modernizing it, nor to give rise to
new questions by new expression. The text of these
statutes had been so fully explained and defined, by
numerous adjudications, as scarcely ever now to produce
a question in our courts.
Thus, the revisors, at Jefferson's behest, merely reformed
the style of the

earlier statutes by eliminating their

"verbosity, their endless tautologies, their involutions of
case within case, and parenthesis within parenthesis, and
their multiplied efforts at certainty, by saids and
26Boyd, PTJ, 505.
27The legal principle of Lex Talionis [retaliation]
originated in Mosaic law "an eye for an eye," etc. Black,
Law Dictionary, 822.
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aforesaids, by ors and by ands . • . u28
Jefferson's central concerns,
revised the penal code.

True reform, one of

escaped the committee as it

Once again, strict adherence to

custom restrained the hand of innovation, making the crimes
bills one of the truly illustrative aspects of the
arnbivalent revolutionary settlement.
Jefferson won his greatest successes in forcing the
legislature to attend to the areas of religious freedom and
education.

The statute of religious freedom owed much to

the growing political power of the state's evangelical
protestants.

And the bills governing education reflected

the republican commitment to education.29
Thus the revisal represented moderate success both for
Jeffersonian and conservative legislators--many reforms were
implemented, others blocked.
about a true legal revolution.

The settlement failed to bring
Nonetheless, the revisal of

the laws did ensure that some aspects of Post-Revolutionary
Virginia would be drastically different from its colonial
predecessor.
The effort to create Virginia's court system
parallelled, indeed was part of, the revisal of the laws.
Before the Revolution, justice was administered in county
courts, usually dispensed by lay magistrates, with special
28Bergh, Writings, 64-65.
29Much to Jefferson's chagrin, the educational bills
failed to pass the legislature. For an analysis of the
statute on religious freedom see F. J. Hood, "Revolution and
Religious Liberty: The Conservation of the Theocratic
Concept in Virginia," VMHB (1971).
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sessions of oyer and terminer to handle criminal
proceedings.

Appeals were made to the Virginia council

sitting as the General Court.

Vice-Admiralty courts

controlled maritime jurisdiction with appeals to British
admiralty courts.

Finally, the General court possessed

original chancery jurisdiction, although appeals could be
made to the Privy council.30
Suspension of the courts, however, forced the
legislators to reconstruct the system from the ground up.
Not only would they have to provide for county justice, but
in the area of appeals, they had to fill the gaps left by
the separation from England.

Accordingly, Virginia's court

revision consisted not only of a reconstruction of the
county and General Courts, but the creation of an entirely
new system containing

chancery and admiralty courts as well

as a court of appeals.

The Court of Appeals marks a major

reform, as appeals before 1776 came under the purview of the
General Court.

Thus the Court of Appeals represents the

first independent appellate tribunal in the history of the
Old Dominion.
As part of the revisal of the laws, Thomas Jefferson
led the drive to recreate the courts.

Although the

legislative reconstruction of the courts proceeded through
committees in the General Assembly, Jefferson drafted the
3 OGeorge Le\vis Chumbley, Colonial Justice in Virginia,
(Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1938), 55-76; for a fine
discussion of these types of appeals, see the introduction
to Joseph H. Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council from the
American Plantations.
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court bills which instituted Virginia's court system.
Originally outlined in his draft of the Virginia
constitution, the Sage's ambitious proposals received bitter
opposition from conservatives in the legislature.
Nonetheless, the restructuring of the Old Dominion's courts
eventually succeeded, and they remain one of the lasting
monuments of the American Revolution.31
Many problems plagued the reconstruction of the
courts.

At an ideological level, the growing desire to

separate the powers of the branches of government posed
peculiar difficulties for legislators charged with creating
a republican judiciary.

British constitutional theory had

long embraced the conception of mixed government.

In

practice, the branches of the British government were
inextricably intertwined.

The judiciary originally

represented an extension of executive authority.

Since the

Whig theorists who informed the rhetoric of American
revolutionaries feared executive corruption most of all, the
judiciary had to become and tc remain independent.

British

courts had indeed become independent in the aftermath of the
Glorious Revolution, but in colonial Virginia, judicial
power remained a function of the legislative branch as the
council sat as both the upper house of the legislature and
as the General Court.

Virginians, however, provided for a

separation of powers when they framed the 1776 constitution.
But Virginians refined their thinking on the matter of
31Boyd, PTJ, vol. I, 605, 607.
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separation of powers throughout the post-revolutionary era.
In the early stages of independence the term merely meant
the removal of executive authority from legislative and
judicial prerogatives and the elimination of possibilities
for dual office holding.

By the late 1780s, the idea of

separation of powers had matured into a conception of three
separate and independent governmental branches.
Accordingly, as ideas about separation of power matured, so
did the conception about the role of the various branches in
the governmental process.

For Virginia, the maturation of

these ideas evolved into a movement to create an independent
judiciary.
For the Old Dominion, the evolution of the idea of
separation of powers signalled a major legal and
governmental reform.

Physical separation of judicial and

appellate responsibility from the council of state insured
that the council's function would become purely executive.
Construction of an independent judiciary with a high court
of appeals created a new governmental official, the high
court judge.

The emergence of such judges and their attempt

to define their role in government represents one of the
most important and neglected aspects of the history of the
early republic.32

32The best discussion of the British conception of
mixed government, ministerial corruption, and its impact on
the American political system is in Bernard Bailyn, Origins
of American Politics, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
1967; on the separation of powers see Wood, Creation of the
American Republic, 157-160; 446-463.
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Replacing British institutions for resolving disputes
and overlapping jurisdictions, however, were the most vexing
structural problems facing the Committee for Courts of
Justice.

During the colonial period legal actions in

Virginia followed two basic paths: domestic or metropolitan.
Domestic suits consisted of home grown litigation in the
county courts and appeals to the General Court.
Metropolitan suits were varied in nature: appeals from the
General Court; disputes between the General Assembly and
Parliament; some admiralty and chancery appeals were heard
in the privy council.

Separation from England did little to

change the activities of Virginia's domestic litigation,
with the exception of closing the courts to British
merchants and redefining roles of the governor and council.
The need to settle cases formerly of a metropolitan nature,
on the other hand, required Virginians to consider creating
courts of a different stripe from those which had existed in
the Old Dominion.

Thus, the Committee for Courts of Justice

not only had to replace the suspended Virginia courts but
also to provide for appeals from the general court as well
as matters of equity and admiralty.
In recognition of the enormity and complexity of the
committee's task, the House instructed it to bring in
separate bills for each area of judicial administration:
appeals, chancery, the General Court, admiralty, and the
county courts.33

on 25 November 1776, Jefferson presented

33JHD, 1 November 1776, 32-33.
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his bills to establish a court of Appeals, a High Court of
Chancery, and a bill to establish the General Court and
Assize Courts.

Two days later, the bills to create the

Court of Appeals, the General and Assize Courts were read
and committed to a committee of the whole house.

After two

more days, the bill to establish the High Court of Chancery
was read and submitted to a committee of the whole house.34
The following week, the house read through, debated,
and amended the bills.

On 4 December, the committee

delivered the bill to create the Court of Admiralty.

A day

later, the House agreed to the bills to establish the
chancery court and the assize courts, the bills were then
engrossed and read a third time.

By 9 December, the House

was still deliberating the bill to create the court of
Appeals.

Since the session was winding down, the House

resolved to put off the Court of Appeals bill till the next
session.

The legislators then turned their attention to the

Admiralty Courts.

When it became apparent that the

Admiralty bill would be the only one finished before the
session ended, the legislators tabled the bills for
chancery, the General Court, and the assize courts till the
following session, a delay agreeable to all since it put off
the question of reopening the courts to British creditors.35
On 16 December 1776 the senate returned the Admiralty
34Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 606.
35Boyd, PTJ, v. I 606-607; JHD, 4 December 1776, 82; 5
December 1776, 83.
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bill to the House with an amendment.

The bill was read and

the House agreed to the Senate's changes.

The following

day, the ballots for appointments to the Court of Admiralty
were tallied and sent to the Senate.

The Senate confirmed

the appointments and Richard Cary, William Holt, and Bernard
Moore became Virginia's first republican admiralty judges.36
But opposition by conservatives in the Assembly, the
fear of opening the courts to British creditors, and more
pressing military issues delayed the passage of Jefferson's
other court bills.

A High Court of Chancery bill and a

General Court bill did not pass until January of 1778.

The

bill to create a Court of Appeals did not pass until
December 1778. And Jefferson failed to get the assembly to
pass his county court bill.37

Despite these setbacks, the

court bills of the Revolutionary assemblies reflect much of
Jefferson's thinking on judiciary reform in the early
republic.38
The easy passage of the Admiralty Court bill owes its
success to the nature of Virginia's economy rather than
Jefferson's constitutional brilliance or his political
acumen.

Admiralty suits represented an important form of

litigation in the Old Dominion during the Revolution.

A

flurry of privateering successes against British ships in
36JHD, 17 December 1776, 100.
37For a detailed analysis of the social and political
significance of the county court bill, see below, 68-69.
38Boyd, PTJ, v. I 605-607.
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the Chesapeake Bay under the direction of Captain James
Barron influenced the Virginia Convention to create a navy.
Expecting continued success in the Bay, the delegates
created a stopgap admiralty court in the summer of 1776 to
condemn Barron's prizes.39

The Virginians' desire to

legitimate the admiralty court and to provide a more concise
blueprint for its procedures in handling prizes played a
major role in the quick acceptance of Jefferson's admiralty
bill.
Jefferson's Admiralty Court bill dealt with three
specific issues: the duties and ethics of the judges, the
jurisdiction of the court, and appeals.

In the first

section of the bill, Jefferson provided for the appointment
of three judges to be chosen by joint ballot of the two
houses and commissioned by the governor, with any two judges
making a court.

The judges of the admiralty court were

instructed in the proper oaths and actions necessary to
serve the state in republican fashion.

After swearing an

oath of fidelity to the commonwealth, the prospective judge
was required to take an oath in open court to "do equal
right to all manner of people great and small, high and low,
rich and poor, of what country or nation soever they be
without respect of persons."

Judges were prohibited from

accepting fees and gratuities not provided for in their
official salaries.

The act restricted the judges from

maintaining cases in which they were directly involved.
39selby, Revolution, 76.
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They were instructed not to delay letters or requests from
any persons before the court, and to ignore letters coming
to them from extra-legal means.

Finally, the judges were

instructed to conduct themselves "faithfully, justly and
truly according to the best of your skill and judgment, do
equal and impartial justice, without fraud, favor,
affection, or partiality.n40
The bill granted the court cognizance in all cases
previously considered under admiralty jurisdiction.

It

ordered the judges to use the regulations of the continental
congress, acts of the General Assembly, pre-1607 British
statutes and imperial laws, and Oleron and Rhodian laws,41
"so far as the same have been heretofore observed in the
English courts of admiralty" as the basis for its decisions.
Furthermore, the bill recognized the supremacy of
congressional laws over those of Virginia's General Assembly
in cases involving war criminals and fugitives, but in other
matters, the bill proclaimed the Old Dominion's laws
supreme.

Finally, in a bid to prevent competing

jurisdictions, the bill denied the admiralty court the power
40Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 645-649.
4loleron laws were developed as a code on the Island of
Oleron in the twelfth century by Eleanor of Guienne.
Richard I, Henry III, and Edward III, each adodpted them for
English practice. Citations from the Oleron laws frequently
take precedence over decisions in the British Admiralty
courts. Rhodian laws represent the oldest known maritime
code. Adopted by the people of the island of Rhodes around
900 B. c., only the articles concerning jettison survived in
the revolutionary era (see Kent's Comm., 232-233), Black,
Law Dictionary, 979, 1188.
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to judge capital cases.42
In addition to sketching out the boundaries of the
admiralty court's jurisdiction, the court bill invested the
judges with the basic powers they needed to carry out their
judgments.

The bill empowered the court to deputize

marshalls and regulated the duties of those officers; to
administer the oath of fidelity to the commonwealth to all
officers of the court; to sell perishable items impounded
for suits and to retain the monies from those sales for the
litigants; to require security for cargoes under dispute; to
award costs and executions, and to regulate the executions
by comntonwealth sheriffs subject to court penalties; to
condemn vessels; and to sell captured vessels.43
The admiralty bill also directed court procedures by
defining the method of filing libels, summoning shipmasters
or owners, holding trials, and publishing decrees in the
Virginia Gazette.

Finally, the bill provided for appeals

and writs of error to the Court of Appeals in cases
involving enemies of the United States and in suits for
values greater than an amount to be specified later.44
Jefferson's draft was passed with only minor
amendments and deletions.

Procedurally, the completed act

defined the role of the legislature in creating judiciary
bills.

By setting down the ethical standards of the judges,

42Boyd, PTJ, v. I 645-649.
43Boyd, PTJ, v.I, 645-649.
44Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 645-649.
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Jefferson (via the General Assembly) initiated legislative
action to ensure republican virtue among the members of the
bench.

He mapped out the basic boundaries of the court's

jurisdiction.

Finally, by providing for methods of filing,

summoning, trial, execution of judgments, costs, and appeals
Jefferson delineated the general jurisdiction of the new
court.45

Although recasting the admiralty court under the

jurisdiction of the state of Virginia helped to define the
role of the legislature in creating courts in the new
republic, Jefferson's court bill did little to reform
established procedure.

In fact, the admiralty bill merely

recreated the procedure of British courts under the
jurisdiction of the state of Virginia.
simple.

The lesson is

Virginia lawyers, steeped in British custom and

practice, needed to legitimate their new courts and to
define the relationship between those tribunals and the new
state assembly; but they quailed at true legal innovation.
Thus the creation of the admiralty court reflects the nature
of the ambivalent revolutionary settlement--new courts were
needed as a practical matter of separation, but the
Virginians wished to retain much of their British legal
heritage.
Structurally, however, the admiralty bill offered
important deviation from colonial practice.

In the colonial

period, the royal governor served as vice-admiral and county
45Boyd, PTJ, v. I 645-649; William Waller Hening, The
statutes at Large, "An Act for Establishing a Court of
Admiralty," v. IX, 202-206.
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courts or the general court heard cases of admiralty when
the need arose.

The passage of the admiralty bill,

therefore, represents a structural reform since it created a
separate court of admiralty and negated the governor's
authority as vice-admiral.

Both are important changes.

Vesting judicial power in a separate court reflects a
movement to streamline judicial activity and the growing
importance of admiralty cases to the state's judicial
system.

Revoking the governor's power as vice-admiral

illustrates the mouncing importance of separating judicial
authority from executive influence in late eighteenthcentury America.
The next court bill for which Jefferson engineered
passage established the High Court of Chancery.

In creating

the equity court, Jefferson followed the basic structure of
his bill to establish the admiralty court.

Like the

admiralty bill, the chancery act provided not only for the
court's general jurisdiction, but also for the method of
choosing its judges.

The court consisted of three judges to

be chosen by the joint ballot of both Houses and
commissioned by the governor.

Tenure for the judges was

based on good behavior, with a majority of the members
constituting a court.46
As in the admiralty bill, Jefferson defined the
standard of ethics that the judges would follow.

He

scripted the chancery oath along the same lines as the Court
46Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 610-620.
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of Admiralty.

Of all the oaths Jefferson prescribed, for

some inexplicable reason, this one was the only one sworn
"So Help You God."

Jefferson vested the court with general

equity jurisdiction "over all persons and in all causes in
Chancery whether brought before them by original process,
appeal from any inferior Court, Certiorari, or other legal
means."

In order to regulate the court's caseload,

Jefferson limited the court's original jurisdiction to
causes with a value over L1o.47
Unlike the admiralty court, Jefferson required the
chancery court to sit for two eighteen-day sessions per
year, one beginning on 5 April, one on 5 September
(excluding Sundays).

When the court was not in session,

however, Jefferson vested it with the power to grant
injunctions and to issue writs of ne exeat48 and "other
process allowed by the laws to be issued in time of Vacation
by the Clerk of the General Court in Chancery."

In

addition, the bill gave the judges the authority to appoint
a clerk.49
In the next section of the bill, Jefferson spelled out
the rules and procedures for filing and amending suits in
47 Boy d , PTJ, v. I, 611.
48Ne Exeat writs are issued to prohibit a person from
leaving the country. Sometimes they are used to keep a
person from fleeing a certain court's jurisdiction. The
writs are also used to restrain persons from removing
property at question in a civil action from the court's
jurisdiction.
49Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 612.
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chancery; subpoenaing litigants; taking depositions;
regulating attachments and contempt proceedings; swearing
complaints and answers; filing exceptions; formulating rules
to regulate

pleadings, answers, replies, rejoinders, and

other proceedings; examining witnesses; trying matters of
fact by jury; changing venue; hearing cases originally
assigned to the assize courts; setting aside dismissions and
reinstating suits; and correcting proceedings.

To preserve

court records, the bill provided for the clerk to keep a
general minute book and a special book relating to land
titles.

Jefferson also drafted legislation that allowed the

chancery court to issue writs of injunction and stays of
execution for all the common law courts in cases where the
value of the dispute was sufficient to admit to orignal
chancery jurisdiction (LlO}.

Paralleling the admiralty

bill, Jefferson allowed the court to hear all chancery cases
pending at the dissolution of the last session of the
General Court.

Finally, the bill granted the court the

authority to depose litigants residing outside of the
country in their own place of residence.

In order to

enforce the court's powers, the bill allowed it to receive
security for cases involving absentee defendants and to
publish its orders in the Virginia Gazette or, following
Sunday services, on the front doors of any churches which
the complaintant chose.

In cases where the defendants would

not answer, the court was empowered to appoint attorneys for
them, and provided for rehearings if the defendants were not
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served. 5°
As the legislature debated the chancery bill between
1776 and 1778, it adopted amendments to establish the seats
of the chancery court in Williamsburg and Richmond; to
refine the process for taking interrogatories; and to hear
evidence in viva voce examinations.

In a major defeat for

Jefferson, the legislature struck out clauses relating to
the court's ability to change venue.

Although Jefferson

fought vigorously to have the clauses reinstated, he failed.
Finally, the legislature set the salaries of the chancery
judges at L50o.51
The writing, amending, and passing of the chancery
bill reveals striking features of Virginia's revolutionary
settlement.

By approving the general nature of the bill,

the legislature affirmed the pattern Jefferson defined for
creating jurisdiction in the admiralty bill.

Attention to

the length of Court sessions, professional ethics, and basic
procedures illustrated the depth of the legislature's
control of the courts.52

Moreover, the legislature assured

Virginians that their long-established British rights to
both common law and equity remained secure.

In striking out

Jefferson's clauses on venue, conservative forces in the
50Boyd, PTJ, v. I 612-620.
51Boyd, PTJ, 610-620; Hening, Stat~utes, "An Act for
Establishing a High court of Chancery," v. IX 389-399.
52In fact, one might argue that in Virginia, the
legislators replaced the British notion of the judiciary as
an extension of the executive with judicial dependence on
the legislature.

-------
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legislature continued their lengthy and bitter battle
against the intrusion of the central government into the
counties.

But in the end, Jefferson won a clear victory

over the conservatives as he fended off Pendleton's attempt
to make the jury provisions of the chancery bill voluntary.
To Jefferson, making jury trials voluntary would have
obliterated their usefulness as a request for a jury from a
litigant would suggest that he distrusted the judge's
discretion.53

Finally, in vesting chancery jurisdiction,

formerly a function of the General Court, in a single
tribunal, the legislature reinforced Jefferson's vision of
establishing separate high courts with specific
jurisdictions.
Ten days after passing the Chancery Court bill, the
legislature passed Jefferson's bill "For establishing a
Court of Common Law of general jurisdiction for the more
speedy and easy administration of Justice in this
Commonwealth and for regulating the proceedings therein.n54
Following the strategy he worked out in drafting the other
court bills, Jefferson broke the bill up into three parts:
ethics, jurisdiction, and procedure.

Since the General

Court was the most familiar to Virginians, it is not
surprising that the bill to recreate it was the most
detailed and extensive of Jefferson's three successful
53Jefferson, "Autobiography," in Ford, ed., Works of
Jefferson; cf., Selby, Revolution, 156.
54Hening, Statutes, "An Act for Establishing a General
Court, v. IX, 401.
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judiciary acts.
After spelling out the oaths and general standards of
ethics, Jefferson described the jurisdiction of the court.
Primarily, the five-man General Court (any three of whom
comprised a quorum) would have jurisdiction over all persons
and causes at common law valued over LlO or two thousand
pounds of tobacco "whether brought before them by Original
process, by appeal from any inferior Court Habeas Corpus,
Certiorari, Writ of Error, supersedas, mandamus or by any
other legal ways or means •

11

The bill prescribed that

the court would sit for two sessions beginning 1 March and 1
August each year (excepting sundays).

One major difference

between the General Court bill and those for admiralty and
chancery was the creation of the office of chief justice.
According to Jefferson 1 s draft, the chief justice was to
serve as administrator over all of the court's business by
bearing teste to all of the attachments and writs awarded by
the court.55
Since the General court would be the principal court
of the commonwealth and would handle both civil and criminal
cases, Jefferson referred to previous General Court acts as
he carefully detailed the court's procedures.

He wove into

the act rules for summoning, filing, and executing judgments
in original civil and criminal actions, and suits involving
officers of the commonwealth.

The bill empowered sheriffs

to process executions based on the court's judgments.

Local

55Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 621-644.
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judges and JPs were authorized to receive bails when the
court was out of session.

And the accused were granted the

rights to counsel and to call witnesses.

Jefferson, again

concerned about preserving court records, required the
clerks to keep and to distribute order books and docket
books at the end of each court session.56
A major section of the general court act dealt with
the creation and specific rules and details of assize or
itinerant superior courts.

Mirroring British practices, the

five judges of the General Court were to divide the assize
court schedule among themselves.

In each county, a judge of

the General Court would sit on the Court of Assize.

His

judgments would then be reviewed at the following session of
the full General Court.

If confirmed, the judgments of the

assize court would have the authority of General Court
decisions.

In order to record the work of the assize

courts, Jefferson empowered each of the judges to appoint
clerks. 57
Creation of the assize courts was a controversial
proposal.

By going into the counties, the assizes brought

the authority of the state into the jealously guarded
bailiwicks of Virginia's gentry.

Not only would these

intrusions into the counties, the bastions of local power,
put state officials in a position of superiority over the
parochial elite, but also the increased presence of
56Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 621-644.
57Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 628-634.
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professional lawyers and judges would no doubt exacerbate
the already tense relations with local lay magistrates.
With Edmund Pendleton's encouragement, Jefferson introduced
this bill to the House of Delegates on 25 November 1776 and
he may have expected a bitter battle to get it passed.

When

the House of Delegates ordered the Co1nmittee for Courts of
Justice to bring in a General Court bill, they did not
mention the need for such an elaborate system of assize
courts.

Thomas Jefferson, however, titled his bill "An Act

for establishing a General Court & Courts of Assize."

The

bill was read, amended, and engrossed in the fall session.
But on 13 December 1776, the House postponed passage of the
bill until the following session.

At the commencement of

the next session, Jefferson was again named to the Committee
for Courts of Justice and ordered to bring in a bill to
create a "General Court and Courts of Assize."

In the

following deliberations and amendments, the assize section
of the bill was struck out by the senate as was Jefferson's
provision for the post of chief justice.

The delegates,

however, reinstated the office of chief justice, when it
passed the bill October 1777.58
Omission of the assize section in the General Court
Bill reflects a more difficult problem than the ordinary
political contest between Jeffersonians and conservatives.
Both conservative and Jeffersonian lawyers bemoaned the lack

58JHD, 30 October 1777, 6-7; Hening, Statutes, "Act for
. General Court," 401.
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of professionalism on the county court level.

By embracing

the notion of assize courts, the legal community could
ensure a measure of professionalism in local matters.
Familiar enemies such as Pendleton and Jefferson cooperated
in support of the assize section of the General court bill.
Thus, the defeat of the assize proposal, in political terms,
better illustrates the depth of distrust which non-lawyers
harbored against the growing legal profession rather than an
ideological split between conservatives and Jeffersonians.
Whether non-lawyers saw the extension of the assize system
into the counties as a possible source of governmental
corruption or whether they saw the intrusions of
professional lawyers as dangerous to their local hegemony,
the senators sent the judiciary a strong message in
defeating the assize section of the General Court bill.
Appeals courts were needed and wanted, but only on the
superior court level.

In the counties, original proceedings

were to remain under the purview of the local, and mainly
lay, magistrates.59
Jefferson's county court bill similarly met with
defeat rather swiftly.

Traditionally, historians have

blamed the defeat of the bill on the question of British
debts.

But Jefferson, on the advice of the delegates,

included a clause in his original draft of the bill which

59Edmund Pendleton to William Woodford, 2 January 1778,
Mays, PEP, v.I, 240; Pendleton to Woodford, 16 January 1778,
v. I, 246; Pendleton to Woodford, 31 January 1778, v. I,
247.
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denied British creditors the right to sue in Virginia
courts.

More recent evidence points to the reluctance of

conservative assembly to legislate over these local
institutions.

In the interim, most localities recreated

their county courts on their own, and by the time Jefferson
drafted his legislation, they had resumed their operations.
Failure of the county court bill restricted separation of
powers on the local level by mingling judicial, legislative,
and executive power in one body which oversaw the powerful
office of the sheriff.

Thus revolutionary ideology did not

invade the county courts via legislation, and they remained
"the bulwark of the old order.n60

More important, in

judicial matters, the county courts were able to insulate
themselves from the wave of republican reform marked by
Jefferson's revision of the court system.
The final bill in the restructuring of the courts
established the Court of Appeals in 1778.

Initially, the

assembly envisioned a legislatively elected bench consisting
of the judges of the General Court joined by three
"assistant 11 judges to hear appeals from Admiralty and
Chancery; Chancery judges and the assistants to hear appeals
from the General Court; and judges from either Chancery or
the General Court with the assistants to hear appeals from
Admiralty.

Finally, the assembly granted the Court of

Appeals jurisdiction over all cases pending appeal from the

60Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 606-607.
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General Court to the British Privy Council.61

Two annual

sessions, one in March and one in August would be held in
Williamsburg.

But before the act went into effect, the

chancellors completed their 1779 revisal of the laws.
To replace the 1778 bill, the chancellors drafted a statute
which left the twice yearly sessions intact, but revised the
constitution of the bench and more clearly spelled out its
jurisdiction and procedures.

Dispensing with the concept of

elected assistants, the chancellors provided for the court
to consist of all the members of the three high courts
sitting together, with the chancellors taking the highest
rank, followed in order by the judges of the General Court
and the Court of Admiralty.

Any five of these justices

together would constitute a court.

The chancellors adhered

to Jefferson's wording of the judges' oaths.

They gave the

court original jurisdiction for jury trials, and enabled it
to hear appeals and writs of error from the other three high
courts in cases exceeding L50 or involving a freehold or
franchise, making it the state's court of last resort.62
After defining the court's jurisdiction, the chancellors
spelled out its procedures involving appeals and writs of
error.

They provided for and defined the duties of clerks,

docketing causes, writing briefs, and certifying

61Hening, st.atutes, "An Act for Establishing a Court of
Appeals," v. IX, 522-525.
62Hening, statutes, "An Act Constituting the Court of
Appeals," v. X, 89-90.

-
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decisions. 63
By ending the practice of legislatively appointed
assistants and limiting the members of the Court of Appeals
to sitting members of the state's high courts, the
chancellors struck a blow for the developing concept of
judicial independence.

The Chancellors' Revisal, insofar as

the judges themselves defined the jurisdiction and
procedures of their own courts, provided a striking, early
example of judicial independence and the possibilities
inherent in the separation of powers.
Although Jefferson failed to have all of his reforms
passed, the court bills represent his most important
contribution to Virginia's revolutionary legacy.

Since

Jefferson's draft of the Virginia constitution arrived too
late to challenge the adoption of George Mason's more
conservative document in 1776, the reconstruction of the
courts offers the most comprehensive expression of
Jeffersonian republicanism in the development of the Old
Dominion.

Even though it was only a partial victory,

Jefferson's success assured the continuation of Jeffersonian
principles in Virginia's halls of justice.

Moreover, the

provisions for the Court of Appeals in the conservative
Chancellors' Revisal actually improved on Jefferson's
conception of court-building--a remarkable example of the
political ambivalence of the revolutionary settlement.

63Hening, statutes, "An Act . . . court of Appeals" v.
X,

90-92.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

Once they were created, the courts of the postRevolutionary settlement began operation.

In typical common

law fashion, the judges of Virginia's courts played a
creative role in defining their courts• position within the
governmental structure.

As soon as the courts opened,

Virginia's judges, as a matter of practice, began
interpreting their prerogatives as officers of the new state
government.
For the most part the Court of Appeals functioned in
routinely conservative fashion.

Nonetheless, when

constitutional questions arose, the court faced them
courageously and adhered to developing American conceptions
of government.

The most striking example of the court's

commitment to these ideals is the case of Caton v.
Commonwealth, commonly known as the Case of the Prisoners.
In this case, the court for the first time formally
addressed the issue of separation of powers.

British

victories in Virginia under the direction of generals
William Phillips and Benedict Arnold heartened Tory
sympathizers.

Banastre Tarleton's dazzling raid on

Charlottesville in 1781 emboldened the long quiet loyalists
to avenge the harsh treatment they had received from the
revolutionary government.
short lived.

But the loyalists' victory proved

When Cornwallis retreated to Yorktown and the

French navy swept the British out of the Chesapeake Bay,
Washington seized his chance and reclaimed the lost
territory.

Washington's victory at Yorktown turned the tide
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of the war in favor of the patriots.
the spring of 1782 looked grim.

Thus, for the Tories,

Three of their leaders,

John Caton, Joshua Hopkins, and James Lamb, were arrested
for treason.

The General Court convicted and sentenced them

to death in an oyer and terminer session.64
Facing death, the prisoners sued for mercy.

Following

the loosely phrased section of the 1776 constitution, Andrew
Ronald, the attorney for the prisoners, requested a pardon
from the General Assembly.

The House granted the pardon,

but the Senate did not concur.

Nonetheless, on the day set

for the executions, the attorneys for the condemned
presented the House resolution to the sheriff and demanded
the release of the "pardoned" prisoners.

Thoroughly

confused, the sheriff kept the defendants in custody, but
stayed execution until the next meeting of the General
Court.65
When the General Court met for its October 1782
session, the air was charged with anticipation over the fate
of the prisoners.

Representing the commonwealth, Attorney

General Edmund Randolph asked the court to issue a new rule
for the execution of the prisoners.

Meanwhile, Ronald

argued that the House resolution represented a full pardon.
Randolph countered that the entire Assembly must concur to
64Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 187-189; cf. PEP, 416427, although the actual case is cited in Daniel Call's
edition of Virginia Reports (4 Call, 5), Edmund Pendleton's
notes offer a more complete report of the proceedings as the
judge documented several matters not reported.
65Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 189.
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sanction a pardon.
General court.

The motions of both counsels divided the

Not only did the judges disagree over

whether the act violated the constitution, but also they
split over whether the General Court had the power to
nullify an act of assembly, raising the difficult question
of judicial review.

After taking a day off to ponder the

matter, the court agreed to adjourn the case on difficulty
to the Court of Appeals.66
Upset over the General Court ruling, some members of
the Assembly proposed an ad hoc committee of legislators and
appellate judges to define the power of each governmental
branch.

Some officials, including Edmund Randolph, surmised

that the matter might even be appealed to the people.
Hearing of these suggestions, Pendleton rushed to Richmond
to call the Court of Appeals into session in order to deal
with the matter.

Amid the commotion, the Court of Appeals

met on 29 October 1782 to appoint a date to hear the case. 6 7
Two days later, the Court met to hear the case.

In

response to Pendleton's invitation, the members of the bar
who were present in Richmond packed the courtroom to lend
their opinions as amici curiae.

Sitting on the bench with

Pendleton were his fellow chancellors, George Wythe and John
Blair.

Chief Justice Paul carrington and associates

Bartholomew Dandridge, Peter Lyons, and James Mercer

66Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 189-190.
67Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 190-191.
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represented the General Court.68

Richard Cary sat as the

lone representative of the court of Admiralty.69
After hearing the motions of the attorneys 1 the judges
listened to the opinion of the members of the bar.

Two

issues were at stake--whether the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction in the case and whether or not the act which
sanctioned the pardon contradicted the treason provisions of
the 1776 constitution.

The problem grew out of the

differences in wording between the 1776 constitution and the
Act of Assembly which defined the assembly's power to grant
pardons.70

According to the constitution, the power to

pardon rested with the governor save in those instances
where the prosecutions were directed in the House of
Delegates.

In those cases, the House alone was vested with

the authority to grant pardons.

The Act of Assembly,

however, stated that the governor had no right to pardon in
cases of treason.
"General Assembly."

such authority rested solely in the
Thus, under the constitution, the

defense did not need senate affirmation of the House
Resolution.

Under the Act of Assembly, however, both houses

needed to approve the pardon.
68Mays, Edmund Pendleton, 191-192.
69The admiralty court had been reduced to one judge in
1782, Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, 25 November 1782,
in David John Mays, ed., The Letters and Papers of Edmund
Pendleton, 1734-1803, hereinafter cited as PEP, 2 vols.,
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, published
for the Virginia Historical Society, 1967), v. II, 429-430.
70Hening, statutes, v. IX, 168.
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Most of the judges concurred that the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction in the case.

Bartholomew Dandridge

remained neutral on the issue and Peter Lyons argued against
the court's ability to hear the case.

Lyons agreed that the

court could hear appellate cases from the General court as
stipulated in the General Court Act.

But Lyons questioned

whether Caton v. commonwealth could properly be referred to
as a "case" since it grew out of a criminal proceeding, thus
raising the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals
could render judgments in criminal matters.

Finally, the

court decided that it did have jurisdiction over the case.71
On the matter of whether or not the act of Assembly
which granted the pardon contradicted the constitution, the
judges developed differing views.

Lyons flatly denied that

the court had the right to void an act of the assembly, but
argued that because the senate did not concur with the
House, the pardons were not valid.

Richard Cary, Paul

Carrington, and John Blair concluded that the act was not in
conflict with the constitution and, therefore, was valid;
accordingly, the pardons were void.

James Mercer challenged

the constitutionality of the act pointing out that under the
constitution, the authority to issue a pardon for treason
rested in the House alone; accordingly, the pardons were
valid.

Dandridge, reluctant to vest the court with the

power of judicial review, argued that either the House or
the Senate could grant a pardon; therefore, the pardons were
71Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 194-195.
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valid.

Wythe argued that the court did have the right to

declare an act of assembly unconstitutional.

Although he

stopped short of declaring the act in question
unconstitutional, he argued that the sovereignty or
"organic" power of the constitution presaged the doings of
the assembly; therefore, the pardons were void.

Wythe held

that

if the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated,
shall attempt to overleap the bounds, prescribed to
them by the people, I, in administering the public
justice of the country, will meet the united powers, at
my seat in this tribunal; and, pointing to the
constitution, will say, to them, here is the limit of
your authority; and hither, shall you go, but no
further.

This declaration formed one of the earliest and most
eloquent statements of separation of powers and judicial
independence by defining the role of the high court in
regard to judicial review.

Pendleton likewise adhered to

the principle of separation of powers and concluded that the
act was not contrary to the constitution and sided with the
majority.

Thus the pardons granted by the Assembly were

overturned by a six to two margin.72
The ruling in eaton v. Commonwealth did much more than
address the fate of three condemned prisoners.

At the heart

of the case lay the vital issue of the role of the
constitution in a republic.

That the judges actually ruled

72Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 195-202.
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on the constitutionality of a legislative act confirmed the
role of the judiciary in the commonwealth and rendered the
law of the constitution supreme to that of elected
officials.

Furthermore, Wythe's notion of the constitution

as a "higher" or "organic" law marked a profound
contribution not only to contemporary political theory in
Virginia, but it represented one of the earliest expressions
of judicial review in the new nation.

Wythe's pronouncement

bolstered the delicate condition of Virginia's political
order (Only recently the Assembly had defeated a measure to
create a dictatorship by a narrow margin).

Thus the idea of

the constitution as a "higher" law, superior to the
prerogatives of the Assembly, forced Virginians to redefine
fundamental constitutional principles regarding the
relationship between the legislature and the judiciary in
their new republic.73
In response to the court's decision, the Assembly
reconsidered the pardons.

This time the houses agreed.

Caton was pardoned and, along with other political
prisoners, forced to serve in the Revolutionary Army until
the war's end.

Hopkins and Lamb were banished from the

state until the end of the war.74

Jefferson's plan for an

independent judiciary had withstood its first major test,
and in doing so had taken a giant step toward defining the

73Jefferson, Notes of the State of Virginia, 126-129.
74Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 193-202.
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republic.75
The fact that Jefferson's plan of court revision
succeeded only partially, created significant structural
problems for the Old Dominion's courts in the 1780s.
Especially vexing were problems of scheduling related to the
chancery court's inablity to change venue and the fact that
the failure of the assize bill put the county courts outside
the direct control of the high court judges, frustrating two
objectives that remained important to Jeffersonians in the
Old Dominion.

By the close of the decade, the legacy of

Jefferson's court bills combined with the clarification of
American legal principles in the Constitution of the United
states to give rise to a movement for judicial reform which
dominated the early history of Virginia's Supreme Court.
Agitation for court reform came from various sources.
Initially, the judges encountered problems stemming from the
separation of appellate jurisdiction into three different
courts.

In this regard, Jefferson and the legislators may

have been overly concerned in providing to many substitutes
for the British appeals courts.

Accordingly, in the early

court sessions, especially in the Court of Appeals, the
judges often found themselves with little to do.76
75For the complete record of the Case of the Prisoners,
see Caton v. Commonwealth, 4 Call 5; for Pendleton's
account, which was omitted in Call's Reports, see PEP, v.
II, 416-433.
76Edmund Pendleton to William Woodford, 31 August 1779,
PEP, v. II, 297; Edmund Pendleton to William Woodford, 9
September 1779, ibid., 299.

- ------
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Edmund Pendleton noted that the courts did not achieve full
employment until the spring sessions of 1783.

By then,

however, Virginians had begun to litigate vigorously.
Pendleton wrote that the judges heard causes for six hours
and used mornings and evenings "For digesting and settling"
opinions.

The grind was so demanding that Pendleton,

already an ill man, considered resigning.77
Throughout the 1780s the litigious nature of
Virginians gradually increased the burdens on the courts.
By 1788, the delays that had become a commonplace feature of
the system forced both the Court of Appeals and the assembly
to address the problem of burdensome dockets.
In the Court of Appeals, as the

judg~s

slaved away,

motions for appeal mounted and the dockets became clogged.78
The Court of Appeals' addressed these considerations in its
first rulemaking session in 1784.

Hoping to reform its

procedures for scheduling appeals in order to relieve
immediate pressures on the dockets, the court provided that
all cases brought before it for appeal, on difficulty, or by
writ of error must be heard in the following term, unless
either party could show good cause to permit a hearing at
the present sitting.79

Almost immediately, however, the

rule proved obsolete as more motions for appeal flooded the
77Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, 26 May 1783, PEP,
v. II, 447.
78rbid.
79Rule of court, 29 April 1784, 1 H&M, 10.
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system.

Two years later, the court amended the rule to

prohibit hearings in the first term unless the court
received reasonable notice of a motion for immediate
action.80
objective.

Basically, the 1784 and 1786 rules had the same
The 1786 ruling, however, made the process more

difficult by prohibiting the practice of immediate hearings
as a matter of course and requiring special notices and
motions for pushing a case up on the docket.

Although these

rules relieved immediate pressures on the dockets, they
added to the logjam within the judicial system by extending
the period of time in which appeals could be heard, thus
further delaying the appellate process.

Such delays

threatened the constitutional rights to a speedy trial of
those facing criminal charges.

So in 1787 the court ruled

to hear all criminal causes sent up from the General Court
in the term when the record was scheduled for return, except
when good cause could be shown otherwise.81

These

procedural reforms failed to meet growing demands for
appellate action and gave supporters and critics of the
judiciary more ammunition to call for a comprehensive
revision of the judicial system.
Near the end of the decade, detailed plans for court
revision began circulating among well-placed members of the
legal community.82

Led by such leading political luminaries

80Rule of Court, 6 November 1786, 1 H&M, 10.
81Rule of Court, 13 November 1787, 1 H&M, 10.
82see Appendix II.
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as James Madison, a movement to reform both procedures and
the overall conception of the court system attracted a great
deal of legal and legislative support.

Drawing its strength

from the increasing dissatisfaction with both the county and
superior courts, especially the General Court, the reformers
created a system of district courts in December 1788.

The

new system established the district courts as an extension
of the General Court.

Primarily, the legislators designed

the district courts to lighten the load on the General Court
and to provide a more professional alternative to the county
courts.

And the response to the legislative program which

created the district courts combined with maturing ideas of
republican government to influence sweeping reforms of the
entire appellate structure in the following year.83
The road to the district courts was a bumpy one.
Virginians of a Jeffersonian stripe, as well as many members
of the professional legal community, had been bemoaning the
demise of the assize bill in 1778 and the failure of later
attempts to put the system into operation.

In the nine

years that followed, criticism of the county court system
mounted and, by 1787, it had combined with the call to
reform the General Court.

In response to the growing

criticism of both the county court and the General Court,
the legislature debated a bill to create a system of
district courts near the end of the year.

Arguing that the

delays in the General court were equal to a "denial of
83Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, 201-202.
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justice," the assembly passed the bill on 2 January 1788.

A

tremendously detailed document, the first district court
statute divided the state into eighteen judicial districts,
added four judges to the General Court (who by statute would
also sit on the court of Appeals), changed the times of the
sessions for Virginia's four high courts, and required the
judges of all four courts to ride circuit throughout the
districts at various times.

The act carefully spelled out

the jurisdiction and many of the practices and procedures of
the court.

In a decidedly Jeffersonian vein, however, the

creation of new district courts represented a more
professional alternative to the county courts.84
The level of specificity in which the District Court
bill regulated the procedures of the court was unprecedented
in Virginia's history.

Since the bill redefined the duties

of all of Virginia's sitting high court judges, it is not
surprising that opposition to the bill arose from those
quarters.

In the next session of the Court of Appeals, the

judges issued the "Judges Remonstrance" attacking the
constitutionality of the bill as it mingled judicial duties
and forced the judges to provide for their own travel
expenses.85
In a letter to Governor Edmund Randolph on 12 May
1788, Edmund Pendleton, as presiding judge of the Court of
84Hening, statutes, "An Act Establishing District
Courts," v. XII, 532-559.
85"Remonstrance of the Judges," 12 May 1788, PEP, 504508.
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Appeals, requested that Randolph transmit the remonstrance
to the assembly at the next session.86

According to the

judges, the imprecise wording of the act's directive to the
judges to begin appointing clerks, even though the law did
not go into effect until the following July, induced the
court to rule upon it.

The justices remarked that in the

progress of their discussion they "found it unavoidable" to
consider the constitutionality of the document.

Exercising

their powers of judicial review, first defined in the Case
of the Prisoners, the judges informed the assembly that they
felt it necessary "either to decide those [constitutional]
questions or resign their offices.n87
The judges argued that although resignation would
sustain their individual interests, their responsibilities
to fellow citizens required commenting on the
constitutionality of the issue.

Accordingly, the judges

proclaimed the act unconstitutional.

Citing the passage in

the declaration of rights that "no free government, or the
blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people but
(among other things) by frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles," the judges maintained that the "propriety and
necessity of the independence of the Judges is evident in
reason, and the nature of their office."

Legislative

blending of the duties of the high court judges in the
86Edmund Pendleton to Edmund Randolph, 12 May 1788,
PEP, 503-504.
87"Remonstrance of the Judges," 12 May 1788, PEP,
504-508.
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district court bill, therefore, violated the fundamental
principle of judicial independence.

The repercussions of

Caton v. Commonwealth here carne through with a vengance.
Wythe's articulation of judicial review had allowed the
judges to cite the doctrine in the face of the District
Court reform, this time to bolster their own budding
interpretation of the need for judicial independence.

And

in the "Judges' Remonstrance," the Virginia Assembly got
much more than it bargained for when it created an
independent judicial branch--a judiciary that acted
independently.88
Next, the judges argued that the bill created a new
office for the judges of the Chancery, Admiralty, and
General Courts that greatly increased their duties without
providing for adequate compensation.

such an attack on

their financial position severely challenged their judicial
independence.

They remarked

For vain would be the precautions of the founders of
our government to secure liberty, if the legislature,
though restrained from changing the tenure of judicial
office, are at liberty to compel a resignation by
reducing salaries to a copper, or by making it a part of
the judicial duty to become hewers of wood, and drawers
of water, or if, in case of a contrary disposition, they
can make salaries exhorbitant; or by lessening the
duties render offices almost sinecures; the independence
of the judiciary is in either case equally annihilated.
Thus, the judges maintained that they ought not appoint the
clerks because that would signify compliance with an act

88"Remonstrance of the Judges," 12 May 1788, PEP 504508; I am grateful to Warren M. Billings for helping me to
clarify this interpretation.
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contrary to the constitution.89
Finally, the judges urged the legislature to consider
their objections.

Should the legislature disagree, the

judges suggested that they appeal to the people.90

Governor

Randolph perceived the serious constitutional implications
of the judges' objections and suggestions and called the
legislature into session two days after receiving the
remonstrance.

But the timing of the special session could

not have been worse.

Before the legislators could deal with

the district court bill, many had to attend the ratification
convention.

By the time that obstacle was overcome, the

legislators found themselves approaching mid-summer.

With

harvest nigh, the assembly decided to suspend the district
court bill91, putting off deliberations until the fall
session.92
By the end of the fall session, the legislature worked
out a new district court plan.

On 22 December 1788, the

assembly concluded that the delays resulting from the dual
criminal and civil jurisdiction of the General Court were
still equal to a "denial of justice" as they
are unnecessaryily burthensome to the citizens of this
commonwealth, violations of the laws frequently pass
with impunity from the difficulty with which witnesses
89"The Remonstrance of the Judges," PEP, 508.
90"The Remonstrance of the Judges," PEP, 508.
91Hening, statutes, "An Act to Suspend the Operation of
the Act, entitled An Act Establishing District Courts," v.
XII, 644.
92Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 273-274.
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attend from great distances and the authority of those
laws would be more diffusively promulgated by the
establishment of district courts . • . •
The new district courts would meet at various times
throughout the state with the exception of the district of
Kentucky.93
In the first section of the detailed statute, the
assembly defined the jurisdiction of the district courts and
revised the General Court.

It divided the state into

eighteen judicial districts.94

To provide for enough

judges, the assembly added three justices to the nine-member
General Court.

Every six months, the twelve judges would

review their calendars and decide on which sessions of the
eighteen district courts they would attend, adjusting their
schedules so that two General Court judges would be in
attendance at each meeting of a district court.95
The second section of the statute specifically
addressed the burgeoning criminal dockets.

Legislative

requirements provided that under ordinary circumstances only
one General Court judge needed to attend oyer and terminer
sessions of the district courts.

When the courts heard

criminal cases involving capital punishment or burning of
93Hening, statutes, "An Act for establishing District
Courts, and for regulating the General court," v. XII, 730.
94The districts were Richmond, Williamsburg,
Northumberland, King and Queen, Fredericksburg, Winchester,
Staunton, Charlottesville, Dumfries, Monongalia, Washington
and Montgomery, Suffolk, Petersburg, Brunswick, Prince
Edward, New London, Accomack, and Lewisburg.
95Hening, Statutes, "An Act . . . District Courts, and
. . • General Court," v. XII, 730-732.

--------
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the hand, however, two General court judges were required to
attend the court unless the prisoner petitioned for trial
with the absence of one judge notwithstanding.

If two

judges split over a criminal case either over an issue
arising in the court or over final judgment or sentence, the
case would be settled in favor of the prisoner.

t~en

there

were too many criminal cases to satisfy in one term, those
cases would be held over until the next term.

If two judges

failed to attend the next term, however, the prisoner would
be bailed.

If that prisoner then showed himself on the

first day of the next court session, and there was not a
sufficient court, he would be bailed on his own
recognizance.

Finally, if a sufficient court would not

exist by the third day of that session, then the prisoner
would be discharged.96
The third section of the act dealt with the
constitution of the district courts.

In addition to the

oath the judges would take as members of the General Court,
they would also be sworn in as judges of the district
courts.

Providing for contingencies, the assembly allowed

for court adjournments and continuances and forbade any
district court to discontinue cases.
A fourth section of the act defined the jurisdiction
of the court to be over
all persons, and in all causes, matters, or things at
common law now cognizable in the general court, and
96Hening, statutes, An Act . . . District Courts, and .
General court," v. XII, 734.
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which shall amount to thirty pounds, or three thousand
pounds of tobacco, whether brought before them by
original process, by habeas corpus, appeal, writ of
error, supersedeas, mandamus, certiorari, to remove
proceedings on a forcible entry or detainer, or for any
other purpose, or by any legal ways or means whatsoever.
The assembly, in order to relieve the burden on the current
General Court docket, granted the district courts
jurisdiction in all causes currently pending in the General
Court, except, in cases involving mills, wills, roads,
letters of administration, orphans and guardians, and public
debtors when the causes arose outside of the district.9 7
The assembly also transferred admiralty jurisdiction
to the General Court.

As admiralty cases had not presented

much of a challenge to the post-Revolutionary court system,
and as the legislature had reduced the number of judges in
the admiralty court, the assembly understood that, as a
matter of practicality, the district courts could meet the
demands of admiralty jurisdiction.

Thus admiralty

jurisdiction combined with that of the General Court in the
districts.98
Because the General Court would still hear original
causes, the assembly continued to vest it with the power to
summon juries, and to hear motions against sheriffs or other
officers and for attornies at law for the directors of the
97Hening, statutes, "An Act . . . District Court, and .
General Court," v. XII, 735-736.
98Hening, statutes, "An Act • . . District Courts, and
General court," v. XII, 736; the Admiralty Court had already
been limited to one judge in 1782, Edmund Pendleton to James
Madison, 25 November 1782, PEP, v. II, 429.
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James River and Potomac companies.99
Since the legislators designed the district courts as
extensions of the General Court, they also envisioned that
occasionally, the two district court judges would be faced
with difficult legal questions which they might have trouble
adjudicating on their own.

In those instances, the act

allowed causes involving difficult questions to be adjourned
to the General Court.

Likewise, the assembly gave the Court

of Appeals direct discretionary appellate jurisdiction over
the district court through use of the writ of error.lOO
In order to assure an even distribution of the
district court judges' circuit duties, the act provided that
no judge could attend two successive sessions
district.

i~

the same

Since the General Court was to be the presiding

institution of the district courts, the assembly granted it
the power to appoint clerks.

But the assembly was not

willing to give the General Court free rein in regulating
district proceedings.

In an effort to restrain recent

advances in judicial independence, the assembly spelled out
the procedures of the district courts in great detail.
Accordingly, a goodly portion of the district court act
regulated clerks' fees, forms and teste of writs, bonds,
bails, exceptions, judgments, surrenders, and a plethora of

99Hening, statutes, "An Act . . . District Courts, and
. General Court," v. XII, 736.
lOOHening, statutes, "An Act . . • District courts, and
.General Court," v. XII, 737.
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minute details regarding practice in the courts.lOl

Besides

the usual procedural matters, the assembly spelled out the
court's jurisdiction regarding witnesses, evidence, court
costs notices, record keeping, fees for maintaining
prisoners, holding grand juries, nominating commonwealth
attornies, and even regulating lawyers's fees,

All of these

matters were much more clearly defined by the legislature
than in the original court bills that created the judiciary
system.l02
The final section of the act restructured the existing
General Court.

Since establishing district courts

necessitated the appropriation of portions of the General
Court's jurisdiction, the act reflected the jurisdictional
changes.

Furthermore, all cases pending in the General

Court save those that directly came under the court's
purview, for instance, appeals, writs of error, supersedeas,
special verdicts, case agreed, motions in arrest of
judgment, or causes where a point of law was reserved, were
distributed to the district courts.
were set in June and November.

Two annual sessions

Three judges could

constitute the court, except in cases of impeachment when
all judges would have to attend.l03
lOlHening, statutes, "An Act . . . District Courts, and
. General Court," v. XII 738-747.
102Hening, statutes, "An Act . . . District Courts, and
. General Court," v. XII, 747-759.
103Hening, statutes, "An Act . . . District Courts, and
. General Court," v. XII, 760-762.
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Since the General Court presided over the district
courts, the assembly granted it the power to try or to
change venue in any case pending before a district court.
In order to provide for the effects of the new act, the
assembly decreed that any supersedeas or appeal granted by
inferior courts before the act went into effect should be
retried by the General court.

The assembly guaranteed all

deeds and wills under the jurisdiction of the court and
validated all ongoing inquisitions and processes.

Finally,

the assembly prescribed the rates of judicial taxes,
provided rules for impeachment and disqualifications of
judges, and repealed all previous laws which contravened the
act.l04
Because of the objections of the judges of the Court
of Appeals to the first district court bill, the legislature
passed a second act reconstituting the Court of Appeals,
creating a truly separate appellate court and releasing its
judges from any

respon~iblity

to other state courts.

By

virtue of the 1779 act the Court of Appeals drew its
membership from the High Court of Chancery, the Court of
Admiralty, and the General Court.

Since the district court

bill drastically increased the duties of the judges of the
General Court by creating a gruelling circuit schedule, and
since the bill vested admiralty jurisdiction to the General
Court, the court of Appeals demanded certain changes.

104Hening, Statutes, "An Act . . . District Courts, and
. General Court," v. XII, 762-763.
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Accordingly, on the same day that it passed the district
court bill, the assembly created a new Court of Appeals.l05
The act provided for a five-man Court of Appeals, any
three of whom would constitute a court.

Richmond would be

the primary seat of the court for its two regular annual
sessions; however, the assembly or the governor could
appoint new venues in case of emergencies.

Moreover, the

act provided for the dates of regular sessions, rules
regarding impeachments, appointing clerks, and conflicts of
interest.

Jurisdiction pending in suits before the court of

appeals remained under the purview of the new court.

The

act also repealed portions of earlier statutes that
conflicted with its new provisions.106
Finally, the assembly completed its overhaul of the
judicial system in December with three acts.

Since the

district court act required the General court judges to
spend a great deal of time riding circuit, the assembly
granted them a stipend of six pence per mile in travel
expenses.l07

Another act abolished the Court of Admiralty

by appointing its judges to the General Court.l08

Then,

105Hening, statutes, "An Act for Amending the Act,
Intitled An Act Constituting the court of Appeals," v. XII,
764.
106Hening, Statutes, "An Act • . . Constituting the
Court of Appeals," v. XII, 765-766.
107Hening, Statutes, "An Act Allowing travelling
expences to the Judges of the General Court," v. XII,
768-769.
108Hening, statutes, "An Act Concerning the Court of
Admiralty, and the Judges thereof," v. XII, 769-770.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97
since three judges of the General Court, Peter Lyons, Paul
Carrington, and William Fleming, received appointments to
the Supreme Court of Appeals, along with chancellors Blair
and Pendleton, the assembly passed an act allowing the
General Court to consist temporarily of only ten judges and
ordered the court to begin allotments to district courts
immediately.l09
For the most part the "December Reform" which
redefined the court system marked a successful experiment in
legislative revision of the judiciary.

The district courts

became a crucial part of Virginia's legal system.

The

General Court sat without interuption until the
constitutional reoganization of 1851.

creation of the new

Supreme court of Appeals, now a separate and independant
tribunal, marked the beginning of the maturation of the Old
Dominion's judiciary.

In fitting ambivalent fashion; the

new court, born in a spirit of reform, contained a curious
mixture of

judg~s

who represented both conservative and

liberal elements of the political structure.

The ways in

which these men and their successors joined together in the
Supreme Court of Appeals would inform the character of
Virginia's legal system for the next four decades.
Although the "December Reform" created a new and
separate supreme court, the legislation that reordered the
tribunal paid little heed to revising practice and

109Hening, statutes, "An Act Concerning the General
Court," v. XII, 770-771.

-------------
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procedure.

The revision set up a new administrative

structure for the court, but did little to address the
problems caused by Virginia's ambivalent revolutionary
settlement.

Questions regarding substantive legal issues

such as descents, the paradox of basing the court on British
models but restricting it from employing post-1607 British
judicial innovations, and the relationship between the
supreme bench and the other branches of the Old Dominion's
governmental organization were left for the judges of the
new court to flesh out in the coming decades.

How the

justices answered these questions reveals much about the
development of the supreme court and the definition of its
role in Virginia's state government.
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Chapter Three
Courts and the 'Clash of Cultures?' 1803-1812
The Territory of Orleans
Only eleven years after Virginia's statesmen revised
the state's laws and established a republican court system,
Jefferson once again found himself involved in creating a
new jurisdiction, this time in the recently acquired
territories of the Louisiana Purchase.

As was the case of

Virginia, Louisiana's legal system boasted a long colonial
heritage.

Purchase of the territory by the United States

left room for the reconstitution of Louisiana's legal system
along republican lines, just as the American Revolution
provided for a similar recreation in the Old Dominion.

The

manner in which the president, his officials, and the
territory's assemblies approached the revision of
Louisiana's legal system parallelled Virginia's
revolutionary settlement.

complicated legal, political, and

cultural issues evident in the attempt to incorporate
Louisiana into the American nation offer not only an
illustration of territorial settlement in the early republic
but also a compelling glimpse at how the practical and
philosophical issues which informed Virginia's revolutionary
legal reconstruction played a role in recreating what has
been largely regarded as a unique jurisdiction.

* * *
On 20 December 1803, in a crowded hallway of the Hotel
99
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de Ville, Pierre Clement de Laussat solemnly passed the keys
to the City of New Orleans to W.
Wilkinson.

c. c. Claiborne and James

The three officials then moved to the balcony of

city hall and watched as the Tricolor was lowered to allow
the Stars and Stripes to take its place.

When the two

colors passed each other on the flagpoles, a single cannon
shot rang out, touching off a salute from all of the forts
and batteries along the Mississippi river.l

With those

opening salvos, initially a celebration of peace and
transition, the ancienne population of Louisiana and its new
American residents engaged in a complicated battle for
cultural hegemony.

one of the major skirmishes of that

clash of cultures centered on the legal administration of
the territory.
Traditionally, historians have taken as the main
battle between the rival cultures the struggle over whether
to continue civilian precepts as the basis for the region's
private law, a contest that scholars have usually judged a
"victory" for a native or "creole" faction of the state's
legal order. 2

Thus Louisiana has been characterized as an

l"Act of Delivery, 20 December 1803, 11 American state
Papers, Public Lands, V, 728-729. Pierre Clement de
Laussat, Memoirs of My life, trans. Sister Agnes-Josephine
Pastwa, ed., Robert D. Bush, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1978), 88.
2samuel B. Groner, "Louisiana Law: Its Development in
the First Quarter Century of American Rule," Louisiana Law
Review, (January 1948), 350-382; Elizabeth Gaspar Brown,
"Legal systems in Conflict: Orleans Territory, 1804-1812,"
American Journal of Legal History, (1957), 35-75;
,
"Law and Government in the Louisiana Purchase: 1803-1804,"
Wayne Law Review, 2 (1956), 169-189; George Dargo,
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anomaly in the American judicial system.3

That

characterization, however, obscures the profound influence
of Anglo-American principles on Louisiana's legal
development.

Those principles invaded Louisiana's legal

heritage largely through the efforts of a bench and bar that
were dominated by American lawyers and judges.

The actions

of those men, evident in the practices and procedures of the
territorial courts, allowed for the smooth introduction of
the common law into Louisiana's legal system.

Thus

Louisiana became a mixed jurisdiction, remarkably similar to
Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal
Traditions, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1975), passim; Richard H. Kilbourne, Jr., "An
Overview of the Wo:t'k of the Territorial court, 1804-1808, A
Missing Chapter in the Development of the Louisiana civil
Code," in Edward F. Haas, ed., Louisiana's Legal Heritage,
(Pensacola: The Perdido Bay Press, published for the
Louisiana state Museum, Studies in Louisiana Culture Series,
1983), 107-129. Kilbourne's analysis is especially
problematical because his frequent encounters with conunc:-~
law precedents and procedures detract from that of the
territorial court as a "missing chapter" in the development
of the code.
3There are numerous examples of this interpretation.
Recently, in a work intended to introduce lay persons to the
American legal system, Lawrence M. Friedman has commented on
Louisiana's lack of a common law tradition, American Law: An
Introduction, (New York: w. w. Norton & company, 1984), 44;
perhaps the most significant example, however, may be seen
in Charles Cook's decision not to include Louisiana in his
study of codification in America, The American Codification
Movement: A study of Antebellum Legal Reform, (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Contributions in Legal
studies, Number 14, 1981), thus the example of the mixing of
civil law and common law in American jurisdictions, first
evident in Louisiana, has been ignored. Cook viewed
Louisiana as unusual because of its civilian heritage. But
when one views the development of private law in nineteenthcentury United States Courts, the solutions to the problem
of mingling the two systems, first fleshed out in Louisiana,
appear to be remarkably similiar.

--

---

---------------------

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102
those that arose in other American states as the
codification movement swept the nation in the nineteenth
century.
During the codification movement, American lawyers,
lawmakers, and judges eschewed "moral" or "republican"
justice in favor of more "pragmatic" solutions.

One of the

features of the shift from moral to pragmatic justice
involved replacing British authorities with civilian sources
as the foundation of American private law.4

As American

lawyers embraced civilian icons such as Pothier and Domat,
their counterparts in Louisiana created a judicial system
which depended upon Anglo-American patterns of procedure.
Louisianians also embraced English and American authorities
as the basis of their public law.

Moreover, Louisiana's

leaders, demonstrating the innate conservatism of the legal
profession, retained civilian sources as the foundation of
the state's private law.

Thus, in Louisiana and in the rest

of the nation in the early nineteenth century, the legal
system was in flux.

As most American jurisdiction

gravitated toward civilian treatises as their guides to
private law, Louisianians adopted an American style of
judicial administration and embraced common law ideas on
public law.

The end result was that by mid-century,

Louisiana closely resembled other jurisdictions around the

4sandra F. VanBurkleo, "'That Our Pure Republican
Principles might not Wither•: Kentucky's Relief Crisis and
the Pursuit of 'Moral Justice,' 1818-1826. 11 Ph. D. diss.,
University of Minnesota, 1988.
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nation--civilian sources governed the administration of
private law while the state's court structure and its
criminal procedures owed their origins to Anglo-American
influences.
In order to understand the evolution of Louisiana's
jurisdiction, it is necessary to investigate the manner in
which the territorial officials constructed their legal
order between 1803 and 1812, for it was in that critical
period that Louisiana's leaders created a common law
judiciary to preside over their complicated mixed
jurisdiction--an administrative decision that allowed for a
stronger measure of judicial leadership than would have been
possible under a civilian judiciary (see appendix I).
Moreover, the establishment of a powerful and creative
judiciary ensured not only that judges would follow American
procedures, but that they would be able to inject the AngloAmerican legal traditions--those that they were most
familiar with--into Louisiana's jurisprudence more easily
than if bound by the more limited authority of a civilian
judge.

Thus the very structure and complexion of the

judiciary increased the influence of Anglo-American patterns
of justice on Louisiana's judicial system.
Although jurisdictional and operational difficulties
plagued Louisiana's early courts, the cooperation of the
bench and bar in creating the jurisdiction suggests that the
clash of legal traditions did not play a major role in the
development of those courts.

In fact, American control of
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the bench and bar and the latent conservatism of the legal
profession ensured that battles between rival cultures
occurred only rarely in Louisiana's courtrooms.
When Prefect Laussat handed over the keys to New
Orleans, however, he presented the United States government
with an enormous administrative problem.

Louisiana had been

a civilian jurisdiction since the French king granted
Anthony Crozat letters patent to "all the territory
possessed by the Crown between old and new Mexico and
Carolina" on 26 September 1712.

Before that time the colony

was subject to the quasi-military rule of various explorers.
Crozat's grant marked a turning point in the colony's
development by ushering in a period of conciliar rule which
established Louisiana's first judicial system.

Separate

edicts of 12 and 23 December 1712 set up a temporary
Superior council which gave way to a more permanent eightman council on 16 September 1716.

Both bodies possessed

legislative and judicial powers.5
The edict which created the Superior Council granted
it jurisdiction in all civil and criminal causes.

New

France's Intendant served as the honorary president of the
council, but in practice a Senior Councillor presided over
the court.

He alone sat as the court of first instance in

provincial actions, while a quorum of three was needed to
5Ben Robertson Miller, The Louisiana Judiciary, (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, University Studies
number 9, 1932), 1; Francois x. Martin, The History of
Louisiana from the Earliest Period, 2 vols., (New Orleans:
Lyman and Beardslee, 1827-1829), vo1. I, 178.
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try all other civil cases.
criminal matters.

A five-man quorum determined

Meeting monthly, the council operated in

exactly the same fashion as those in san Domingo and
Martinique.6
In 1717 the Western Company, a joint-stock venture,
assumed Crozat's charter and added a system of inferior
courts to assist the council in its judicial duties.

When

the Western Company was a party, the case was heard in the
Consular Jurisdiction of Paris with appeals before the
Parlement of Paris.?
The vigorous growth of the colony following
Bienville's founding of New Orleans in 1718 provided for a
redefinition of the western Company's charter in September
1719.

Under the amended charter, appeals from the inferior

courts received final judgment in council, with the king
reserving the right to review all decrees.

By the time the

company relinquished its charter in 1732, inferior courts
had been organized into nine efficient judicial districts:
Alibamons, Mobile, Biloxi, New Orleans, Natchez, the Yazoos,
the Illinois and Wabash, Arkansas, and Natchitoches.

The

courts consisted of a director or agent of the company
assisted by two local magistrates.8
6Miller, Louisiana Judiciary, 2; Martin, History of
Louisiana, 180-182.
7 Martin, History of Louisiana, 198; Miller, Louisiana
Judiciary, 2.
8Miller, Louisiana Judiciary, 2-3; Martin, History of
Louisiana, 198, 245.
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Indian warfare in 1729, however, led the Western
Company to abandon its hopes of making Louisiana profitable,
and on 7 May 1732 it relinquished its title to the monarch.
Louis XV quickly reorganized his possession by abolishing
the inferior courts and replacing them with a thirteen-man
Superior Council whose members served as "assessors" in
cases of first instance.9

The assessors based their

judgments on the Parisian laws defined in the Coutume de
Paris and royal edicts.

This system served Louisiana for

the next thirty years.lO
As Louis XV's ministers occupied themselves with
imperial wars between 1732 and 1762, Louisiana experienced a
period of "salutary neglect" similar to British policy
toward that country's North American colonies in the age of
Walpole.

Viewing Louisiana as a poor stepchild to the

richer preserve of New France, Louis XV allowed the
officials and citizens of Louisiana to fend for themselves
in a variety of political and administrative venues.
Insofar as its legal responsibilities were concerned,
Louisiana's council provided for a high level of judicial
service, exceeding the quality of the mother country's

9Miller, Louisiana Judiciary, 3; Martin, History of
Louisiana, 215-216.
lOFer a brief analysis of the evolution of the Coutume
de Paris and its application in Louisiana see Jerah Johnson,
"La Coutume de Paris, Louisiana's First Law," Louisiana
History, (Spring 1989), 145-155.
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courts in both civil and criminal causes.ll
But the superb judicial administration of the
Superior Council came to an end when France ceded the colony
to Spain in 1762 for timely support in the Seven Years' War.
In the interregnum Louisiana's government was severely
neglected as Antonio de Ulloa did not assume control of
Louisiana for the Spanish king until 1766.12
Ulloa was an unfortunate choice for Spain's first
governor of Louisiana.l3

An inexperienced, dogmatic,

brusque, and overbearing presence, Ulloa did little to
appease the wary French citizenry who feared that Spanish
administrative and legal reforms would deprive them of their
property rights and place them "under the yoke of Spain.nl4
Almost immediately after his arrival, Ulloa began to feed
those fears.
In the early months of his administration, Ulloa made
drastic changes in the colony's administrative and judicial
systems.

He abolished the civilian council that had

governed the colony during the interregnum and in the
process angered powerful Louisiana citizens who controlled
llJohn Preston Moore, Revolt in Louisiana: The Soanish
Occupation. 1766-1770, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1976), 32, 29n; cf. James D. Hardy, Jr.,
"The Superior Council in Colonial Louisiana," in John
Francis McDermott, ed., Frenchmen and French ways in the
Mississippi Valley, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1969)' 101.
12Moore, ~evolt in Louisiana, 34-40.
13Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, 34-40.
14Martin, History of Louisiana, 353.
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that body via a corrupt junto.

Once Ulloa broke the

council, he urged his superior, Jeronimo Grimaldi, to issue
a series of decrees which revised the colony's laws and
placed all judicial power into the governor's hands.15
Grimaldi's revised "municipal code" represented a farreaching reform of Louisiana's laws regarding "Religion,"
"Manners," "Provisions," "Public Health," and "Public
Safety."

The disgruntled junto interpreted the

comprehensive nature of the code and the dissolution of the
Superior Council as a clear threat to the autonomy that they
had enjoyed since 1762.

Rigid enforcement of commercial

regulations under the "Public Safety" titre or section of
the code, hit the Orleanais merchant community especially
hard.

Since those merchants comprised the most influential

segment of the colony's population, indeed many merchants
had been leaders of the deposed junto, dissention grew as
Ulloa's reforms seemed to forecast the very outcome that
Louisiana's citizens feared most about Spanish rule.16
As Ulloa pursued his vigorous reforms, the colony
entered into an economic depression and a monetary crisis
which threatened its stability.

Angry merchants and deposed

politicians seized the initiative and devised schemes to
unseat the unpopular governor and to return a measure of
domestic control to the native residents of Louisiana.
the fall of 1768, Louisiana, under the leadership of the
15Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, 40-53.
16rbid., 40-59; Martin, History of Louisiana, 355.
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merchant community, erupted into open rebellion against the
Spanish governor.

By the end of October a citizen's council

expelled Ulloa from the colony and awaited Charles III's
response.l7
Charles responded by sending a trusted soldier of
fortune, Alexander O'Reilly, to crush the rebellion and
restore order in the insurgent colony.

O'Reilly quickly

beefed up Spain's military presence, arrested and executed
the leaders of the insurrection, and put an end to the
revolt, a task which soon won him the nickname "Bloody
O'Reilly."

Nonetheless, O'Reilly realized that continued

oppression would likely lead to further insurrection.

In

the months following the executions, he moved swiftly to
solidify Spanish rule and to provide the colony with stable
leadership.

By removing all remaining French officials;

establishishing Spanish as the colony's official language;
creating a new legal code and judicial and administrative
systems; and revitalizing the catholic church, O'Reilly
ensured Spain's administrative control of the colony, and
provided the residents with the social, economic, and

1 7Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, 60-165; Light T. Cummins,
"Anglo Merchants in Spanish New Orleans: Capital Migration
and the Atlantic Economy, 1760-1803, 11 unpublished paper
delivered at the 53rd meeting of the Southern Historical
Association, New Orleans, 13 November 1987; Lewis William
Newton, The Americanization of French Louisiana: A Study in
the Process of Adjustment Between the French and AngloAmerican Populations of Louisiana. 1803-1860, (New York:
Arne Press, A New York Times Company, 1980), 1; Martin,
History of Louisiana, 356-359; Gayarre, History of
Louisiana, v. II, 381-383.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

110
political stability necessary to maintain the peace.lB
O'Reilly's decisive policies quelled the rebellion and
established Spain's undisputed control of the colony.

From

a legal and judicial standpoint, O'Reilly's administrative
reforms provided Louisiana with a stable court system until
Laussat reclaimed the colony for France in 1803.

The new

code that O'Reilly issued in 1769 drew its inspiration from
the Recopilacion des las Indias, the Siete Partidas, and the
French Code Noir of 1724.

He dissolved a post-Ulloa

citizen's council and established another concilliar body,
the Cabildo, as the residence of the administrative and
judicial offices of the Spanish government.

Dividing the

province into eleven districts under military commanders,
O'Reilly vested each officer with nominal civil and criminal
jurisdiction.

The Cabildo would function as the general

court with final judicial authority resting in the Captain
General of Havana.

A special tribunal of military and

executive officials in Havana, with the Captain General
presiding, heard appeals from the local courts.l9
For the most part, O'Reilly's measures proved sound.
He induced the Spanish government to recognize French land
grants, thus soothing any fears of confiscation among the
citizenry.

The new courts functioned well and soon won the

trust of the French inhabitants.

Although minor differences

18Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, 190-217; Martin, History
of Louisiana, 356-359.
19rbid., 209-217.
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existed between French and Spanish legal tribunals, on the
whole the civilian system of Castille differed little in
theory from the French codes that Louisiana's citizens were
accustomed to.

Accordingly, the transition from French to

Spanish leadership, insofar as judicial administration was
concerned, proceeded smoothly after Ulloa's deposition.

But

when Laussat received the colony for Napoleon in 1803, he
instituted a series of reforms which left the government,
especially the judicial system, in a confused state when
Claiborne and Wilkinson claimed Louisiana for the United
States in 1803.
Pierre Clement de Laussat possessed all of the talents
of an imperial bureaucrat.

Earning his stripes in the

tropics, he looked forward to the passage of Louisiana to
France following the treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800.

He

convinced Napoleon to appoint him governor of the colony.
But before Laussat could reach Louisiana, Bonaparte
negotiated the sale of Louisiana to the United States.

Thus

Laussat's instructions were changed to presiding over the
retrocession of the colony from Spain and effecting cession
of the territory to United States officials.

In fact, the

double transfer was to take place on the same day, but
Wilkinson and Claiborne could not reach New Orleans in time
and Laussat was forced to preside over the colony for three
weeks.
Although Laussat knew that his mission to Louisiana
was short-lived, he inexplicably embarked on an effort to
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restructure the colony's government.

One of his first steps

was to suspend the Spanish laws and the Cabildo, although he
did not have time to erect a French substitute before he
turned Louisiana over to the Americans.

Accordingly, the

Americans received a territory without courts or laws, and a
citizenry clamoring for a means to resolve their mounting
legal disputes.20
Why did Laussat choose to disolve the Cabildo?

Two

possible reasons immediately come to mind; either he was
pursuing his own foreign policy or he was engaging in a
secret Napoleanic plot to cause confusion and revolt in
Louisiana when the Americans took possession of the
territory.

Since Laussat was a proud man who had looked

forward to his position in Louisiana, it seems possible that
his administrative shenanigans reflected his own designs on
the colony.21

No evidence exists, however, to give credence

to the theory that the prefect was engaging in a clandestine
attempt with Napoleon to create confusion in Louisiana and
to foil the American takeover.

Nonetheless, Laussat's

actions created significant difficulties for the territory's
new guardians.

As in the case of the Spanish takeover,

Louisianians viewed the new government with skepticism.

The

same fears of dispossession resulting from alien land
policies rose among the anciene population.

Moreover,

20oargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 105.
21E. Wilson Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy. 17591804, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934),243-246.
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Laussat•s actions exacerbated the situation by suspending
the colony's administrative organs.

In 1766, Charles III

assumed leadership of a region that had benefitted from some
form of civilian government.

In 1803, Jefferson took

control of a community populated by a suspicious and anxious
citizenry and totally devoid of governmental or judicial
direction.

Moreover, Jefferson understood that his new

charges had risen in rebellion under similar circumstances
in 1768.

His efforts to govern the territory required

reconstruction of the government from the ground up, a
proposition that in a seemingly more stable situation had
precipitated rebellion.
In view of the instability of the situation, Jefferson
and Congress adopted swift measures to bring order to the
Purchase.

On 26 March 1804 congress divided the ceded lands

into b:o territories.

Orleans Territory, comprising most of

the modern state of Louisiana, with a long-settled port and
an ethnic hodge-podge of inhabitants, promised to be the
most difficult to govern.

To manage the province, congress

provided for a system of conciliar government, with a
governor and a thirteen-man legislative council at the
head.22

Judging that the creole population of the territory

would be suspicious of rash innovation and brusque
leadership, Jefferson appointed

w.

c. c. Claiborne, a

22"An Act Erecting Louisiana into Two Territories, and
Providing for the Temporary Government Thereof, March 26,
1804," u. s. Congress, Statutes at Large, comp., Richard
Peters, (Boston: Little and Brown, 1845), 322.
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cautious politician with experience in frontier government,
as governor.23
Unlike Ulloa, Claiborne fit the position perfectly.

A

politician, not a soldier, Claiborne had served a lengthy
apprenticeship before he assumed a leadership role.
fifteen he accepted a post as clerk of the
Representatives.

u.

At

s. House of

Six years later, Claiborne returned home

to sussex, Virginia, to read law.

Upon finishing his

education, Claiborne, like many young Virginians of his day,
sought his fortune on the Tennessee frontier.

There he

established a thriving criminal practice and rose quickly
through the ranks of the frontier elite.

When Tennessee

petitioned for statehood in 1796, Claiborne became a
delegate to the territorial constitutional convention.

He

topped off that service with an appointment to the state
supreme court in the same year and from there went on to sit
in the House of Representatives when Andrew Jackson resigned
in 1797 to pursue a senate post.

These early achievements

drew notice from Claiborne's cousin, President Jefferson,
who appointed the young man governor of Mississipi.

When

Jefferson purchased Louisiana, he called on his territorial
officials for advice on administering the new acquisition.
Claiborne's counsel to his cousin on the Louisiana question
23oictionary of American Biography, hereinafter cited
as DAB, v. II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958),
115-116; w. c. c. Claiborne to Thomas Jefferson, 5 October
1804, Clarence E. Carter, comp., The Territorial Papers of
the United States, v. IX, (Washington, D. c., u. s.
Government Printing Office, 1940, 307; Brown, "Legal Systems
in Conflict," 41-42.
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and his prudent direction of Mississippi's Indian territory
prodded the Sage of Monticello to offer him the Louisiana
position when James Monroe turned it down.24
Both Jefferson and his governor wished for a swift
introduction of the common law as the basis for the
territory's legal system, yet both suspected that such a
step would foment dissent among the territory's creole
residents.

Nor did such vigorous revision have any

precedent in Anglo-American traditions of judicial
administration.25

Accordingly, Jefferson and Claiborne

moved cautiously to construct a judiciary that would meet
the pressing needs of the community,

ensur~

American

constitutional guarantees, and allow for a judicious
intermingling of both American and civilian legal
principles.
Claiborne's first attempt to construct a court system
reflects the cautious nature of his administration.

Almost

immediately after the cession, Claiborne created courts to
24oAB, v. II (New York: Charles scribner's Sons, 1958),
115-116; w. c. c. Claiborne to Thomas Jefferson, 5 October
1804, Clarence E Carter, comp., The Territorial Papers of
the United States, v. IX, (Washington, D. c., u. S.
Government Printing Office, 1940), 307; Robert v. Remini,
Andrew Jackson, (New York: Perennial Library, Harper & Row
Publishers, 1966), 38.
25British officials likewise adhered to the common law
emphasis on custom and usage when they allowed French
residents of the Canadian and western provinces to hold on
to their 'laws in force' under provisions of the Quebec Act
of 1774, see Clarence E. Carter, "The Office of Commander in
Chief: A Phase of Imperial Unity on the Eve of the
Revolution," in Richard B. Morris, ed., The Era of the
American Revolution: Studies Inscribed to Evarts Boutell
Greene, (New York: Columbia University Press, 183.
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settle the rising number of suits that had been accumulating
ever since Laussat had suspended the Cabildo.

To deal with

minor civil causes, Claiborne and the legislative council
instituted a nine-man court of pleas with jurisdiction in
matters under $3,ooo.oo. 26

Claiborne appointed Anthony

Argotte, Beverley Chew, Benjamin Morgan, William Kenner,
Paul Lanusse, Francis M. Guerin, Gaspard Debuys, William
Garland, and Eugene Dorsiere as judges to the court of
pleas.27

At the first session on 10 January 1804, the court

adopted fifteen rules of procedure.

Adhering to American

practices 1 the court required all suits to commence by writs
of summons, capias, or attachment and prescribed the form
and manner in which the writs were to be issued.28

Article

four of the rules ordered that "the court will proceed to
trial immediately," thus guaranteeing defendants their
constitutional right to a speedy trial.29

After describing

the proper manner in which litigants should respond to the
writs, the justices focused on the structural matters
necessary to govern trials in the court.

They allowed all

26william c. c. Claiborne "An Ordinance to aid in the
Administration of Justice," 30 December 1803, in Dunbar s.
Rowland, ed., Official Letterbooks of W. c. C. Claiborne.
1801-1816, hereinafter cited as OL, (Jackson, Mississippi:
State Department of Archives and History, 1917), I, 317-319;
Groner, "Louisiana Law," 358-361.
27court of Pleas for the Territory of Orleans, Minute
Book, Mss. City Archives, New Orleans Public Library,
Louisiana Division, 1.
28"Articles 1-3, 11 Court of Pleas Minute Book, 1-2.
29"Article Four," Court of Pleas, Minute Book, 2.
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parties to issue subpoenas, ascribed the liability of court
costs to the losing party, and instructed the clerks,
constables, and sheriffs on the proper manner of processing
and executing judgments.30

Finally, the judges defined the

offices that made up the court's staff.

One crier was to be

appointed by the court; each municipality within the city
was to provide a constable; and the judges empowered the
clerk of court, Etienne Mazaureau, to issue all oaths
necessary for the operation of the tribunal.31

(see

appendix IV)
Louisiana's citizens responded to the court of pleas
enthusiastically, and soon the dockets became clogged.
Averaging five hundred cases per year,32 the court became
the territory's busiest tribunal.

As did later territorial

and state courts in Louisiana, the court of pleas adopted
Anglo-American procedures, writs, and summonses to govern
its practice.

In doing so, the court of pleas represented

the first extension of Anglo-American judicial practices to
Louisiana and forecast one of the most powerful aspects of
Louisiana's legal settlement--the introduction of common law
forms and procedures as the basis for the region's legal
discourse.
In addition to the court of pleas, Claiborne set up a
'governor's' court to handle major civil actions, appeals
30"Articles 5-7, court of Pleas, Minute Book, 2-3.
3l"Articles 7-15, 11 Court of Pleas, Minute Book, 3-6.
32court of Pleas, Minute Book, passim.
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from the court of pleas in cases involving amounts over
$500.00, and criminal appeals in capital cases.

Finally,

he took steps to develop a county court system to decide
original civil and criminal complaints.

Claiborne took

great pains to attract competent men as justices of the
peace, as he understood that traditional forms of lay
justice, for instance those practiced in Virginia's county
courts, would present magistrates with an extremely
difficult task, as the subtlties of placing an AngloAmerican system of court administration over a mixed body of
laws could be confusing to the most astute legal scholar.
Solving the personnel problems on the county court level
proved to be one of the most vexing problems of Claiborne's
administration.

Many qualified members of the ancienne

population, either wary of American ambitions or ignorant of
American judicial procedures, declined appointments to the
county bench.

Claiborne, consequently, filled many

positions with Americans, furthering American control of the
bench and bar.33
Claiborne, however, realized the inadequacy of these
tribunals.

County courts went unmanned for want of

competant magistrates.
cases.

The court of pleas was swamped with

But the most vexing problem, in Claiborne's opinion,

33william c. c. Claiborne "An Ordinance to aid in the
Administration of Justice," OL, I, 317-319; Groner,
"Louisiana Law," 358-361. On the matter of county
appointments, Claiborne's letters chronicle a long and
difficult process. The author is currently involved in a
study of the development of Louisiana's county or "parish"
courts which he hopes to publish in the near future.

----------------
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was the lack of an efficient appellate system.

Although

Claiborne was an accomplished lawyer, he recognized that his
duties on the governor's court not only conflicted with his
busy schedule, but also that his inexpert knowledge of civil
law, which despite the reception of American forms and
procedures still informed Louisiana's legal discourse to a
great degree, impeded his ability to dispense justice.
Moreover, given his heavy workload, Claiborne felt hardpressed to hear appeals in capital cases.34
Louisiana's residents also grasped the weaknesses of
the arrangement.

Since one of the provisions of the cession

treaty of 1803 was that "the inhabitants of the ceded
territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United
States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the
principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of
all the rights, advantages, and immunities, of citizens of
the United States . . • . n35

When the act of 26 March

created a territorial arrangement that limited the "rights,
advantages, and immunities" of the territory's citizens,
opposition to the government mobilized.
The controversy revolved about a provision in the act
of 26 March which placed an embargo on slave importation.
34w. c. c. Claiborne to Robert Smith, 18 March 1811,
OL, V, 183-184; Claiborne to James Madison, 15 June 1806,
OL, III, 331; Claiborne to Thomas Jefferson, 17 June 1806,
OL, III 333-335; Claiborne to Madison, 9 June 1804, OL, II
197-199; Claiborne to Madison, 13 February 1804, OL, I, 371373.
35oargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 30.
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Only slaves from foreign ports imported into the United
States after 1 May 1798 were allowed into the territory.
Furthermore, the only slaves granted entrance were those
brought by United States citizens "removing into said
territory for actual settlement."

Since the slave embargo

directly contradicted Article I, section 9, of the Federal
Constitution, which stated that no restrictions could be
placed upon the slave trade until 1808, dissenters rightly
contended that they were being denied a fundamental
principle of the constitution.36
In the spring of 1804 a group of Orleans natives led
by Americans Edward Livingston, Daniel Clark and Evan Jones,
presented a memorial to Congress protesting Claiborne's
management of the territory and petitioning for statehood.
By quick acceptance, the petitioners hoped to gain
admittance to the union and at the same time to preserve
their cultural prominence in Louisiana by securing civilian
traditions.37

They listed as oppressive in the memorial the

slave embargo, Claiborne's "inadequacy" and the "extensive
powers of the governor's office," and they criticized

36Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 30-32; "An Act Erecting
Louisiana • . . ," u. s. Statutes at Large, 322; "The
Constitution of The United states of America--1789," in
Francis Newton Thorpe, ed., The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Organic Laws of the
States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming
the United States of America, (Washington, D. C.: u. s.
Government Printing Office, 1909), v. I, 22.
37warren M. Billings, "From this Seed: The Louisiana
Constitution of 1812," forthcoming.
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judicial system that Claiborne had created.38
But Jefferson, the Congress, and Claiborne himself,
questioned the abilities of Louisianians to govern
themselves within the republican system.39

Consequently,

all that the memorialists could gain was permission to
organize a territorial government under the provisions of
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.

That ordinance mandated

the implementation of the common law, but it allowed local
institutions to observe the recognized 'laws in force' of
their regions.4°

Under these narrower restrictions the

Louisianians quickly established a new government.
Claiborne remained as governor, but an elected assembly
replaced the legislative council.

To handle legal disputes,

the new legislature created a three-man superior court to
decide both original and appellate causes.

This new court,

as directed by the Northwest Ordinance, drew its judgments
from the 'laws in force' of the region.41

The framers of

38oargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 32.
39For congress, see Winthrop D. Jordan, White over
Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812, (New
York: W. w. Norton & Company, 1977; first published by the
University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of
Early American History and Culture, 1968), 389; Claiborne
had first expressed this sentiment in a January letter to
James Madison. Unfortunately, Claiborne's letter was leaked
to an unidentified Federalist newspaper. When news of the
letter reached New Orleans, considerable opposition
developed among the anciene population, Dargo, Jefferson's
Louisiana, 29.
40united states Statutes at Large, 322; cf. George
Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 128-129.
41u. s. statutes at Large, 322; cf. Dargo, Jefferson's
Louisiana, 128-129.

----------
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the Northwest Ordinance, however, did not anticipate the
takeover of as alien a jurisdiction as Louisiana.

Thus the

loose stricture of adhering to 'laws in force' presented
unique problems to Louisianians.

Since Laussat's suspension

of the Cabildo had cast doubt on what the existing laws
were, the legislature set out immediately to define them.
Claiborne welcomed this initiative since his own experience
as territorial judge demonstrated the need for
clarification.
As these efforts proceeded, Jefferson and the state
department undertook the tedious task of filling judicial
positions in the territory, a problem that would plague the
court throughout its early history.

Their initial choices

demonstrate both the desire to create a common law
jurisdiction and to appease creole inhabitants who feared
wholesale intrusions of common law.

John Prevost of New

York, Pierre Etienne Duponceau of Pennsylvania, and Ephraim
Kirby of Connecticut received the first nominations.
Prevost spoke both French and Spanish fluently, a talent
which made him an indispensible choice for the job.
Duponceau, a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, was an accomplished common lawyer (and totally
Americanized, in Philadelphia he was known as Peter Stephen
Duponceau),42 but his French background would allay fears
among the creole community.

Ephraim Kirby, an ardent

42conway Robinson to Samuel Jaudon, 14 July 1836,
Conway Robinson Papers, Virginia Historical Society.
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republican and supporter of the Louisiana Purchase, had
established a reputation as one of the nation's first law
reporters, but more importantly, like Jefferson, he was an
early advocate of codification.

Although Prevost was the

only one of this triumvarite to claim his commission, since
Kirby died enroute to New Orleans and Duponceau declined the
post, their selection reveals the president's inclination
toward implementing American legal reforms in a cautious and
compromising fashion.43

The American judicial system had to

be represented, but Jefferson sought to do so by appointing
judges who, though thoroughly Americanized, would ba both
appealing and sympathetic to the wishes of the territory's
native inhabitants.
Prevost, as the territory's first judge, was the
single most important figure in Louisiana's judicial
development.

Since territorial judges made only $2000.00

per year, numerous candidates for positions on the bench
declined appointments.

Consequently, Prevost, despite

financial hardship,44 sat for two years as the territory's
43 Henry Plauche Dart, "The History of the Supreme court
of Louisiana," speech at the centenary of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, Louisiana Annual Reports, hereinafter cited
as La. Ann., 133, (St. Paul: West Publishing co., 1914),
xxxiii; DAB, V, 423-424, 525-526; Eldred Simkins to Creed
Taylor, 17 May 1803; Eldred Simkins to creed Taylor, 1
August 1803, Creed Taylor Papers, Special Collections,
Alderman Library, University of Virginia.
44During his tenure as superior court judge, Prevost
accumulated debts of at least$17,500. His inability to
payoff his loans led to two Superior court cases as his
creditors sought to recover their investments, see Carrick
v. Prevost, superior Court Case #243 and McDonagh v.
Prevost, Superior Court Case #1243.
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lone appellate magistrate.

During that tenure he

courageously faced lengthy dockets and strove to render
justice in a form that would satisfy both American and
Orleanais interests, earning the profound respect of the
governor, the citizens, and most importantly, the
territory's bar.

on several occasions Claiborne; members of

the bar, and influential New Orleanians urged officials of
the United States to provide Prevost with brother justices
and financial relief.

Uniformly these requests praised

Prevost's judical acumen.

James Brown's remarks to Samuel

Smith on this matter are illustrative
To say that he [Prevost] has been upright in a
country where the name of a Judge was formerly but a
name for corruption, would, be no encomium; for thank
God! altho the poor Louisianian stares at the idea of
an honest judge, yet the opposite is hardly known in
our happy country . • . But the penetration and
diligence which could ingraft the practice of American
courts, with its viva voce examinations of witnesses,
trial by Jury, upon the principles of the Civil Law and
digest a system of practice equally acceptable to the
disciple of Lord Coke and of Justinian, are the
qualities more rare and better calculated to excite our
applause and command our gratitude. This has been done
by Judge Prevost and the proof of it is the enclosed
petition signed by the entire members of a bar where
the French, English, and Spanish languages are in daily
use and all of which are understood by the court.
Yet despite such pleas, the administration failed to send
additional aid to Prevost.45

45w. c. c. Claiborne to Thomas Jefferson, 1 July 1804,
carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 247;. "Petition to Congress
by Lawyers of the Territory, 1805, 11 Ibid., 269; James Brown
to Thomas Jefferson, 8 January 1805, Ibid., 365-366; Brown
to John Breckinridge, 15 January 1805, Ibid., 369; Brown to
Samuel Smith, 28 November 1805, Ibid., 537-539.
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Nonetheless, the Prevost court proved to be the most
influential of all of Louisiana's early courts merely
because it was the first to deal with many of the sticky
issues that arose from the transfer of jurisdictions.

The

most mundane example, important from a legal standpoint
despite its apparent insignificance, came from the court's
authority to issue summary writs.

In this manner, Prevost

directly influenced further courts by prescribing the form
of the writs.

An example of that authority is the oldest

surviving writ of habeas corpus issued by a Louisiana judge.
Prevost issued the writ for a Mr. Wakefield who had been
detained by Orleans county sheriff George T. Ross.
Prevost's construction of the writ followed standard
American forms, hence through simple actions such forms
became commonplace features of Louisiana's legal
discourse.4 6
Unfortunately, none of Prevost's decisions have
survived.4 7

Nonetheless, the records of the Superior Court

reveal much about his judicial ability.

Faced by

unprecedented jurisdictional uncertainty, Prevost presided
46writ of Habeas Corpus issued 19 April 1806, superior
Court for the Territory of Orleans, New Orleans Public
Library, city Archives, Box# 1171-1303, see Appendix III.
47Indeed, one of the more serious problems with
interpreting the legal records of territorial Louisiana is
the fact that no judicial decisions are recorded in the case
files prior to 1809 when Francois Martin began reporting and
publishing the superior Court's decisions. The surviving
documents for the pre-1809 period, therefore, are
incomplete. Nonetheless, those judgments and pleadings that
do survive offer some insight into the workings of the court
during this formative era.
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over many complicated proceedings.

Confusion over the laws

in force forced Prevost to cope with a plethora of problems
caused by competing jurisdictions.

French laws such as the

"Code Noir" still governed the treatment of slaves.48

In

Coudrain v. Bagneris and in other instances Prevost heard
appeals of cases from Spanish tribunals which forced him to
discern their methods and to rule upon their judgments.49
Finally, since he alone constituted the court, Prevost was
responsible for the entire Superior Court docket.

Despite

the many difficulties he encountered, Prevost performed
admirably and provided a remarkable measure of judicial
stability.
By Spring 1806, however, Prevost realized that he
could no longer manage such an enormous assignment.
Inadequate compensation had forced him into debt, and the
tremendous workload compromised his health.

Prevost urged

Secretary Madison to appoint a successor so that he could
retire.

Prevost pointed out that the workload was so great

and the compensation so little that
To justify the necessary sacrifices of time and
feelings--on the one hand to penetrate the mysteries of
a code so obsolete in practice from the corruptions of
my predecessors to assimiliate this to the present
government without legislative aid so as to form some
48Gautier v. Sainet, no case #, Box #100-209. No dates
will be assessed for unreported cases decided in the
Superior Court since no decisions (the existence of which
dete~nines the date of cases in standard court reporting)
survive.
49coudrain v. Bagneris, #87, Superior Court, NOPL, Box
#3-98.
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kind of system, to give effect to my decrees and at the
same time to unite public opinion has indeed proved a
herculean task.
In April 1806,50 Madison appointed William Sprigg of Ohio
and George Mathews, Jr., a Virginian recently settled in
Georgia, to fill the vacancies on the bench.

Sprigg

responded quickly and without reservation to his
appointment, and Mathews also accepted, but he made it clear
that he was concerned about the weight of the duties and the
piddling compensation, and that he preferred to use his
Orleans post as a springboard to a similar position in
Mississippi. 51
From that point on, the court's personnel remained
stable.

When Prevost resigned at the end of 1806,

Kentuckian Joshua Lewis took his place.

Sprigg retired in

1808 and an American resident of New Orleans, John Thompson,
accepted a seat on the bench.

Judge Thompson shot and

ratally wounded himself in 1810 and was that year replaced
by Francois X. Martin, a judge on the Mississippi superior
court.52

Martin was the last judge appointed to the

superior court and served until the creation of the Supreme
50J. B. Prevost to James Madison, 10 March 1806, Ibid.,
608.
5loart, "Centenary," xxxiv; William Sprigg to James
Madison, 8 April 1806, George Mathews, Jr., to James
Madison, 20 April 1806, Domenic Hall to James Madison, 23
January 1807, Carter, Territorial Papers, 626, 704.
52oart, "Centenary," xxxiv, William Garrard to James
Madison, 20 January 1812, TP, 998.
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Court of Louisiana in 1813.53

All of these jurists shared

an affinity for the American judicial system.

Even Martin,

a transplanted Frenchmen and a civilian scholar, was
thoroughly Americanized when he accepted his appointment.
The quest to find suitable judges for the territory,
reveals an important aspect of the so-called 'clash of
cultures•--that by the time the judicial system was
organized, Americans, not creole Louisianians, dominated the
territorial bench.

Without significant numbers of the

ancienne population involved in the judiciary, few chances
for a 'clash' ever developed.

Furthermore, largely through

Prevost's efforts, the court forged a deep and lasting
relationship with the bar (its strongest potential opponent)
that made for a consistent measure of political stabilty
within the territory's legal elite.54
As in post-Revoltutionary Virginia, determining the
'laws in force' proved to be the most troublesome problem
facing Louisiana's legislature and its superior court.
Prevost, and later George Mathews, ruled in favor of
legislative resolutions proclaiming Roman, French, and
Spanish civil traditions the core of Louisiana's private
law.

By 1806, it was apparent that these early measures

53Martin later served for many years on the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, for information on his influence on the
development of that body, see Mark F. Fernandez, "From Chaos
to continuity: Early Reforms of the supreme Court of
Louisiana, 1845-1852, 11 Louisiana History 28 (Winter 1987),
19-36.
54see note 66 above.
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fell well short of presenting a concise map of the
labyrinthine jurisdictional overlaps and contradictions
caused by the lack of an official territorial code and the
vague language and application of the Northwest Ordinance by
American officials.

Thus the rulings by Prevost and Mathews

represented stop-gap solutions that failed to solve the
pressing need for a clear body of laws in force.55
Accordingly, the legislature appointed two jurisconsults,
James Brown and Louis Moreau Lislet to digest the civil
laws.
Identifying the criminal law of the territory proved
almost as difficult as defining its private laws.

The

Breckinridge Act, which organized Orleans Territory,
required criminal law to be based on common law, but failed
to provide much guidance, leaving the specific aspects of
criminal procedure up to the governor and territorial
officials.
in 1805.

As such, the legislature passed a 'Crimes Act•
Most of the bills comprising the crimes act were

drafted by an Irish lawyer named James Workman.

In fifty-

two comprehensive sections, the Crimes Act of 1805 defined
punishable offences, established original jurisdiction for
misdemeanors in the county and superior courts, and granted
the superior court sole jurisdiction in capital cases and in
cases involving prison sentences of seven years or more.
55oargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 132; Richard H.
Kilbourne, Jr, A History of the Louisiana civil Code: The
Formative Years, 1803-1839, (Baton Rouge: The Publications
Institute, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University, 1987), 21-22.
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Workman paid close attention to extend American guarantees
of due process to the citizens of Louisiana; accordingly,
sections of the crimes act dealt with establishing the
rights of defendants to trial by jury and to face their
accusers, both privileges were summarily denied under
civilian regulations.

Moreover, Workman introduced some

extremely enlightened sections into the act that guaranteed
Louisianians certain rights that would not be extended to
the residents of many American states and territories until
later in the century.

Thus by the Crimes Act, Louisiana

residents received the benefit of counsel and "free access"
to their attorneys, the right to subpoena witnesses, to
"make any proof" of their innocence, to receive indictments
and jury lists prior to trial, the latter being subject to
the "discretion of the court."56
As enlightened as it was, however, Workman's crimes
bill raised difficult problems for the territory.
Particularly vexing was the language in section 33 which
stated
all the crimes, offences and misdemeanors . • . , shall
be taken, intended and construed, according to and in
conformity with the common law of England; and that the
forms of indictment, (divested however of unnecessary
prolixity) the method of trial; the rules of evidence,
and all other proceedings whatsoever in the prosecution
of the said crimes, and misdemeanors, changing what
ought to be changed, shall be except as is by this act
othen1ise provided for, according to the said common
5 6warren M. Billings, "Origins of Criminal Law in
Louisiana," Louisiana History, XXXII, (Winter 1991), 63-76;
"An Act for the Punishment of Crimes and Misdemeanors, 4 May
1805, Orleans Acts.

--

--

---------
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law.

The section proved extremely problematical.

Louisiana's

judges and lawyers had to decide just what Workman meant by
the "common law of England."

Did the act sanction only

those British statutes passed prior to 1805?
American criminal practices to be considered?

How were
What exactly

"ought to be changed" regarding rules of evidence?

Who was

to judge what "prolixities" should be deemed "unnecessary?"
Response to these questions arose almost immediately in
Louisiana.

Governor Claiborne, a lawyer himself, realized

the prospective problems inherent in the legislation.
Accordingly, he appointed Lewis Kerr, another Irishman and
part of his household, to collect the criminal laws passed
by the assembly and to mine the vast quarry of AngloAmerican authorities for pertinent emendations and
clarifications.

Kerr pursued his task as

juri~consults

compiled the civil digest.57
The fruits of the compilation efforts to define the
laws in force appeared in Lewis Kerr's Exposition of the
Criminal Laws for the Territory of Orleans (1806) and James

57"An Act for the Punisment of Crimes and
Misdemeanors," Orleans Acts, 4 May 1805; Billings, "Criminal
Law in Louisiana," 70-71. Although Kerr's Exposition,
resolved numerous problems related to this section of the
Crimes Act, problems related to its vague wording troubled
Louisiana's lawyers until 1861. For a good illustration of
this see state v. McClean, (1849) Docket no. 1333, Supreme
Court of Louisiana Collection, Acct. 106, Department of
Archives and Manuscripts, Earl K. Long Library, University
of New Orleans.

-----------

-
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Brown and Moreau Lislet•s

Digest of 1808.

With those two

publications, the branches of government came to a relative
agreement about the laws in force.58
Louisiana's civil laws, as compiled in the Digest, were
drawn from a combination of Roman, French, and Spanish
civilian authorities such as Justinian's Corpus Juris
Civilis, the Code Noir, Domat, the French Civil Code of
1804, Pothier's Obligations, the Coutume de Paris, the
various projets of Post-Revolutionary France, the
Compilation of Castille, the Siete Partidas, Febrero
Adicionado, the Curia Philipica, royal ordinances, and the
Fuero Real.

Included in the Digest also were the

pronouncements of great British legal commentators such as
58Kerr's task was by far the easiest of the two since
the Crimes Act of 1805 mandated that all crimes, offenses,
and misdemeanors were to be construed in accordance with the
common laws of England. Moreau Lislet and Brown, however,
had to plow through relevant Roman, French, Spanish,
English, and American authorities to complete their
compendium. Accordingly, Kerr's Exposition appeared in
1806, while the more comprehensive Digest, was not completed
until 1808. For a lengthy analysis of the writing and
development of the code, see Ru.Jolpho Batiza, "The Louisiana
Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance,"
Robert A. Paschal, "Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply
to Professor Batiza," and Rudolpho Batiza, "Rejoinder,"
Tulane Law Review XLVI (1972), 4-164, 603-652. "An Act for
the Punishment of Crimes and Misdemeanors," 4 May 1805,
Orleans Acts. This act is analyzed in state v. McClean,
(1849) Docket no. 1333, Supreme Court of Louisiana
Collection, Acct. 106, Department of Archives and
Manuscripts, Earl K. Long Library, University of New
Orleans. The anonymous interpretation in this case, though
previously unpublished, constitutes the first 'history' of
criminal law in Louisiana. Lewis Kerr, An Exposition of the
criminal Laws of the Territory of Orleans, (New Orleans:
Published in Pursuance of an Act of the Leg~slature of the
Territory, Entitled, "An Act For the Punishment of Crimes
and Misdeanors," (sect. 48), Passed may 4, 1805; rept. Wm.
w. Gaunt & Sons, Inc.; 1986.

---------- -

.
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Blackstone and Coke and various Louisiana statutes.

As for

criminal proceedings, Kerr's Exposition relied on the
Louisiana 'Crimes Act' of 1805 and English commentators,
especially Blackstone and Sir Mathew Hale.

Ironically, the

Code Napoleon, which is so often used to describe the
foundation of Louisiana's legal theory had not reached the
territory before these compilations were published.59
As in Virginia's law revisal, the two jurisconsults'
compilation of the civil laws and Kerr's Exposition failed
to present Louisiana with a full-blown law code.
Accordingly, the Superior Court judges did not view it as
such, and neither document was invested with the authority
of a code.

When the judges referred to the Digest of 1808

or to Kerr's Exposition, as they did on numerous occasions
in the territorial period, they did so in the same manner as
they referred to English authorities such as Blackstone's
Commentaries--in the same way as Virginia's judges cited
similar sources.

In doing so, they deviated from

traditional civilian practice in which the jurist's main
occupation consists of applying appropriate code
citations. 60
Furthermore, agreement over laws in force and actual
judicial practice are two different things.

Although the

legislature and the court accepted many civilian precepts as
59Batiza, "Origins of Modern Codification," 584-585;
Kerr, Exposition, passim; Martin, History of Louisiana, v.
II, 291-292.
60see appendix I.
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the core of the terrritory's private law, the practices and
procedures of the territorial court--the very engines which
motivated the exercise and administration of the law-deviated from civil tradition as they mirrored the judicial
practices of other American states and possessions.

By

manipulating those practices and procedures, the judges of
the territorial court insured the consistent intrusion of
common law doctrines into Louisiana's jurisprudence.

Those

intrusions are best seen by examining the inner workings of
the court's procedures.
After Prevost resigned, as the court patiently awaited
completion of the work of the jurisconsults, it did its best
to dispense justice to the territory's citizens.
Jurisdictional difficulties related to the transfer of the
colony from one sovereign nation to another caused some
problems.

When Laussat suspended the Cabildo, Spanish

proceedings came to an abrupt and incomplete end.
Nonetheless, some Louisianians were still engaged in
disputes with Spanish authorities.

Matters normally handled

by Spanish courts, were now thrown under the jurisdiction of
the Prevost court, and several appeals of cases decided by
lower Spanish tribunals remained unsettled.

Seeking

resolution of the disputes, the litigants in these cases
turned to the Superior court for justice.

In ruling on the

petition of Louisiana planter, John F. Mericault, the judges
voided a mercantile agreement made between Mericault and the
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Spanish Royal Hacienda.61

On three occasions, the court

ruled on cases previously decided by Spanish tribunals.62
And in Ducourneau & Wife v. Darensburg & Others, the court
applied court costs pending before a Spanish tribunal to the
case which had been continued in the Superior Court.63

But

for the most part, the court engaged in the type of routine
debt cases, criminal proceedings, and estate settlements
that characterized American court proceedings and in these
decisions, the judges struggled to render justice by mixing
principles from Spanish, Roman, French, British, and
American sources.

Although the informal state of the laws

in force in these causes allowed for the haphazard inclusion
of common law tenets, it was the various structural measures
related to the creation and operation of the court that
provided the most reliable vehicle for the recepticn of
English and American legal precepts.
As in most cases in the Jeffersonian era, the
territorial legislators required the superior court to ride
circuit.

They divided Louisiana into twelve counties and

required the judges to go on circuit from 1 June to 1
November.

In 1807, the legislators relieved the judges from

some of their travel duties by amending the circuit act,
6lpetition of John F. Mericault, Superior court, case
#1022.
62Fernandez v. Gravier, Superior court, case #1165;
Ducourneau & Wife v. Darensburg & Others, Superior court,
case #1294; and Livingston v. De la Rionda & Wittz, Superior
Court, case #1994.
63oucourneau & Wife v. Darensburg & Others, supra.
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dividing Louisiana into five appellate districts.

The court

then sat for fixed times in Donaldsonville, Pointe Coupee,
Rap ides, and Opelousas with Nevl Orleans serving as the
primary seat.64
Originally, the legislature empowered the superior
court to hear all civil and criminal appeals from the lower
courts in the Practice Act of 10 April 1805.

According to

the act, litigants could base their arguments on original
pleadings, or they could amend their causes to entertain
either new or more complete arguments.

The act authorized

the court to entertain petitions, to mediate intercounty
disputes, to render judgments in both English and French, to
summon juries, to grant new trials, to conduct
interrogatories, to keep dockets, to issue writs, to
regulate sheriffs and coroners, to fine absent jurors and
officers, to call witnesses, to appoint referees to settle
complicated proceedings, to execute settlements, and to make
its own rules whenever necessary provided that the court
followed the strictures of English common law.65
64 11 An Act Providing for the Superior Court Going
Circuit, 11 orleans Acts, 3 July 1805; 11 An Act Supplementary
to an Act, Entitled 'An Act Providing for the Superior court
Going Ciruit,' and for Establishing courts of Inferior
Jurisdiction, 11 Orleans Acts, 31 March 1807. New Orleans's
district also served the new counties of st. Bernard,
Plaquemines, st. Charles, and st. John.
65 11 An Act Regulating the Practice of the Superior Court
in Civil Causes, 11 Orleans Acts, 10 April 1805, such actions
closely resembled the patterns of procedure fleshed out in
Virginia following the American Revolution see 11 Agreement
between the Gentlemen Practicing at the General Court Bar,"
Robinson Family Papers, Mss. 1R5685bl582 (sect. 42) Virginia
Historical Society.
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As in other American jurisdictions, the legislature
empowered the superior court to issue a wide variety of
writs.

Such writs were everyday features of American

courts.

Common bonds of attachment and execution were

included in the enabling act as well as writs of fieri
facias, distringas, quo warranto, procedendo, mandamus, and
prohibition

11

Which said writs shall pursue the forms, and be

conducted according to the rules and regulations prescribed
by the common law. 11

In pursuing these measures the

legislature ensured that although Louisiana's body of laws
would comprise a mixed jurisdiction, the courts that
presided over those laws would follow established common law
procedures.66
In these matters, the superior

court~s

guideline's

resembled Virginia's supreme court by requiring appropriate
district and superior court justices to ride circuit, to
entertain pleadings based on both original and amended
briefs, and to issue necessary writs and executions
according to the common law.

Thus the day to day routine

and forms of pleading in both jurisdictions were essentially
the same.67
66-b'd
.:L.:L·
67A. G. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates and Republican
Lawyers: Creators of Virginia Legal Culture, 1680-1810,
(Chapel Hill: Unviersity of North Carolina Press in
Association with the American Society for Legal History,
1981), 203-216; cf. Charles F. Hobson, et al. eds., The
Papers of John Marshall, V, (Chapel Hill: University of
North carolina Press in Association with the Institute of
Early American History and Culture, 1987), xxviii-xxxiii.
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The legislature also granted the superior court a
certain measure of rule-making discretion.

A need for

courts to flesh out their own procedures to meet particular
demands necessitated this extension of authority.

Although

there is nothing unique about allowing courts to make their
own rules, the training, background, and judicial style of
the superior court judges ensured that Louisiana's court
rules would follow American patterns of judicial
development, thus continuing the trend that the legislature
started in the acts that defined the court's jurisdiction.
Some of the early rules which the Orleans justices ordered
offer important glimpses into what concerned their
territorial tribunal in its formative years.
For the period between 1804 and 1809, before the
court's proceedings were reported, there are only two
allusions to court rules.

The judgment in Heyman v. Woods

refers to a court rule that allowed the judges to appoint
referees to examine Woods's accounts in order to determine
the amount of debt he owed the plaintiff.

A similar rule

was alluded to in Jenkins v. Lartigue et al. where Joseph
Faurie and Charles Patton were appointed
the defendant's estate.

a~

appraisers of

Unfortunately, these brief glimpses

are the only evidence of rule-making in the superior court
found in the unreported cases.68
After Francois Martin began editing his Reports in

68Heyman v. Woods, superior court; case #787; Jenkins
v. Lartigue et al., Superior Court, case #796.

-~-------
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1809, the court engaged in three rule-making sessions.
Thanks to Martin, the rules have been preserved in their
entirety.

Since the rules were of an elementary nature, it

is reasonable to presume that the court was setting them
down for the first time or placing them in the record to
validate earlier, unreported strictures.

In the first

session that Martin chronicled, the judges authored
important guidelines to facilitate the court's operation.
Since jury trials were a new addition to Louisiana's legal
system, the first recorded court rules established
procedures regarding selection of juries.

These measures

specified the sheriff's duties, the obligations of the
litigants, and the court's own ability to issue venire
writs.

Next, Martin reported the rules governing the

processes involved in appealing criminal cases.

These

regulations prescribed the methods of filing transcripts,
recording verdicts, receiving grand jury indictments, and
docketing criminal hearings.

To make court sessions proceed

more smoothly, the judges prescribed methods of motioning,
filing suits, securing fees, taking depositions, posting
trial lists, and rotating dockets.

Finally, the court

ordered that attorneys and counsellors admitted to the bar
must be American citizens.69
At the request of the bar the court's next rule-making
session dealt exclusively with lawyers.

Just as the early

Supreme Court of the United States had done, the Orleans
69La. Ann., 1 Mart. (0. S.), 82-87.
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court divided its officers into two categories.70

Lawyers

were required each year to specify whether they wished to
serve as attorneys or counsellors.

Attorneys prepared and

signed pleas, took out writs and citations, filed entries
and orders, summoned all witnesses, and declared all summary
motions.

Justices empowered counsellors to examine and to

correct pleadings and to argue special motions and trials.
Moreover, the court ordered that no attorney could serve as
a counsellor or vice versa during the year covering the
original application, nor could superior court attorneys
practice in the parish courts.

Since the court required

attorneys to practice under the auspices of a counsellor for
at least two years before they could achieve the latter
rank,71 these rules may be viewed as an embryonic exercise
of the court's prerogative to govern legal education.72
Creation of a graduated bar mirrors behavior in other states
in the early national period where republican lawyers
clustered in professional associations centered on high
judicial institutitons.73

Thus the growing professionalism

70Henry Campbell Black, Law Dictionary, 410.
71La. Ann., 1 Mart. (0. S.), 140-141.
72sometimes, the court and the legislature collaborated
to draft comprehensive regulations. For instance, in 1805
the legislature promulgated an explicit fee bill which set
the standard fees which attorneys and counsellors could
charge for their services, "An Act Establishing an Explicit
Fee Bill," 27 April 1805.
73rn Virginia, for instance, lawyers in the district or
superior court bar actually rode circuit with those
tribunals, see Charles T. Cullen, "Completing the Revisal of
the Laws in Post-Revolutionary Virginia," Virginia Magazine
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of the American bar informed Louisiana's legal system from
the very beginning of its territorial development.
The rules promulgated in the court's last rule-making
session suggests increasing pressure on the dockets.

During

the 1811 fall term the court redefined its methods of filing
civil causes and questioning witnesses, and provided stiff
penalties for litigants seeking continuances for frivolous
reasons.

The court also abandoned its practice of setting

up special days for hearing jury trials, summary causes, and
calendering pleadings.

Finally, the court restricted the

activities of members of the bar by admonishing them to
annunciate their motions in a clear and orderly fashion and
to police their seats after each session.74
These early rules parallel practices in other American
dominions in the early national period.

Those tribunals

made rules, regulated proceedings, policed the bar according
to republican standards, and grappled with burgeoning
dockets.

In these matters, the practices of the superior

court bear no resemblance to French civil courts or to the
Spanish Cabildo.

Forms of pleading in the Orleans court,

use of juries and summary writs, citing precedents, and
judicial rulings based on these procedures reflect distinct
English and American judicial practices.

In civilian

jurisdictions, judges mainly manage written appeals and
apply appropriate code citations in order to render
of History and Biography, 82 (1974), 84-99.
74La. Ann., 2 Mart. (0. S.), 1-10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

142
judgments.

References to previous decisions take a backseat

to the powerful codes.75
~nerican

At the Orleans court, however,

judges met with American lawyers and decided cases

according to American juridical procedures.

Such examples

of judicial authority and the creative aspect of judge-made
law are not features of the civilian tradition.
The territorial period marked the beginning of a legal
transformation of Louisiana.

Laussat's suspension of the

Cabildo and the subsequent failure to invest Louisiana with
an authoritative code allowed for frequent borrowing from
English and American judicial traditions.

Further borrowing

was made possible by legislative and judicial restrictions
on the construction of summary writs.

American domination

of the bar started with the territorial court's regulatory
provisions in rulemaking sessions--provisions promulgated at
the request of Louisiana's lawyers.

Thus a deferential

relationship of court over bar developed within Louisiana's
appellate structure since the very beginning of the
territory's judicial history.76
75For a lively discussion of these differences in the
role of the judge in present-day civil and common law
jurisdictions, see Jean Baudouin, "Impact of Common Law in
Louisiana and Quebec," and Albert Tate, Jr., "The Role of
the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The Louisiana Experience,"
in Joseph Dainow, ed., The Role of judicial Decisions and
Doctrine in Civil Law and Mixed Jurisdictions, (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 1-38. Although
both of these essays refer to modern courts, both authors
include discussions of theoretical and historical role of
the judge in common law and civil law.
76For a good example of how this dominance continued in
the antebellum period see Elizabeth Gaspard, "Rise of the
Louisiana Bar," Louisiana History, 28 (Spring 1987),
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At the cession of the colony to the United States, all
of the preconditions necessary for legal change existed in
Louisiana.

Confusion over the laws in force had made the

legal system "cumbrous and remote from social realities."
The subsequent attempts to define the laws in force via the
Digest of 1808 and Kerr's Exposition facilitated the further
introduction of Anglo-American tradtions, thus allowing for
the "realistic borrowing" of foreign legal principles.
Although the transfer of Louisiana to the United States
cannot be considered a social or political revolution, the
rebuilding of the territory's administration according to
American standards represented a change tantamount to a
revolution in government.

Finally, the change within the

elite structure of Louisiana, stimulated by the Purchase,
led many Americans to fill important governmental and
judicial posts, thus allowing for a "forceful elite" to use
"law as a tool" for legal change.
The legal and judicial changes of the territorial
period led to the development of a common law-oriented
juridical discourse within a mixed system of laws.

With the

entry of Louisiana into the Union and the calling of a
constitutional convention, Louisiana's lawmakers were
presented with an opportunity to comment upon and to revise
the structure of the state's judiciary.

Whether they would

incorporate the pattern of courts and judicial discourse
that developed in the territorial period or revert to more
186-187.
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orthodox civilian patterns of justice depended upon the type
of appellate judiciary they would create in the
constitutional revision.
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Chapter Four
The Supreme Court of Appeals for the State of Virginia
The "December Reform" centralized Virginia's appellate
system.

Although the General Court and the High court of

Chancery still existed, their judges no longer sat on the
Court of Appeals.

District courts absorbed whatever

admiralty jurisdiction that had not been assumed by the
federal courts and much of the General Court's power.
Stabilization of the Supreme court of Appeals, however,
marked the most important feature of the 1788 reform.l
Despite the stability, rising levels of litigation and
increasingly complicated practices combined to create a
docket crisis that eventually stimulated a new cry for
reform and further redefinition of the court's jurisdiction.
The effect of these disputes led to a continuation of the
ambivalent settlement of the Revolution into the early
national period.
Continuation of the ambivalent settlement toolt on a
new twist in the years following the December reform.
Creation of the Supreme Court of Appeals as a separate
tribunal extended the boundaries of judicial independence,
as the judges could devote much of their time, effort, and
lHening, statutes, "An Act for Establishing District
Courts, and for Regulating tha General Court," v. XII, 730763; "An Act for Amending the Act, Intitled An Act
Constituting the Court of Admiralty and the Judges thereof,"
v. XII, 769-770; "An Act Concerning the General Court," v.
XII I 77 0-771.
145
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expertise to question the role of the appellate court in the
new republic.

As the judges exercised their new

independence within the context of a single tribunal, they
assumed a greater measure of control over defining the
practices and procedures of that court.

In doing so, the

judges exacerbated the paradoxes inherent in the creation of
the judicial system and created others as they charted new
territory.

The investigation of such matters reveals the

ambiguous nature of the court--anxious to exercise and to
protect its new-found measure of judicial independence, yet
equally attuned to a paradoxical American fascination with
both common law tradition and the supremacy of the
legislative will.

In order to illustrate the impact of the

1788 reform, it is necessary to focus on four elemental
areas of the Supreme court of Appeals: the structural
changes in the appellate court, the background of its
personnel, the rules the court created for itself, and the
important decisions which defined the role of both common
law and statute in the Old Dominion.

* * *
Structurally, judges of Virginia's other high courts
sitting in leave constituted the Court of Appeals before
1788.

The reform of 1788 sought to remedy the problems

caused by the growing litigiousness of Virginians and
recreated the Supreme court of Appeals as a permanent
tribunal with its own personnel.

Moreover, the 1788

revision realigned Virginia's judicial elite.

Before the
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reform, Virginia's appellate judges shared nearly equal
status since they all sat on the high court.

Although

Chancery judges ranked slightly higher than those of the
other courts, distinctions mattered little as the other
judges often reviewed chancery decisions.

Revision of the

court system drastically changed the arrangement.

General

Court judges divided their duties between that court's
sessions and a grueling district court itinerary.

Chancery

remained a separate tribunal, but became subordinate to the
reconstituted Supreme Court of Appeals.2

Thus the judges of

the Supreme Court of Appeals possessed higher status than
any other members of the state's judiciary.3

As the supreme

court judges exercised their higher status by promulgating
new court rules and ruling on both appeals and matters of
jurisdiction, the court assumed a position of leadership
that it had not enjoyed previously.

Specifically, the new

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia began to dictate not
only judicial interpretations as a court of last resort, but
the practices, procedures, and jurisdictions of other courts
as well.
Basically, the Virginia supreme court matured in two
2rn fact, Chancery jurisdiction would soon come under
attack. By the first decade of the nineteenth century, the
chancellors had to fend off plans to reapportion the
chancery court along the lines of the district courts. one
popular method that was discussed involved blending equity
and common law jurisdictions. John Minor to Creed Taylor,
30 November 1809, Archibald stuart to creed Taylor, 20
December 1809, 19 January 1812, Creed Taylor Papers, Special
Collections, Alderman Library, University of Virginia.
3rbid.
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phases between 1788 and 1830 under five chief judges: Edmund
Pendleton, Paul Carrington, Peter Lyons, William Fleming,
and William H. Cabell.

Between 1788 and 1803 Chief Judge

Edmund Pendleton dominated the court.

Although Pendleton's

conservative views often presaged the substance of his
opinions, he never hesitated to pen bold decisions in
confirmation of the republican revolution.

After

Pendleton's death, the court continued operation on a
consistent level; however, without his strong direction the
court began to feel the strain of a changing ideology, one
that rewrote Virginia's constitution and led to a new wave
of judicial activism.
The Supreme Court of Appeals under presiding judge
Pendleton initially consisted of Peter Lyons, William
Fleming, John Blair, Jr., and Paul Carrington.

For the most

part, these jurists represented the generation that reached
political maturity with the American Revolution.

Pendleton

and Lyons hailed from the ranks of Virginia's conservative
elite.

They took to revolution cautiously and tempered

their republicanism with the traditions of the old order.
Fleming, Blair, and Carrington closely adhered to
Jefferson's view of the Revolution.

Each possessed singular

talents, honed sharp through years of study and practice,
that suited them for service on the fledgling court.
Senior Judge Edmund Pendleton's qualifications for his
honored position stemmed from almost a half-century of
experience as a practicing lawyer and jurist.

Pendleton's
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judicial career reflected his training and experience as a
county and General Court lawyer, burgess, and chancellor.
Edmund Pendleton established his law career in the
midst of Virginia's Golden Age.

Born on 9 September 1721 in

a portion of Essex that later became Caroline county,
Pendleton faced bleak prospects early in life.
died four months before Pendleton's birth.

His father

Thus, his

mother, Mary Taylor, burdened with the upkeep of seven
orphans, married Edward Watkins, a small planter, when
Pendleton was two years old.

Since the Watkins soon had two

children of their own, Edmund eased into the industrious
life of a middle child in a large family.
Pendleton caught the eye of county clerk

By age fourteen,
B~njamin

Robinson

who took him as his apprentice and launched his legal
career.4
As Robinson's apprentice, Pendleton acquired the
skills that would serve him for the rest of his life.

In

the mid- eighteenth century no standard governed legal
education in the colonies.

Some attorneys, such as St.

George Tucker, read law after completing a formal
education.5

Others, like John Blair, Jr., journeyed to

4oavid John Mays, Edmund Pendleton, 1721-1803: A
Biography, v. I, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1952), 6-12.
5char1es Cullen, "St. George Tucker and the Law,"
(Ph. D. dissertation, University of Virginia); Cullen, "St.
George Tucker," in w. Hamilton Bryson Legal Education in
Virginia, A Biographical Approach, (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia 1982).
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England to study at the celebrated Inns of Court.6
Pendleton, like many Virginians of his day, pursued his
education in a more informal manner.

Working in Robinson's

office Pendleton steeped himself in the everyday activities
of a law practice.

Using his spare change to finance latin

classes and to buy law books, Pendleton plunged into the
complicated lessons of the law with a rare determination.
Soon, Pendleton's portian attention to study and to detail
landed him the clerkship of st. Mary's vestry in addition to
his apprenticeship.

Similarly, when Pendleton joined the

county muster, he became the clerk of the court martial.?
Immersion in the intricacies of the law brought
Pendleton to the bar by age nineteen. 8

Between 1741 and

1745, Pendleton built his law practice in Caroline County.
In 1744 he was appointed deputy king's attorney for
Caroline.

And in 1745 he gained admitance to the General

Court Bar.

Although the General Court held the stronger

attraction to the Old Dominion's lawyers, Pendleton's work
as a prosecutor and the bulk of his private practice tied
him closely to the Caroline County court.

Accordingly, in

December 1751, he accepted an appointment as a justice to
that court.

Other duties, however soon interrupted

Pendleton's tenure as a justice of the peace.

Just one

6Alfred E. Jones, American Members of the Inns of
Court, (London: The Saint catherine Press, 1924), xiii, 2321.
?Edmund Pendleton, v. I, 12-22.
8Mays,Edmund Pendleton, v. I, 24.
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month later his neighbors elected him to the House of
Burgesses where he divided his time between his duties as a
lawyer, lawmaker, and justice of the peace until the
Revolution.

During that period, Pendleton employed the

lessons he learned as a young apprentice to become one of
Virginia's leading lawyers.9
Pendleton's early experiences profoundly influenced
the course of his life.

The attention to detail and

appreciation of things legal that became part of his persona
as Robinson's clerk so dictated Pendleton's actions that his
epitaph read
He soon acquired a profound knowledge of the character
of mankind, and of human affairs. And perhaps it was
his happiness, throughout his life, to have extracted
his opinions from realities, rather than from the
speculations of philosphers.
Such realities formed the hallmarks of Pendleton's judicial
decisions.10
Despite his conservative nature, Pendleton played an
important role in Virginia's Revolutionary assembly.

He

served as delegate to the first Continental Congress, a
member of Virginia's first revolutionary convention,
president of the convention of 1776, and Speaker of the
House of Delegates.11

Philip Mazzei reported that during

9Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. I 25-306.
v.

I

10American Epitaphs, cited in Mays, Edmund Pendleton,
23.

11David L. Pulliam, The Constitutional Conventions of
Virginia from the Foundation of the Commonwealth to the
Present Time, (Richmond: John T. West, Publisher, 1901), 27.
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the Revolution "men of clear vision [ i. e., republicans]"
called him "Moderation."

In the revisal of the laws,

Pendleton often opposed Jefferson.

Mazzei remarked

Four of the members were always in agreement; but Mr.
Edmund Pendleton, a greater lover of legal matters than
of philosophy, was often a dissenter, especiallY on the
articles about religion and about inheritance.l2
Despite his disputes with much of Jefferson's program,
Pendleton unflinchingly supported the efforts to liberalize
the courts.l3
After the Revolution, Pendleton repeatedly
distinguished himself as president of the chancery court.
In fact, throughout his judicial career, Pendleton never had
one opinion overturned.l4

In 1789, Pendleton turned down a

presidential appointment as judge on the United States
District Court of Virginia so that he could serve the Old
Dominion on the Court of Appeals.l5

That Pendleton, despite

his conservative bent, assumed so many important leadership
positions in the new republic stemmed equally from his
respected lawyerly achievements and the ambivalent nature of
Virginia's republican government.

As chief judge of the

12nMemoirs of Philip Mazzei," trans., E. c. Branchi,
second installment, WMO, 2nd ser., (October, 1929), 248.
13This fact is evident in Pendleton's vigorous support
of Jefferson's assize plan which drew loud opposition from
conservative forces in the general assembly, PEP, v. I
Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, 19 December 1786, 491.
14The only exception to this was a decision that
Pendleton himself found flawed.
15pulliam, Constitutional Conventions, 27.
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Supreme Court of Appeals, Pendleton's conservative nature
and adherence to tradition forced him into the ironic
position of being the judicial defender of liberal
legislative efforts that he vehemently opposed as a member
of the Virginia revolutionary convention.l6
The qualifications of other members of the Pendleton
court complemented their president's excellent credentials.
John Blair, Jr., was born into the ranks of Virginia's
ruling elite in 1732.17

His father was president of the

Virginia Council and could afford his son all of life's
advantages.

Since his great uncle, James Blair, co-founded

the College of William and Mary, John matriculated there.
In 1753 he ventured to London's Middle Temple where he
joined fellow Virginians John Banister and John Ambler.
Four years later he presented himself to the English bar.l8
Education in the prestigious Inns of Court was a rarity in
colonial Virginia; accordingly, Blair's training insured him
instant success upon his return to the colony.
Shortly after his return to the Old Dominion Blair
began practicing law.

In 1766 he engaged in a long career

in politics and public service when he was elected as the
College of William and Mary's representative to the House of
16see the discussions of Thornton v. Smith and Brown et
al. v. Turberville below.
17DAB, 337.
18Jones, American Members of the Inns of Court, xiii,
21-23.
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Burgesses.l9

He became the college bursar and the clerk of

the Virginia Council in 177o.20

Three years later, he

joined the Williamsburg Lodge of Masons and became its first
Grand Master in 1778.21
As a burgess, Blair exhibited an early disposition to
resist Britain.

He presided over the passage of a bill

condemning a parliamentary resolution restricting the
colony's right to tax and to petition in 1769.22

During the

Revolution Blair played a prominent role in the resistance.
An ardent republican, Blair sat on the committee that penned
The College of William and Mary's "Declaration of Rights,n23
served on the constitutional committee of the 1776
convention, and became a member of Virginia's Privy Council.
Republican commentator Philip Mazzei described Blair as "a
man gifted with talent, a clear mind, and a good heart.n24
Blair began his judicial career in 1778 by accepting
an appointment to the General Court.

Two years later he

19DAB, 338.
20nAccounts of Salaries in 1770, 11 WMO, 1st ser.,
(January, 1898), 189.
1892)

2lnwilliamsburg Lodge of Masons," WMO, 1st ser. (July,
1
10, 17.

22 11 Resolves of the House of Burgesses Upholding the
Rights to Tax and to Petition and Condemning a Resolution of
Parliament," 16 May 1769, in Van Schreeven, etc., The Road
to Revolution in Virginia, (Richmond: Virginia state Library
and Archives, 1976?), 68-70.
23"Education in colonial Virginia," Part V, WMO, 1st
ser., (July, 1898), 2.
24Mazzei, "Memoir," 250.
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replaced Robert Carter Nicholas on the court of Admiralty.25
In 1782, he participated in the important resolution of
eaton v. commonwealth.26

Meanwhile, Blair kept up his law

practice,27 served on the committee to study the lunatic
asylum,28 and in 1787, accepted the Governor's appointment
to the Philadelphia convention.29

Few Virginian's possessed

his energy, lawyerly ability, and commitment to republican
principles.

Blair's choice for the Supreme Court of Appeals

provided a fine counterpoint to the conservative disposition
of the tribunal's chief judge.

Unfortunately for the court,

Blair's tenure as a justice was short-lived as he accepted a
position on the Supreme Court of the United States in 1789.
Peter Lyons also hailed from Virginia's conservative
leadership.

Born in Cork, Ireland, in 1734, Lyons read law

in Virginia with James Power, with whom he formed a lifelong
friendship,30 and gained admission to the Virginia bar in
25DAB, 338.
26see Chapter II.
27John Blair to Governor Nelson, 15 July 1781, VCSP, v.
II, 220.
28John Blair, Nathaniel Burwell, John de Siqueyra,
James Madison, and Joseph Prentis to Governor Nelson, July
1781 "Report on the Deplorable Conditions of the 'Hospital
for Lunatics,"' VCSP, v. II, 279.
29John Blair to the Governor of Virginia, 25 December
1786, VCSP, v. IV, 210-211.
30peter Lyons to Bartholomew Dandridge, 1784, eustis
Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society.
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1756.31

Lyons soon became one of Virginia's leading

attorneys, representing many prominent planters and legal
figures. 32

His skill quickly led to an appointment as

king's counsellor.

As king's attorney, Lyons frequently

practiced before the the General Court.

In his most famous

action, he represented the crown in the affair of the
Parson's Cause in 1755-1765.

The victory over the

flamboyant young Patrick Henry solidified Lyons's position
as one of the colony's leading legal minds.33

Pendleton

enlisted Lyons's aid in settling John Robinson's complicated
estate, and the two judges remained good friends and
colleagues for many years.34

Like many conservatives of his

day, Lyons supported Virginia over the mother country in the
Revolution.

Soon his legal abilities and sound judgment

thrust him into the forefront of the struggle.

After the

Revolution the assembly rewarded Lyons with a General Court
judgeship. 3 5

Subsequently, on the Court of Appeals, Lyons

31Jerry Kail, ed., Who Was Who during the American
Revolution, (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1976), 463.
3 2Judge Robert Carter to Thomas Claiborne, 16 April
1771, Carter Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society.
33Glenn Curtis Smith, "The Parson's cause, 1755-1765, 11
Tylers Historical Magazine, 21 (1940), 140-171, 291-306.
34Bond, Joseph and Benjamin Holladay to Peter Randolph,
Edmund Pendleton and Peter Lyons, Robinson's admins., 30
January 1767, Bond, Joseph Holladay to Benjamin Rawlins,
Edmund Pendleton and Peter Lyons, Robinson's admins., 20
January 1767 Holladay Family Papers, Virginia Historical
Society; John Lewis to Edmund Randolph, 22 July 17[?], John
Lewis Papers, Virginia Historical Society.
35Kail, Who Was Who, 463.
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played a role in many of the celebrated cases of the day
including Caton v. Commonwealth.36

Thus like Pendleton,

Lyons brought a conservative voice and long experience to
the new republican bench.

And, as Pendleton, Lyons blended

his conservative personality with republican ideals to
become a powerful member of the revolutionary establishment.
William Fleming was born in 1736.

He graduated from

the College of William and Mary in 1763 and began his legal
studies.

In 1772 he represented Cumberland County in the

House of Burgesses.

During the Revolution, Fleming attended

the 1775 and 1776 Virginia conventions37 and served in the
House of Delegates in 1776 and 1777.38

In 1778 Fleming

accepted an appointment to the General Court, but left the
following year to sit in the Continental Congress where he
served the Old Dominion until 1781.39

He represented

Cumberland County in the Virginia Ratification Convention of
1788.40

During the Revolution Fleming became one of

Jefferson's closest advisors41 and for the rest of his life
36see Chapter II.
37Edwin c. Carter, II, Angeline Polites, Lee w.
Formwalt, and John c. Van Horne, eds., The Virginia Journals
of Benjamin Henry Latrobe. 1795-1798, v. 2, 1797-1798, (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, Published for the
Maryland Historical Society, 1977), 541.
38william Fleming to William Preston, 15 December 1777,
Preston Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society.
39carter, et al., Latrobe Journals, 541.
40Pulliam, Constitutional Conventions, 22.
41Dumas Malone, Jefferson and his Time, v. I, 240-241.
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he espoused the Jeffersonian vision of America.
Paul Carrington's appointment to the court crowned a
stunning law career.

Born in Charlotte county in 1733,

Carrington led the raucous life of a youth on Virgnia's
southside frontler.42

A handsome and vigorous lad, he

caught the attention of Colonel Clement Read, clerk of the
Charlotte County Court.

Thus, like Pendleton, Carrington's

legal apprenticeship began under the watchful eye of a
county clerk.

In 1750, Carrington moved into Read's home

and began to read law with the colonel.43

He followed up

that training by attending the College of William and Mary
where he graduated in 1753.44

Peyton Randolph, John

Brandford, and George Wythe signed Carrington's license to
practice law in the colony's county and inferior courts in
1755.45

Because of the wealth of legal business on the

southside, Carrington secured licences to practice as crown
attorney in Bedford, Mecklenburg, Lunenburg, and Charlotte
counties between 1756 and 1770.46
42pulliam, Constitutional Conventions, 21.
43John w. Eggleston, "'Judge Paul Carrington,' an
address delivered at an APVA meeting in 1954, 11 Lang Syne,
Charlotte County Branch, APVA, (September, 1972), 15.
44Kail, Who Was Who, 442-443.
45peyton Randolph, John Brandford, and George Wythe,
"License to Practice in County and Inferior Courts," 1755,
Paul carrington Papers, Virginia Historical Society.
46Robert Dinwiddie, "License to Practice as Crown
Attorney in Bedford County," 3 May 1756, Paul Carrington
Papers, Virginia Historical Society; Francis Fauquier,
"License to Practice as Crown Attorney in Mecklenburg
County," 1767, Paul Carrington Papers, Virginia Historical
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Not surprisingly, Carrington used his legal career to
further his political ambitions.
from 1765-1776.

He served as a burgess

Embracing the resistance early on, he

became a member of the Mercantile Association and sat in the
first four Virginia conventions, the Committee of Safety,
and the House of Delegates.47

Patrick Henry launched

Carrington's judicial career in 1778 with an appointment to
the General Court.48

A staunch republican throughout the

Revolution, Carrington served in the ratification
convention.49
When John Blair, Jr., resigned shortly after joining
the court in 1789, another staunch republican, James Mercer,
took his place.
in 1736.

Mercer was born into a rich Virginia family

He received most of his early schooling at home

until he attended the College of William and Mary.

After

graduating from the College, Mercer read law and entered the
bar.

In the Seven Years' War, Mercer served as captain and

commander of Fort Loudoun.

Mercer's legal abilities and

wartime service led to his involvement in colonial politics.
He sat in the House of Burgesses from 1762-1775 and in the
Society; Norborne Botetourt, "License to Practice as Crown
Attorney in Charlotte County," 4 May 1770, Paul Carrington
Papers, Virginia Historical Society; William Nelson,
"License to Practice as Crown Attorney in Lunenburg County,"
Paul Carrington Papers, Virginia Historical Society.
47pulliam, constitutional Conventions, 21.
48patrick Henry, "Appointment to the General Court," 20
February 1778, Paul Carrington Papers, Virginia Historical
Society.
49pulliam, Constitutional Convention, 21.
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Virginia conventions of 1774, 1775, and 1776.

His political

skill and allegiance to Revolutionary ideals won him a spot
in the 1779 Continental Congress.50
Mercer's commitment to the law fostered in him an
interest in legal scholarship.

His family's considerable

fortune allowed him to indulge that interest with the
purchase of many law books.

Accordingly, Mercer's volumes,

along with his brother John's, formed one of the premier law
libraries in colonial America.
tome5 belonged to James Mercer.

Nearly three-score of the
Among the many English

commentaries, how-to-do-it books, and philosophical tracts
in Mercer's collection stood such standard works as Coke's
Institutes and Blackstone's Commentaries.

In addition to

these classics, however, Mercer assembled one of the finest
collections of abridgements and reports in the colonies.
Moreover, Mercer's curiosity about things legal led him to
purchase such diverse titles as Jean Domat•s civil Law and
Sir George Mackenzie's Institutions of the Laws of
Scotland.51

During the colonial period, Mercer's collection

proved invaluable, especially to his brother John, an ardent
collector in his own right,52 who compiled and abridged
50Biographical Dictionary of the United States
Congress, 1774-1989, Bicentennial edition, (Washington, D.
C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), 1490.
51such works were often consulted by colonial judges
when the common law left them without a remedy.
52John Mercer's collection of ninety-seven editions of
law reports alone outdistanced his nearest rival in colonial
Virginia by a three to one margin, w. Hamilton Bryson,
Census of Law Books in Colonial Virginia, (Charlottesville:
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Virginia's acts of assembly in 1769.53

During his tenure on

the bench, Mercer's scholarship and his fine library
assisted him on many occasions.
Mercer's career as a jurist began with his appointment
to the General Court in 1779.

He served on the General

Court and the High court of Admiralty until he received an
appointment to the Supreme Court of Appeals in 1789.54
When Mercer died in 1793, Henry Tazewell filled his
seat.

Tazewell was born in Brunswick county in 1753.

Thus

when Tazewell took up his post on the Court of Appeals, he
became its youngest member.
Mary in 1772.

He graduated from William and

Little is known about Tazewell's legal

education and early career.
practice on the southside.

He built up a thriving legal
In 1785 he was appointed to the

General Court, and hence served briefly on the Court of
Appeals.

In 1793, he replaced Mercer on the Supreme Court

of Appeals where he sat until he resigned to serve in the
United States Senate in 1795.55

Although Tazewell served

briefly and without distinction, his resignation had a major
University Press of Virginia, 1978), xii.
53Bennie Brown, Jr., comp. "Books in the Mason-Mercer
Collection as of November 1, 1974, at Gunston Hall,"
typescript, Virginia Historical Society.
54Pulliam, Constitutional Conventions, 26.
55Who Was Who in the American Revolution, 482; Numerous
documents in the Skipwith Family Papers, Department of
Archives and Special Collections, Earl Gregg swem Library,
College of William and Mary, reveal evidence of Tazewell's
vigorous practice in Brunswick, Lunenburg, and Mecklenburg
counties.
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effect on the Court of Appeals when Spencer Roane accepted
appointment to his vacant seat.
Spencer Roane, like Henry Tazewell, represented a
different generation from his brother justices.

Born in

1762, Roane grew up amid the rhetorical swirl that was
republican Virginia.
Mary where he

He attended the College of William and

became a charter member of Phi Beta Kappa.

After graduating from the College, he read law with
Chancellor Wythe and gained admission to the bar in 1782.
Only twenty-one years old, Roane entered the House of
Delegates where he fought vigorously for the
disestablishment of the Anglican church in opposition to his
mentor, Patrick Henry.

In 1784, Roane was elected to

Henry's council.

Two years later, he took a position in the

Virginia senate.

As a staunch anti-federalist, Roane fought

vigorously against the ratification of the constitution and
exhibited a profound distrust of the power of the national
government for the rest of his life.

Roane began his

judicial career in 1789 when he accepted appointment to the
revamped General Court.

Despite his prickly personality,

Roane was unanimously elected to the Supreme Court of
Appeals in 1794 where he soon becdme a "storm center of
controversy," especially in the years following Pendleton's
death. 56
56nJudge Spencer Roane of Virginia: Champion of States'
Rights--Foe of John I1arsha11," Harvard Law Review, v. 66
(1953), 1242-1246; DAB, v. 15, 642. See also the fine
biographies of Roane by Rex Beach, "Spencer Roane and the
Richmond Junto," WMO, 2d ser. XXII (1942), 1-17; and

---------

--.
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Each of these men brought something valuable and
necessary to the court.

Pendleton contributed his deep

practical knowledge of the law.

Lyons and Pendleton served

as conservative bulwarks in a libertarian age.

Fleming,

Blair, and carrington brought energy, republican zeal, and
considerable political skill to the tribunal.

Tazewell and

Roane brought the vitality of the Revolutionary generation.
Roane's committment to Jefferson's brand of republicanism,
especially, influenced the personality of the Court of
Appeals as he often thrust himself into the center of
Virginia's jurisdictional controversies.

Accordingly, the

supreme bench boasted a long heritage of judicial
experience, political acumen, diverse ideologies, and
balanced leadership as it faced its first years of operation
as an independant tribunal.

More important, the court

benefitted from the respect that the associates had for
Pendleton and from the chief justice's firm guidance and
sound, consistent legal judgment.
Unlike Louisiana's judges, Pendleton and his
associates understood their court's jurisdiction and basic
procedures from the beginning.
existed in Virginia since 1779.

A court of appeals had
Although the Pendleton

court represented a new creation, it continued the pattern

Margaret E. Horsnell, "Spencer Roane: Judicial Advocate of
Jeffersonian Principles," Ph. D. diss., University of
Minnesota, 1967.
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of the first tribunal.57

Thus the new bench benefitted from

a decade of practice, experience, and operation.

Moreover,

no fewer than five legislative acts had defined the court's
jurisdiction during its first ten years.58
Thus when the Pendleton court convened for the first
time in 1789, it had a keen sense of its role in the
political process.

Previous experience demonstrated the

need for the court to take active control of its practices
and procedures in order to ensure a greater measure of
judicial independence.

Under Pendleton, consequently, the

court became more aggressive in defining its procedures in
court rules.

Before 1788 the Court of Appeals had kept

rulemaking sessions to a minimum (partially because the
Revolution did not precipitate a major break with
established court procedures); consequently, the courts
rules were easy to comprehend.

The earlier court made rules

only when docket pressures dictated a need.

Those rules

57Actually, the creation of a single and independent
court of appeals greatly simplified the operations of the
court. In previous sittings the bench was always in a
precarious situation regarding membership. For instance, if
a court convened with only the minimum number of judges in
attendance, all cases in which interested judges were
involved could not be heard in the session. As the court
heard appeals from all of Virginia's superior courts, this
problem alone provided a formidable obstacle in the
tribunal's ability to render justice efficiently.
58Hening, Statutes, "An Act for Establishing a Court of
Appeals," v. 9, 522; "An Act Constituting the Court of
Appeals," v. 10, 89; "An Act for Amending the Act, Intituled
An Act Constituting the Court of Appeals," v. XII 764; "An
Act Allowing Travelling Expenses to the Judges of the
General Court," v. XII, 768; "An Act Concerning the Court of
Admiralty and the Judges Thereof," v. VII, 769; "An Act
Concerning the General Court," v. XII, 770.

---~----
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consistently failed to meet the demands placed upon the
dockets by litigious Virginians.

The failure of the rule

changes to solve the docket crisis became a major ingredient
in the drive to redefine the courts in 1788.59
Even the structural revisions of the 1788 reform
failed to relieve the clogged appellate dockets as attorneys
attached an endless string of motions to causes pending
before the Supreme Court of Appeals.

Two rules promulgated

in 1790 sought to curb excessive motions.

The court ordered

that attorneys supporting or opposing motions could not
submit affidavits without reasonable notice or without
demonstrating good cause.

In order to cut down on clerical

inconveniences, the judges ruled that objections to
securities placed upon writs of error, supersedeas, and
appeals had to be made to the court to which the writ was
returnable, rather than to the Court of Appeals.60

Each of

these rules constituted time-saving measures and reflected
increased pressure on the dockets.

Thus the judges removed

a major inhibition to the court's operations by reforming
appellate procedures.
Other court rules demonstrate the more aggressive
attitude of the Pendleton court toward regulating its
proceedings.

Consequently, subsequent rules dealt with

sweeping issues related to the administration of justice.
Preserving court records had always been a problem in
59see above, pp. 78-80.
60Rule of court, 1 July 1790, 1 H&M, 10.

--

-----· - - -
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the Old Dominion.

Despite vigorous legislative efforts to

ensure efficient clerical standards, the court encountered
problems in receiving records from district court clerks.
In 1795 the judges crafted regulations to solve those
problems by ordering that when records failed to accompany
appeals from a district court after two terms, that the
record would not be received.

The court reserved the right

to receive the records by motioning the inferior court, thus
making the materials available upon demand.61

The rule

reflected the activist stance that the Pendleton court took
in designing more efficient judicial practices.

Moreover,

the restrictions of the 1795 order illustrate the influence
that the supreme court could wield over the state's lower
courts.

Thus the leadership role of the Supreme Court of

Appeals extended beyond the court's right to review
decisions of lesser tribunals.

By changing its own rules,

the Supreme Court of Appeals could dictate procedural
changes in lower courts as well.
In its last rulemaking session {1803), the Pendleton
court echoed earlier Court of Appeals regulations of April
1784 and November 1786 by requiring hearings in all cases
during the term designated for their return, and dispensed
with the 1786 requirement to file motions in cases requiring
the court's immediate attention.62

Repetition of the type

of rules passed in 1784 and 1786 reflected the fact that the
61Rule of Court, 28 october 1795, 1 H&M, 10.
62see above pp. 78-80.
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court had routinely disregarded the earlier rules, thus
disrupting the flow of cases through the dockets.

The 1803

regulation suggests a revival of earlier practices.
Furthermore, the dispensation of the motion requirement
reduced the amount of motions the court would need to hear
and illustrated its flexibility in rescheduling hearings.63
That the court revived its earlier docketing policies also
suggests that the Supreme court faced the same troubles
which plagued the court of Appeals in the mid-1780s-mounting levels of litigation and impractical delays.
For the most part, the Virginia court's early rules
reflected growing litigiousness and the judges' concerns for
streamlining the appellate and adjournment process.

Long

before the Revolution, Virginia's judges and lawyers had
fleshed out such structural procedures as filing motions,
summoning witnesses, providing for jury trials, hearing and
taking depositions, processing executions, and regulating
the bar.

Virginia's judges, consequently, unlike

Louisiana's magistrates, did not have to attend to such
matters when they manned the reconstructed courts.
As in the case of the early court rules, Virginia
judges, unlike their Louisiana brethren, needed little
precise direction from the legislature regarding their
ability to issue summary writs.

Since Virginia 1 s

restructured court system adhered to ancient English legal
principles, the judges dealt with the same writs that
63Rule of court, 18 November 1803, 1 H&M, 10.
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existed in the courts before the Revolution.

Thus the

assembly empowered the judges to direct the form of writs in
any manner they wished, trusting them to follow the
strictures of the common law.64
Accordingly, the Virginia assembly allowed the judges
more freedom to create and to interpret their day-to-day
procedures than the Louisiana legislature extended to its
magistrates.65

In only one area close to Jefferson's heart-

-the quest for more efficient record keeping--did the
assembly closely spell out the court's policy regarding its
clerks, the preservation of court records, and strict
adherence to the dockets.66

But even in this crucial area

64Hening, Statutes, "An Act for Amending an Act,
Intituled An Act Constituting the Court of Appeals," v. XII,
764; R. C. 1792.
65Nonetheless, the Louisiana legislature's
resistrictions on its judges to follow Anglo-American
traditions in these matters were intended to keep the
supreme court's practices on an American footing, thus
reflecting Jefferson's and Claiborne's wishes to establish a
strong common law foothold in Louisiana. See the Louisiana
Practice Act of 1805.
66see the detailed requirements in 10 Hening, ch. 22
1779; ch. 63 R. c. 1792; and 12 Hening 1788. Although such
detailed instructions seem unnecessary and obvious to modern
students, they were significant reforms in the eighteenth
century; in fact Virginia's lawmakers may be regarded as
pioneers in the field. The recognition of the need for such
regulation in Virginia stemmed from the problems encountered
in the last colonial revisal of the laws in 1769 when the
accumulation of existing statutes and reports would have
been impossible if not for the splendid collection of John
Mercer. Even with Mercer's assistance, however, the
compilation of the acts proved to be a herculean task.
Similar attempts to gather records greatly encumbered the
revolutionary and post-revolutionary revisals (1776-1792).
Like problems existed in the collection and preservation of
court records. Addition of more courts to Virginia's legal
system in the early national period exacerbated the already
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the judges eventually had to assist the assembly in defining
efficient court practices.
During its three rulemaking sessions, the Pendleton
court accomplished two important objectives.

In a technical

sense, the rule changes streamlined and modernized the
manner in which litigation moved through the appellate
process--a direct response to the problems caused by
mounting pressure on the court's caseload.

On a different

level, the rules pertaining to record-keeping influenced the
manner in which all of the state's lower courts dealt with
their own records.

The ability of the Pendleton court to

face both tasks reflects the activist nature of the Supreme
Court of Appeals--the judges took an active role in policing
wasteful practices which often brought criticism down on the
entire judicial system; and they took unprecedented,
positive steps to ensure the preservation of the judicial
system's documentary record.
Despite legislative efforts to define the Old
Dominion's laws in the Post-Revolutionary era, the Virginia
court, like its Louisiana counterpart, faced some confusion
over laws in force in its early years.

When the Pendleton

difficult problems. Recognition of these problems by the
legislature put Virginia in the forefront of a new movement
for systematized court reporting in the early American
republic. In fact, the movement did not gain strength in
the nation at large until the first decade of the nineteenth
century. The early efforts of the Virginia General Assembly
in this regard have often been taken for granted. One need
only survey the damage that fire, war, and civil
disobedience have inflicted on the manuscript records of
Virginia's courts, however, to realize the worth of these
early efforts at preservation and publication.
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court first convened in 1789, Virginia's laws were still in
the process of being revised.

The reception statute, the

Chancellor's revision, and Madison's reforms formed the core
of the state's laws.

Then, shortly after the court began

operation, the Virginia legislature completed its revisal of
the laws.

Completion of the 1792 code equipped Virginia's

judges with a reasonably stable body of statute and common
law.
Unlike the situation in Louisiana, the Revolution did
not bring the Old Dominion's ancient traditions of justice
into question.

Everyone agreed that common law and

precedent should define the state's jurisprudence.

The

reception statute passed during the Revolution provided that
the basis of Virginia's common law tradition should be the
English laws, as practiced before
the fourth year of the reign of King James the first,
and which are of a general nature, not local to that
kingdom, together with the several acts of the general
assembly of this colony now in force, so far as the
same may consist with the several ordinances,
declarations, and resolutions of the general
convention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be
considered as in full force, until the same shall be
altered by the legislative power of this colony.67
Even the reform minded Jefferson believed that the law
67Hening, statutes, 11 0rder of Convention, 3 July 1776, 11
v. IX, 127 proclaimed the common law of England prior to the
fourth year of James I's reign and all acts of the colony
"now in force," which during the term of the Pendleton court
meant those acts passed after 1769, that "may consist with
the several ordinances, declarations, and resolutions of the
general convention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall
be considered as in full force, until the same shall be
altered by the legislative power of this colony;" cf. Act of
March 1661/62, 2 Hening 43.
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revisal should not affect the common law.68

Nonetheless,

the mingling of the state's prerogatives with English
precedents presented some formidible conundrums to
Virginia's justices.
The first and most difficult problem facing the judges
involving the common law centered on the period between 1607
and 1769, the years in which the force of British decisions
was suspended in the repealing statutes promulgated during
the Post-Revolutionary revisal of the laws.69

Simply put,

how could judges reared on precedent disregard over a
century and a half of legislation and decision?

In 1792,

Pendleton in Thornton v. Smith answered the question by
arguing that Virginia's courts could not be bound by English
precedents that addressed matters alien to the state's
republican development.
Thornton v. Smith came before the court of appeals by
a writ of error.

Thornton accused smith of slander and won

a verdict of L55 in the Richmond court of hustings.

Smith

appealed the decision to the district court contending that
the slander he was accused of did not fall within the
husting court's jurisdiction.
and reversed the decision.

The district judges agreed

Although the case came before

the Court of Appeals for several reasons, the majority
agreed with and affirmed the district court's decision.
Pendleton, however, dissented, and commented on the
68Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, 137.
699 Hening, statutes 127.
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application of the common law to Virginia.

He conceded that

the judgments of Virginia courts were based on precedent,
but he argued that the decision of the district court was
founded upon an English precedent not necessarily binding in
the Old Dominion.
This question is placed upon the authority of English
precedents. I shall presently consider these cases at
large, but let us first enquire how far we are bound by
their authority. The ordinance of the convention of
1776, declares all the statutes of England prior to the
4th of James 1st, which were of a general nature,
applicable to Virginia, and not local to that country,
to be in force here. . • [but if there are]
considerations in which ours totally differ from
theirs, then the precedents cannot bind us.70
In this dissent, Pendleton took a giant step forward in
differentiating Virginia's common law even from that of
England prior to 1607.

Although his opinion did not dispute

either the importance of stare decisis71 or the force of
general English decisions prior to 1607 on Virginia's
jurisprudence, Pendleton's discussion questioned the
validity of parochial English precedents on American cases.
Although such a view could shake the very foundations of a
tradition-based legal system, Pendleton's dissent echoed the
sentiment of the order of the 1776 convention which excluded
those laws "local to that kingdom [England]" from being
received into the common law of republican Virginia.
Thornton v. Smith, however, did not settle the issue
of interpreting the common law in the Old Dominion.

In

70Thornton v. Smith 1 Wash. 83-84.
7lsee Appendix I.
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1800, Pendleton again opined on the issue in Browne et al v.
Turberville et al.

The case hinged on a complicated suit in

the High Court of Chancery.

Browne, his wife, and their

associates had been sued by several members of the
Turberville clan and by George Fitzhugh over the intestate
estate of George Waugh, a childless bachelor.72

Because the

petitions in the case centered on interpretation of
Virginia's complicated Statute of Descents (1792),73 which
sought to condense the several revisals of acts on the
subject, the Chancellor reasoned that the seventh section of
the statute did not cover the specific claims mentioned the
Turbervilles' suit.

consequently, he extrapolated on the

meaning of the act to find that the Turbervilles and
Fitzhugh had legitimate claims on Waugh's estate.74
Browne's attorneys argued that the seventh section of
the 1792 act could not be interpreted in the manner in which
the Chancellor Wythe proposed.

They held that the

Chancellor did not have the authority to "substitute words
merely because the Legislature had not made any provision
for the case."

Consequently, the court must look to the

various incarnations of the law as it appeared following the
1785 revisal.

In their reading of the several statutes

between 1785 and 1792, the attorneys argued that they could
72Browne et al v. Turberville et al, 2 Call 390-409.
73Hening, statutes, "An Act to Reduce into one the
Several Acts Directing the course of Descents," v. XIII,
122.
74Browne et al v. Turberville et al.

----------
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detect a change in the legislative will regarding descents.
Thus, they contended that the court should view the matter
as casus omissus,75 and hence subject to the principles of
common law.76

But reversion to the common law on the

particular matter of descents attacked a fundamental
principle of Virginia's republican settlement--abolition of
the laws of primogeniture.
The Turbervilles's attorney argued that since the 1785
statute repealed the common law on the subject, the common
law could not be revived.

Judge Fleming opined that

although the acts of assembly created great confusion, the
1785 act did cover the situation, hence the common law
argument of the appellants was irrelevant.

Carrington cited

some reservations regarding the Chancellor's opinion, but he
concurred in theory with the chancery decision.

Lyons

agreed with the appellants that the legislative will was
evident in the case; however, he proclaimed that as such,
the facts supported the plaintiffs and the results of the
Chancellor's decision held.77
Pendleton himself took the opportunity once again to
comment upon the force of English common law in the Old
75The term casus omissus refers to situations where no
contingency has been provided for in the law. It applies
especially to cases which have not been addressed in a
general statute on the subject. In these instances the
issue is specifically to be covered by common law. Henry
Campbell Black, Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 198.
76Browne et al v. Turberville et al.
77Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

175
Dominion.

In principle, Pendleton allowed that the common

law represented the general law of Virginia where it had not
been superceded by state statutes.

Nonetheless, Pendleton

asserted that the 1785 statute had "totally done away that
common law, as to the course of descents."

He argued that

the rights of primogeniture had been thoroughly abolished in
Virginia, and that when equal relatives could prove kinship
in intestate proceedings, the principle of partible
inheritance applied.

Although the 1792 statute did not

expound specifically on the circumstances surrounding
Waugh's estate, Pendleton argued that Jefferson's
revolutionary attack on primogeniture had been certified by
the previous acts regarding descents.

The legislative will

was clear, it favored the maxim of partible inheritance.
Accordingly, Pendleton concurred with his brother justices'
decision and confirmed the Chancellor's decree.78
Although the court could have settled the Browne case
without considering the issue of Jefferson's attack on
primogeniture--indeed Lyons, carrington, and Fleming easily
avoided the matter--Pendleton boldly asserted his position
as chief judge, and his decision echoed one of Jefferson's
more revolutionary contributions to Virginia's republican
settlement.

Again, Jeffersonian principles found a staunch

ally in Pendleton, the court's most conservative member.
Even though Pendleton vehemently opposed Jefferson's views
on abolition of primogeniture during the revisal of the
7Brbid.
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laws, once the General Assembly accepted the principle, he
became its most influential supporter.79
Throughout his legal career and as a leader in
Virginia's Revolutionary conventions, Pendleton won a
reputation as a cautious and conservative politician.
During the Revolution, Pendleton frustrated Jefferson and
his fellow republicans time and time again.

The very

qualities that led republicans to nickname Pendleton
"moderation" and Philip Mazzei to characterize him as "a
greater lover of legal matters than of philosophy," forced
the judge into the ironic position as champion of the
Jeffersonian revolution.80

Although as a revolutionary

Pendleton shied away from the "speculations of
philosophers," as a judge he was forced to deal with the
fruit of such speculation.
Throughout its existence the Pendleton court dealt
with important fundamental issues.

First, the judges needed

to make the court run smoothly in order to resolve its
business smoothly and in a timely manner.

In this regard,

the rules of court provided solutions to problems of delay
and the need to provide speedy trials.

More important, in

Thornton v. Smith and Browne et al. v. Turberville et al.
the court grappled with difficult philosophical issues as
Jeffersonian reforms clashed with traditional English
79Branchi, ed., "Memoirs of Philip Mazzei," 2nd
Installment, WMQ, (October, 1928), 248.
80"Memoirs of Philip Mazzei," WMQ, 2nd ser.,
1929), 248.

(Oct.
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practices.

At stake in these cases were crucial concerns

that spoke directly to the role of the judiciary in the new
republic.

Specifically, the court had to deal with the

paradoxical fallout of the revolutionary settlement.

Five

significant questions presented themselves: How could the
court achieve judicial independence from Great Britain, yet
retain its British heritage?

How could the court resolve

immediate conflicts between the two legal orders?

How could

the judges use their decisions to create strong guidelines
to govern future decisions?

How could a tradition-based

judiciary remain true to the reforms of the Revolution?

And

how could the judges use jurisprudence to promote
orderliness in judicial proceedings?
In both Thornton v. smith and Browne et al. v.
Turberville et al. the court's associate justices
sidestepped these philosophical questions.

Pendleton,

because of his lifetime fascination with things legal and
because he equated his position as chief justice with
leadership, stepped out of character and faced the
philosophical issues squarely.

His response did as much to

resolve those questions as to define the role of both the
supreme court and the office of chief justice in the new
government.

Accordingly, it is instructive to investigate

Pendleton's contributions to both decisions.
Structurally, the Assembly provided little guidance on
the day-to-day workings of the Supreme court of Appeals.
The 1779 statute which created the Court of Appeals merely

·······--···---
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stated that the judges of the court were bound to render
decisions in cases before it.

When the court was

reconstituted as the supreme Court of Appeals during the
1788 reform, the legislators remained silent on the issue of
decisions, in fact, they simply let the provisions of the
1779 statute remain in force.81

In creating the Supreme

Court of Appeals in 1788, the Assembly devised the office of
chief justice, but failed to define its authority.

Thus it

was left to the court to flesh out its procedures regarding
judicial decisions and the role of the chief justice.
At first, the judges balked at innovation and adopted
a rather democratic way of going about their day to day
affairs.

In keeping with the democratic trend, the

Pendleton court followed the cumbersome practice of writing
seriatim opinions.

Likewise, Pendleton treated his position

as chief judge, at first, merely as an administrative
position.

But in Thornton v. smith and Brown et al. v.

Turberville et al. Pendleton emerged as the court's
undisputed philosophical leader.

In doing so, Pendleton

exhibited a commitment to Jeffersonian principles that
far beyond his own revolutionary politics.

we~t

In those cases,

the desire to achieve legal and judicial independence from
Great Britain, to resolve the immediate questions before the
court, to set consistent rules to govern future proceedings,
to remain true to the reforms of the revolution, and to give
orderliness to Virginia's judicial proceedings overrode
81Hening, statutes.
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Pendleton's innate conservativism.
Throughout the battle with the legislature during 1787
and 1788, Pendleton developed a high regard for an
independent judiciary.

That regard informed his decisions

in both Thornton v. Smith and Browne et al. v. Turberville
et al.

Furthermore, once the battles over the law revisal

had been fought, Pendleton assumed a true republican regard
for the reforms the Revolutionary assembly had passed.

When

the two cases came before the bench, Pendleton recognized
that they represented watersheds in the court's development.
Although Pendleton could easily have sidestepped the issues,
as his brother justices had done, he carefully considered
his position as chief justice and penned bold decisions that
would guide the court in future years.
In doing so, Pendleton helped to clarify the legal
relationship between Virginia's laws and those of Great
Britain, taking a giant step toward legal and judicial
independence.

He also demonstrated a profound judicial

commitment to revolutionary reforms.

Finally, Pendleton

redefined the office of chief justice from an administrative
position to that of the court's philosophical leader.
Up until his decisions in the Thornton and Browne
cases, Pendleton's presence on the bench promoted a measure
of conservatism.

But when confusion emerged over various

issues that the Revolutionary assemblies had failed to
consider, Pendleton stepped out of character and created
judicial precedents that echoed Jeffersonian reform.
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Pendleton's decisions in Thornton v. Smith and in Browne et
al.v. Turberville et al. went a long way in clarifying the
applicability of British precedents in Virginia courts;
however, the decisions did not provide comprehensive
solutions to the problems of reconciling revolutionary
reforms with traditional English precedents.

Rather,

Pendleton's influence provided direction for future cases.
In this regard, Pendleton's leadership and his respectable
presence on the court provided the fledgling bench with an
important measure of stability.
But the stability that characterized the court's
initial phase of development proved only as strong as the
will of its chief justice.

When Pendleton died in 1803 the

court lost its steadiest hand.

Without Pendleton to guide

the tribunal through difficult times, internal squabbles
broke out among the judges over important legal issues.
Consistency, conservatism, and traditionalism guided
the court during the Pendleton era.

Philosophical and

ideological principles remained in the domain of others
while the court focused its attention on the subtleties of
the law.

For the most part, the court favored tradition

over innovation.

But when the law itself called ideological

and philosophical principles into question, the Pendleton
court faced them squarely and in a Jeffersonian fashion.82
After his death, however, the court sorely missed

82see especially Thornton v. Smith, Brown v.
Turberville.
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Pendleton's bold judgment when it faced cases of a similar
nature.
From 1789 to 1803, the court displayed a commitment to
traditionalism, but gave way to reform on certain vital
issues, such as descents.

British precedent remained the

guiding force behind Virginia's common law, but when
revolutionary reforms clashed with precedent, the court
bowed to the legislative will.

In this regard, the Virginia

supreme court embraced the ambivalence that defined
Revolutionary Virginia.
Pendleton's death ushered in a new phase of judicial
development as the strong personalities of the associate
justices emerged in the absence of a venerable chief
justice.

Coincident1ally, Pendleton passed as the nation

was in the midst of a profound legal transformation--one
that witnessed a shift from the "moral" legal principles of
the republican era to more "pragmatic" practices that
allowed for the intrusion of foreign, monarchical practices
into American legal discourse.

Although the shift from

moral to pragmatic justice is generally exemplified by the
reception of civil law precepts into the many state codes
that evolved during the codification movement that gripped
the country in the nineteenth century, in Virginia the
transition also allowed for a greater emphasis on modern
English practices.83
83Historians have debated the motivations behind this
transformation. Some insist that capitalism motivated the
American elite to devise legal methods dispossessing the

----·-···--·
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In the Old Dominion, cases involving the
applicability of British common law in the second phase of
the court's development illustrate the rise of pragmatic
justice.

Following Pendleton's death, Paul Carrington

assumed the office of Presiding Judge.

carrington differed

from Pendleton as he allowed other judges to dominate the
court in cases involving the common law.
successors continued the trend.

Carrington's

Another change in the

complexion of the court following Pendleton's death involved
his replacement, St. George Tucker.
wealthy Bermudan merchant family.

Tucker hailed from a
Immigrating to Virginia

in the 1772, Tucker entered the legal profession in search
of a means of supporting himself in the thriving colony.
Too poor to journey to Middle Temple, Tucker secured the
best education he could in the Old Dominion.

He soon

established himself as one of the colony's leading attorneys
poor, hence securing greater riches in their own hands. In
this vein, monarchical principles, whether civil law or
common law in nature, served to accomplish the task. Others
argue that the law itself motivated these changes as it
evolved inevitably toward its own ideal. still others argue
that the codification movement of the mid nineteenth century
reflected both changing social arrangements and the need to
find simple, pragmatic legal remedies. Joyce Appleby,
Capitalism and the New Social Order; Morton Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law. 1780-1860, (Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press,
1977); Robert w. Gordon and William Nelson, "An Exchange on
Critical Legal studies between R. w. Gordon and William
Nelson," Law and History Review (1988), 139-187; Charles M.
Cook, The American Codification Movement: A Study of
Antebellum Legal Reform, (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood
Press, Contributions in Legal Studies, number 14, 1981);
Sandra F. VanBurkleo, "'That our Pure Republican Principles
Might Not Wither': Kentucky's Relief Crisis and the Pursuit
of 'Moral Justice, 1 1818-1826, 11 unpublished Ph. D.
dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1988.
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and judges.84

After establishing a successful law practice,

Tucker succeeded George Wythe as Professor of Law at the
College of William and Mary.

Through the College Tucker

became one of the most influential legal minds in the new
nation, training a large number of attorneys.

Not the least

influential were his efforts to establish a bona fide law
library at the College, a task accomplished by begging,
cajoling, and threatening the school's board of visitors.85
When Tucker joined the court, he had already established
himself as one of the nation's premier legal scholars.
Particularly, he had secured a reputation as a
constitutional scholar.

Tucker's 1790 edition of

Blackstone's Commentaries, contained lengthy glossing notes
dealing with the deviations between British and American
legal tenets.86
Accordingly, it would follow that after joining the
Court of Appeals, Tucker, as resident expert on the
applicability of common law in America, would have dominated
the court's deliberations in cases related to the
applicability of the common law in Virginia.

But Tucker

remained a staunch republican in an age when Americans were
eschewing their republican legal traditions in favor of more
pragmatic solutions.

st. George Tucker's presence on the

84cullen, "St. George Tucker and the Law."
85st. George Tucker to Creed Taylor, n. d., Creed
Taylor Papers, Special Collections, Alderman Library,
University of Virginia.
86cullen, "St. George Tucker and the Law."
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court unsettled the tribunal as the progressive views of his
contemporaries clashed with his dogmatic adherence to the
accomplishments of the Revolutionary assemblies.
The first time Tucker's republican views collided with
a fellow justice presented itself in the case of Baring v.
Reeder (1806) and marked the beginning of an internal
dispute over the common law between Tucker and Spencer
Roane.

Tucker's literal interpretation of early

revolutionary statutes, an example of his republican
devotion to the legislative will, precipitated the struggle
with Roane, who favored liberal borrowing from contemporary
British sources.

The central debate between the two men

centered on the 1776 ordinance that prohibited the reception
of English jurisprudence made after 1607.

Tucker, in

republican fashion, slavishly adhered to the 1776
prohibition as a solid

~xample

of the legislative will.

Roane, professing allegiance to republican principles,
nonetheless felt free to ignore certain elements of the 1776
prohibition in order to build a better mousetrap.
Procedurally, Baring v. Reeder brought out differences
between England and Virginia's practices regarding the rules
of evidence.

The case came before the court via a writ of

supersedeas.

It hinged on the question of whether or not a

wife represented a competent witness in a case in which her
husband might be interested.

Baring had lent various

articles to Richard Claiborne's wife.

Claiborne, then sold

the goods along with other various and sundry items to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

185
Reeder in 1799. Reeder, however, did not take possession of
the property immediately.

When Baring heard of the sale, he

reclaimed his property from the Claibornes.

Since Reeder

felt that he had paid for the goods, he brought and action
of trover for them in the Monogalia district court.87

In

order to secure the bill, Reeder 1 s attorneys deposed Mrs.
Caiborne on the subject of Baring's loan.

Baring claimed,

however, that Anne Claiborne, owing to her husband's
potential interest in the bargain, was an incompetent
witness.

The jury disagreed and awarded Reeder $1148 in

damages. 8 8
When the case came before the Court of Appeals, Tucker
agreed with the decision of the lower court.

He found that

Mrs. Claiborne's testimony should not have been considered
since she could profit from the outcome of the case.
Tucker's raasoning on the matter conflicted with
contemporary English rules of evidence that would have
allowed Mrs. Claiborne to testify.

The conflict, however,

did not bother Tucker as the reception statute of 1776
accepted English law prior to 1607 as the basis of Virginia
common law and prohibited Virginia's judges from citing more
modern English decisions as precedent.

Moreover, as an

expert on the common law Tucker was aware that even in
87 An action of trover, essentially, is a legal
fiction designed to recover the worth of items wrongly
converted by another for his personal use, Black, Law
Dictionary, 1351.
BBBaring v. Reeder, 1 H & M, 154-176.
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England, the ancient rules of evidence in question were
sometimes applied.

To justify his position, Tucker cited a

1792 decision of the British court of King's Bench, Davis v.
Dinwoody.

In Davis v. Dinwoody modern English judges

favored the ancient English rules of evidence over modern
innovations.89
By citing Davis v. Dinwoody, Tucker raised a tricky
legal issue, as he himself used a modern English decision to
support his ruling.

But Tucker pointed out that he was not

citing the case as precedent, "since no decision in England
since our independence commenced, has any authority in this
court."

Instead Tucker argued that he referred to Davis v.

Djnwoody in order to demonstrate that even in England, where
innovations on the rules of evidence had been pioneered, the
pre-1607 practices could still apply.

According to Tucker,

Davis v. Dinwoody represented an "apposite case decided by
able Judges upon the same law which as to this point
prevails in this country."

Consequently, Tucker upheld the

ancient practices and supported the view of the lower court.
Spencer Roane took exception to Tucker's adaptation of
Davis v. Dinwoody on the subject of evidence.

Roane felt

uncomfortable with Tucker's borrowing from ancient English
procedure when contemporary British rules of evidence spoke
more clearly on the subject.

Pointing out that the doctrine

of evidence represented the most complicated area of

89Davis v. Dinwoody, 4 Durnford and East's Term
Reports, 678-680.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

187
American law because the case reports on the subject had
been so badly confused, Roane divided his analysis into two
categories--ancient and modern.

Citing another precedent in

the Court of King's Bench90, Roane argued that the ancient
sources, King's Bench in particular, were hopelessly
confused about the rules of evidence.

Conversely, Roane

argued that in modern times the Courts of Westminster Hall
had considered the rules more carefully and that their
arrangements were more informed and more logical than the
ancient wisdom on the subject.

Accordingly, Roane contended

that the American judge became bound to review those modern
decisions.91

Those rulings, Roane argued, along with the

"manly and independent" pronouncement of Lord Mansfield who
in Lowe v. Joliffe (1777) proclaimed that "we do not sit
here to take our rules of evidence from Keeble [sic] or
Siderfin" represented the best guides for interpreting the
rules of evidence.92
90Abrahams v. Bunn, 4 Burr. 2251.
91Baring v. Reeder.
92Lowe v. Jolliffe, 1 Blackstone's Reports, 366; here
Mansfield was referring to Samuel Keble's Reports in the
Court of King's Bench at Westminster From the XII to the XXX
Year of the reign of our Late Sovereign Lord King Charles II
1661-1679, (London: w. Rawlins, s. Roycroft, and M.
Fletcher, 1685), and Robert and Thomas Siderfin's Les
Reports des Divier Special Cases Argue and Adjudge en le
Court del Bank de Roy et Auxy en le Co. Ba. & l'Exchequer .
. . 1657-1670 Colligees par Thos. Siderfin . . . Inprimee
par l'Original South son Maine Propre et Francaise. et oue
Publie en Mesne le Language Ouesg; Deux Tables Matiess
Notables, et Rasnes del Cases Contenu en Yceaux, (London: W.
Rawlins and Edw. Atkins for Samuel Keble, 1683-1684),
Mansfield's declaration represented a recognition of what
Roane described as the defective understanding of the rules

--------
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Roane then seized the opportunity to comment upon the
force of modern English decisions in Virginia.

He argued

that he personally believed that he was bound to "pare down"
governmental aspects of the English common law to republican
standards.

Furthermore, Roane contended that he opposed

wholesale borrowing of English procedure even in cases where
it was more "progressive and mutable" than Virginia's
practices:
that law ought not to be received here, whether
evidenced by old or new decisions, in the same extent
that it is admitted in England, the circumstances and
character of which nation varying from ours, produces
(imperceptably perhaps) a correspondent variation of
the rules of their common law.
For example, Roane cited the fact that England's highly
commercialized character made its legal needs vastly
different from those of the Old Dominion.

On the other

hand, Roane opined that he had no qualms about consulting
English judicial authorities "on such rules of common law as
do not change."

He went on to point out that Americans felt

free to consult eminent European jurists and merchants on
the laws of nature and the laws of nations.

Finally, Roane

concluded that "I do not see that we may not avail ourselves
of the testimony of the eminent and able judiciary of
England.n93
On the surface, it may seem as if Roane and Tucker
were positing similar positions.

Both denied the binding

of evidence by the Court of King's Bench.
93Baring v. Reeder.
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authority of post-1775 English decisions in Virginia.

Both

consulted those decisions as the musings of wise and able
men.

Thus the two judges agreed that the learned opinions

of modern English jurists could inform the deliberations in
the Virginia supreme court.

The judges disagreed, however,

on the manner in which British authorities could be
consulted.

Tucker cited Davis v. Dinwoody in order to

demonstrate that the pre-1607 English rules of procedure,
though widely considered antiquated, still informed
contemporary jurisprudence in the court of King's Bench.
Consequently, Tucker used the decision to prop up the notion
that the 1776 reception order did not hamper operations in
the Virginia court as the English court of King's Bench
still applied the old rules of evidence.

Roane used Lowe v.

Joliffe to demonstrate that when court procedures become
obsolete, judges should drop them and embrace practices that
relate to contemporary situations.

Just as Lord Mansfield

shunned the thinking of Keble and Siderfin on the matter of
evidence, Roane eschewed the aspects of the 1776 order which
prohibited him from consulting modern English sources.
Roane's opinion in Baring v. Reeder offers an
important glimpse of the changes that were taking place
within the American legal system.

Roane was careful to

identify himself with the republican Revolution: "I shall
certainly not be accused of partiality towards the
government of Great Britain."

Nonetheless, he clearly

considered the 1776 prohibition as an obsolete product of an
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earlier era, and he favored a more moderate view of English
society; "I wish not, without necessity, to sound the tocsin
against that nation [England]."

The previous generation of

Americans had rejected everything associated with Hanoverian
England as corrupt.

Roane understood that important element

of the Revolutionary ideology.

But Roane also understood

that the vehemence with which the previous generation had
rejected British judicial decisions was misplaced when
English jurisprudence provided sound, commonsensical
innovations on antique procedures.
Roane urged his brother justices to side with him and
to use Baring v. Reeder to sidestep an obsolete legislative
enactment.

In essence, he asked his fellow jurists to put

the rhetoric of the Revolution behind them.

He wrote

I am not willing that an appeal to my pride, as a
citizen of independent America, should prevail over the
best convictions of my understanding. I do not see
why, upon principles of stable and unvarying law, such
as those of evidence, for example, the epoch of our
independence should be clutched with so much avidity .
. . I wish it, however, to be clearly understood, that
I would not only confine the reception of the modern
decisions in England to doctrines of this description,
but would not receive even them as binding authority.
I would receive them merely as affording evidence of
the opinions of eminent Judges as to the doctrines in
question, who have at least as great opportunities to
form correct opinions as we have, and are influenced by
no motives but such as are common to ourselves: *and
with respect to ancient decisions in England, what
Judge would wish to go further?94
In effec·t, Roane asked the judge:: to open their eyes to the
important innovations in judicial procedure that had
occurred in Great Britain in the years following 1607.
94Baring v. Reeder.
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doing so, the judges would allow modern British
jurisprudence to inform Virginia's legal discourse in the
same way other foreign authorities did.

It was a matter of

simple common sense as well as duty to consider English
authorities in order to form the best opinion possible.
Roane argued,
shall we not have the privilege every day exercised in
England, of detecting the errors of former times?
Shall we •take our law of evidence from Keeble and
Siderfin?' Shall we go back to the Gothic days of Lord
Coke, and reject every man as a witness who is not a
Christian?
The argument was forceful and logical.

The arch-

conservative Peter Lyons sided with Tucker, but William
Fleming and Paul Carrington, once staunch Jeffersonian
republicans, accepted the fact that times had changed and
affirmed Roane's recommendation to reverse the lower court's
opinion.

Lyons himself, though in dissent, penned the

majority ruling and remanded the cause to the lower court
and instructed it to hear Mrs. Claiborne's testimony.
The debate over Baring v. Reeder reveals an important
aspect of the republican settlement in Virginia.

Tucker, an

ardent republican, viewed the language of the 1776 Order of
convention quite literally.95

But Tucker's reluctance to

consider modern British decisions deviated from what had
become established judicial practice.

American judges had

consulted the wisdom of foreign judges on many matters in
95Hening, Statutes, "Order of Convention," 3 July 1776,
v. IX, 127.
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the Post-Revolutionary era.

Even the founding fathers had

consulted foreign authorities on natural law and the laws of
nation during the Revolution.
Baring v. Reeder suberbly illustrates the differences
between the theory and practice of the revolutionary
settlement.

Although the Virginia legislature clearly

denounced the authority of modern British decisions in the
1776 convention and in the subsequent revisal of the laws,
the Old Dominion's judges nonetheless referred to those
decisions when the codes and pre-1607 jurisprudence failed
to present adequate legal remedies.

Although such practices

did not carry the weight of precedent, they became vital and
useful tools in rendering decisions.

Thus foreign

principles of justice, even recent developments in British
courts, came to inform Virginia's jurisprudence as the Old
Dominion's judges sought practical remedies in modern
British decisions.

Once the practice of consulting British

authorities resumed, Virginia's judges began to shirk off
their reliance on republican traditionalism and became ever
more receptive to foreign innovations in the law--even \·!hen
those innovations came from Great Britian.96
Three years after Baring v. Reeder the court again
considered the application of the common law to Virginia.
Once again, Tucker and Roane wrestled with the conundrum of
weighing ancient principles against modern practice in

96The same thing happened in Louisiana.
v. swain, 13 La. Ann., 193.

See Reynolds

---------
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Coleman v. Moody.

Francis Moody, an enterprising resident

of Mecklenburg County,

petitioned the county court for

permission to erect a dam on portions of Butcher's Creek on
his property in order to build a grist mill.

Consequently,

Moody gave written notice of his intention to serve Thomas
Coleman, who held in trust the land that would be affected
by damming the stream, with a writ of ad quod damnum.97
After hearing the matter before a jury, the court
ascertained that the building of the mill would greatly
benefit the neighborhood; accordingly, Moody received
permission to begin his project.

The court also determined

that the land in Coleman's trusteeship would be rendered
useless and awarded Coleman $50.00 in compensation.

Coleman

protested the decision and appealed to the Brunswick
District Court and the Court of Appeals and lost in both
courts. 98
Coleman returned to the Court of Appeals and presented
evidence that questioned the validity of the county jury.
Evidently, the court and jury that granted Moody permission
to build the dam had met at Moody's house.

Over the course

of the afternoon, Moody had entertained the jurors,
supplying them with liberal amounts of grog.

Coleman

protested this questionable relationship between the
97Ad quod damnum writs are derived from ancient British
chancery jurisdiction. They instruct the sheriff to inquire
what damages a proposed action might cause so that just
compensation could be worked out; Black, Law Dictionary, 46.
98coleman v. Moody, 4 H & M, 1-23.
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petitioner and the jury.

Ancient British regulations

prohibited such entertainment as juries were likely to
exhibit poor judgment after a tipple.

Moreover, because the

jurors indulged in their libations at the petitioner's
expense, critics could argue that they had been coerced into
their decision by Moody's

generosity.99

Moody's attorneys

argued that the jury's findings were sound even though they
had accepted Moody's hospitality.
occu~red.

Thus no impropriety had

Moreover, Moody's lawyer contended that Coleman's

allegations were absurd as even Lord Coke had questioned the
strictness of the ancient rules governing juries.lOO
None of the judges of Virginia's supreme court were as
bold as Lord Coke, so when they debated the merits of
Coleman v. Moody they refrained from challenging the ancient
laws regarding juries.

Nonetheless, the judges agreed with

Moody's attorney that the jury had rendered a proper
decision.
St. George Tucker again embraced a literal view of the
1776 Order of Convention.

Although he agreed that the jury

had come to the correct decision, and that the rulings of
all three courts were sound, he balked at affirming the
judgment for fear of setting a dangerous precedent regarding
jury trials.

According to Tucker, ancient English

regulations regarding juries formed a major portion of the
common law that the 1776 order allowed Virginians to
99rbid.
lOOsir Edward Coke, Commentaries on the English Law.

------

-------
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receive.

To affirm the lower court's decision, no matter

how correct, under these circumstances would amount to a
subversion of the jurisdiction.

Accordingly, Tucker voted

to set aside the decisions of the lower courts.

The other

judges, again led by Spencer Roane, disagreed with Tucker
and affirmed the judgment.

Ancient precedents

notwithstanding, the lower courts had determined the case
correctly.

Modern British rules regarding juries and

practical considerations simply made more sense than the
antiquated English strictures.

Again, Tucker's literal

interpretation of the republican settlement lost to a more
pragmatic (and less costly) remedy.lOl
Other cases in the Court of Appeals, such as
Findlay v. Smith,102 touched on the variations between the
common law in England and America; however, none of those
decisions touched on important jurisdictional issues.103
101coleman v. Moody.
102Findlay v. Smith et ux. et al.,

(1818) 6 Munf. 148.

103rn this vein see Watson v. Alexander, (1794), 1
Wash. 341-357; M'Williams v. Smith, (1797), 1 Call 123-127;
Martin v. Beverley & Norman, (1805), 5 Call, 444-449;
Templeman v. Steptoe, (1810), 1 Munf. 340-373; Alexander's
Heirs v. Coleman, (1819), 6 Munf. 329-362; Burke's Admin. v.
Levy's Exors., (1821), 1 Rand. 1-3; Bent v. Patten, &c.,
(1821), 1 Rand. 25-39; Royall's Admins. v. Johnson et al.,
(1823), 1 Rand. 420-435; Brooke v. Young, (1824), 3 Rand.
106-122; Thomas M. Cowling, v. The Justices of Nansemond
County, (1828), 6 Rand. 349-353; Stribling v. The Bank of
the Valley, (1827), 5 Rand. 133-195; Thompson Blunt v. The
Commonwealth, (1834), 4 Leigh, 690-692; Bank of Virginia v.
craig, (1835), 6 Leigh, 399-440; Emory v. Erskine, (1836), 7
Leigh, 267-271; Sitlingtons v. Brown et al., (1836), 7
Leigh, 271-277; Towner v. Lane's Admin., (1838), 9 Leigh,
262-293.
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The battle over the force of the common law in the Old
Dominion, then was contested in Thornton v. Smith, Browne et
al. v. Turberville et al., Baring v. Reeder, and Coleman v.
Moody.

These cases centered on two issues: the primacy of

state statutes over common law remedies and the court's
prerogative to consult modern British decisions in variance
with the 1776 Order of Convention.
The court's attitude toward the precedence of state
statutes over the common law, as evidenced in Thornton v.
Smith and Browne v. Turberville, illustrated a curious
aspect of the young nation's republican settlement.

The

break with England led colonial theorists to invest their
trust in the sovereignty of the people.

Nonetheless,

revolutionary assemblies insisted on retention of many
British legal and constitutional principles.

When the

states created their independent jurisdictions they
uniformly passed blanket statutes receiving in large measure
the English common law as the foundation of their
judiciaries.

Virginia provided no exception to this trend

as the order of the convention of 1776 demonstrated.
Retention of the common law seems perfectly consistent
with prevailing theories of the American Revolution.

The

men who led the colonies in rebellion in 1776 did so because
they feared that George III and his corrupt ministers had
preempted their traditional rights as Englishmen,
prerogatives that had been inflated in the minds of the
colonists in the years following the Seven Years' war.
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sense, the Americans revolted because British imperial
reforms compromised their sense of "Englishness."

At first,

then, the Revolution occurred because the Americans had been
"Anglicized" as a result of the Seven Years' War and the new
ministerial policies which it fostered.

The leaders of the

independence movement acted to preserve their English
heritage in the face of what they perceived as a corrupt
British executive.
America's revolutionaries, however, soon found
themselves in a paradoxical predicament.

On the one hand,

Anglicization had fostered in their new state legislators a
reliance on traditional British theories of law and
government.

on the other hand, the political act of

breaking away from the mother country forced the Americans
to redefine and to reinvent their ideological notions of the
political order.

At first popular sovereignty emerged as

the leading explanation of American social and political
arrangements.

But in the years following the Revolution,

state politicians, in the view of some observers, took the
notion of popular soveriegnty too far as local and state
assemblies appeared to grasp too much governmental power.
By 1787, many leading American statesmen had become
disatisfied with the emphasis on the supremacy of the
legislature and sought to create a more balanced political
order.

Madison's scorn towards local assemblies and his

distrust of parochial interest, in fact, motivated his drive
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for a constitutional convention.l04
Adopting the federal Constitution further complicated
matters when the authority of the constitution assumed a
more important role in American jurisdictions than the
workings of the independent branches of government it
created.

This trend influenced the relationship between

state constitutions and their assemblies as well.

In

Virginia, the notion of constitution as a "higher law" had
already been articulated in Commonwealth v. Caton in 1784.
Thus the relationship within the republic between the
branches of government and the Constitution became a
contested issue.

Similarly, the states grappled with the

same questions in regard to the relationship between their
constitutions and branches of government.

All of the

rhetoric and ideology of the Revolution invested power in
the sovereign people and in the state assemblies as the
embodiment of their power.

The 1787 Constitution, however,

blocked that trend by setting up a national and supreme
governing instrument over the assemblies.

Moreover, the

acceptance of the federal Constitution as the higher law of
the land reduced the overall significance of local governing
bodies, and created the possibility of a political
aristocracy.
Although the adoption of the federal constitution

104For a brilliant discussion of this transition in
political theory, see Edmund s. Morgan, Inventing the
People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and
America, (New York: w. w. Norton & Company Ltd., 1988).
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struck a blow against local power, the image of the state
assemblies as bastions of Jeffersonian republicanism
remained prominent.

The dual existence of these competing

bodies watered down the traditional reliance on common law
in both the state and federal courts.

During the colonial

era the common law, as an integral part of the British
constitution, held an almost deified position in American
courts.

But the creation of new states and national

governments wore down American's reliance on traditional
British theories of law and government.

Virginia's

reception statute paid homage to the Old Dominion's British
legal heritage, yet it also provided for deviations from
both Virginia and post-1607 incarnations.

Subsequent law

revisal, especially Jefferson's attack on state sponsored
religion, primogeniture, and entail tore down hardened
reliance on British precedent.

Framing of the constitution

and judicial practice in cases like Commonwealth v. Caton,
Thornton v. Smith, and Browne v. Turberville represented a
new, innovative and activist trend in American legal
policies.

Thus the pre-1607 common law and subsequent

Virginia statutes assumed a less revered stance in
Virginia's Post-revolutionary courts than it did in the
tribunals that existed before 1776.
As time went on, however, the need to innovate upon
ancient legal precepts tore away at republican judicial
principles.

The court easily voted to suspend the

legislative will on the matter of receiving post-1607 common
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law, in Baring v. Reeder and Coleman v. Moody when
established practice and practical circumstances dictated
such deviation.

St. George's Tucker's minority dissents

reflected the fact that the traditionalism of the
revolutionary era had dwindled in its effect on the judges
of the Supreme Court of Appeals, allowing them to consult
British, and for that matter other foreign, precedents more
freely.

Roane summed up his differences with Tucker in a

letter to Creed Taylor "He [Tucker] is too lofty for me; and
I cannot suscribe to his terms.nl0 5

Thus the important

issue of the reception of British common law became cloudy
as Virginia's judges followed their own counsel and
consulted the sources as they personally saw fit.
Increasing reliance on this method of decision making
allowed for legal innovation in the form of increased and
realistic borrowing from foreign sources.l06

This type of

legal innovation bred confusion over the way in which
British decisions informed the Old Dominion's legal
traditions.

In essence, Virginia's judges themselves were

creating their own common law based on a wide variety cf
international authorities, their own specific needs, and
their own legal scholarship.
105spencer Roane to creed Taylor, n. d., creed Taylor
Papers, Alderman Library, University of Virginia.
106Just as similar borrowing allowed for profound
intrusions of common law borrowing in Louisiana. The best
evidence for the influence of such borrowing on Louisiana's
style of decision making may be seen in Reynolds v. swain,
13 La. Ann., 193.
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But Virginia's judges would go only so far in
embracing innovation in order to render their decisions.

As

matters before the court became increasingly complicated,
lawyers's arguments and judicial decisions got longer and
more erudite.

The opinions in the common law cases reveal a

tendency toward

lengthy opinions and numerous citations to

various post-1607 British tribunals.

So much discussion led

to irksome delays in litigation and decreased the court's
ability to render justice swiftly.

Increased litigation in

the lower courts led to a greater number of appeals.
Consequently, at the same time that the judicial process
slowed down to allow for a more measured consideration of
cases pending on appeal, Virginians began to sue each other
more often.

Combination of the two trends created a docket

crisis which paralyzed the appelate system and threatened
the court's ability to provide for speedy trials.
In response to the docket crisis, Spencer Roane
suggested to his brethren in 1808 that the court should
adapt some administrative innovations in order to speed up
the judicial process.

Roane proposed that the judges should

meet in conference before rendering opinions.

That way when

the judges agreed over a cause, they could posit a single
opinion rather than a cumbersome series.

When the judges

disagreed on a case, they would render informal written
opinions before deciding the issue in order to cut down on
the official number of majority opinions and dissents.

But

Roane's brother justices found these reforms too innovative
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and lacking precedent.107

The judges once again failed to

use their administrative powers to resolve a docket crisis.
That failure left the matter to the executive and the
legislature.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in a legal
climate charged by revolution, reform, legal innovation, and
a docket crisis a new call to codify Virginia's laws rang
loudly in the halls of the General Assembly.

By the end of

the first decade of the nineteenth century, the heralds of
those calls screamed for recognition.
The codification impulse sprang from two sources.
Many of Virginia's statesmen had encouraged codification
since the Revolution.

In fact, the 1792 revisal of the laws

represented just such a code.

But the framers of the

revisal, even Jefferson, because of their innate
traditionalism, felt insecure in tampering with the ancient
maxims of English common law.

The 1792 revisal attended to

the 1776 order of the convention which accepted most of the
common law; accordingly, Virginia's judges had to serve two
masters that often disagreed with one another: an
incomprehensive code and the common law.

This tension

muddled the judicial interpretation of the laws in force,
especially in places where legislation was incomplete and in

107"Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia: Champion of
states' Rights--Foe of John Marshall," Harvard Law Review,
Vo 66 (1953) 1 1247 •
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conflict with common law.l08

Mountains of litigation before

Virginia's appellate courts also stimulated the effort to
codify the laws because the high number of pending suits had
caused a significant amount of docket pressure.

Although

the judges had endeavored to relieve some of that pressure
in various rules, their solutions met with minimal success.
Thus costly delays impeded the judicial process.
Furthermore, day-to-day practice led away from strict
reliance on the pre-1607 English sources as the judges
embraced recent British innovations.

But the conflict that

developed over the interpretation of the 1776 Order of
Convention led to cumbersome arguments and inconsistent
jurisprudence.

Advocates of codification in the first

decade of the nineteenth century, including all of the
judges except Tucker, eschewed traditionalism in favor of
more contemporary solutions.
Moreover, a general disallusionment with the legal
community bolstered the codification impulse.
disatisfaction

Much of the

in the first decades of the nineteenth

century stemmed from renewed antagonism toward the
professional bench and bar.

The legal culture that had

developed around most American courts, especially superior
tribunals, excluded laymen, especially county magistrates.
Lawyers and judges had increasingly made their profession
seem more mysterious to the general public.

Impenetrable

108see Browne et al. v. Turberville et al. for and
illustration of this confusion.
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legal jargon and complicated procedures cut the common man
out of the system and made him hopelessly dependent upon the
men of the bar.

Those who remembered simpler times viewed

these changes with suspicion.l09
Governor John Tyler, one Virginian with fond memories
of simpler times, championed the cause of codification in
the early nineteenth century, becoming its most vocal
advocate.

As lengthy debates in Virginia tribunals coupled

with increasing levels of litigation, a severe docket crisis
developed in the first decade of the nineteenth century.
Late in 1810, Tyler solicited the legislature's assistance
in resolving the crisis.

Tyler argued that "the

jurisprudence of this state is certainly not in the most
desirable situation, particularly the Court of Appeals."
The reason the jurisprudence was in such a sad state was
that Virginia's legislators had been faced with a difficult
task when they created the courts.

on the one hand, Tyler

pointed out that Post-Revolutionary lawmakers had to attend
to a republican opinion that "too much delay in the
administration of justice is a great evil.nllO

On the other

hand, the legislators also realized that that exceedingly
swift justice also held great peril "summum jus. summa

l09Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, Horwitz,
Transformation, Cook, American Codification, passim.
llOsuch delays had plagued the Old Dominion's legal
system from its inception. In fact, the December Reform
grew out of similar backlogs in the court dockets. See the
introduction to the 1788 Court of Appeals bill 12 Hening,
Statutes, v. XII, 764.
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iniuria."

In order avoid both evils, Virginia's legal

luminaries chose a middle path.

Moderation on the part of

the creators of the legal system succeeded in preventing
summum jus. summa injuria, but had done little to combat
delays in the administration of justice for any length of
time. 111
Aware of the deference to tradition and common law in
Virginia, Tyler realized that he must posit his solution
carefully.

The first part of Tyler's solution stressed both

institutional and procedural changes.

Institutionally,

Tyler recommended adding judges to the court to manage the
increased workload.

Procedurally, Tyler suggested a series

of reforms designed to move case through the appelate
process more quickly.112
Tyler's first procedural reform sought to simplify the
process of bringing a case before the supreme court.

In

common practice, attorneys sought appellate writs without
supplying the judges with a summary of their specific
objections.113

Consequently, when an appeal was filed the

judges had to sift through the transcripts of earlier trials
111John Tyler to the Honorable Speaker of the Senate
and House of Delegates, 3 December 1810, Executive
Letterbook, 15 January 1810-24 August 1811, Virginia State
Library and Archives.
112Ibid.
113This had been a volatile issue in the past. The
Remonstrance of the Judges protested a previous assembly's
attempt to impose physical and procedural changes on the
court of appeals, the efforts of the legislature eventually
won out in the December Reform.
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in order to "find a point of controversy."

To make the

process more expedient, Tyler proposed that attorneys should
supply the court with briefs so that the points in the case
"should appear naked and clearly stated before them [the
judges], so that the law may be pronounced in a reasonable
time.nll4
Next, Tyler argued that the court should abandon its
practice of hearing appeals as a matter of

ri~ht.

Accordingly, cases brought up on writs of error or
supersedeas would only be heard by the judges'
discretion.ll5

Such a measure would enhance judicial

authority by giving the high court's judges sole discretion
over deciding which cases merited appeal.

Initially, Tyler

intended this reform to quell the rising number of frivolous
appeals; however, such an increase in the judges's
discretionary prerogatives promised a significant inflation
of the power of the judiciary branch.

By giving appellate

magistrates complete control over deciding which cases they
would hear, Tyler offered them the power to decide which
aspects of constitutional law would come under the court's
scrutiny.

Under such circumstances, the conception of

judicial review could take on serious new political
meanings.

Not only could the supreme court rule on the

constitutionality of various issues, it could also decide
114rbid.
115Tyler to the Speakers, 3 December 1810, Executive
Letterbooks.
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which issues it wanted to examine.

Likewise, Tyler's

proposal would allow the court to ignore matters it did not
want to address.ll6
Tyler further sought to diminish the instances of
frivolous appeals by barring lawyers who sued on the county
or district level from representing their clients during the
appeal.

In arguing this point, Tyler criticized the ethics

of the Old Dominion's bar by suggesting that they were using
appeals to pad their fees and comparing them to "Ravens
follow[ing] the carcase."

Thus Tyler propped up his

argument with an attack on corrupt attorneys, a common
practice of politicians in the early decades of the
nineteenth century.ll7
Day-to-day operations of the court also came under
Tyler's attack.

Essentially, Tyler accused the tribunal of

becoming a "talking court" where judges and attorneys
unnecessarily delayed cases with long speeches and
cumbersome opinions.

The judges, he argued, had fallen into

a bad habit of quoting lengthy passages from British cases.
Moreover, the judges had wasted precious time "reconciling
absurd and contradictory opinions of foreign Judges, which
certainly can be no part of an American judge's duty."

For

116The ability to decline to address the
constitutionality of certain issues was of equal
constitutional importance as the matter of judicial review.
117Ibid. The conception of a graduated bar was not new
to the Old Dominion. In fact, Tyler's proposition did not
suggest anything new. He merely was trying to get the
legislature to support legal conventions which had been
ignored in recent years.
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a glaring example of these frivolities, Tyler invited the
legislators to peruse Bustar v. Wallace where the attorneys
cited no fewer than thirty-three cases, and he admonished
them to survey "a still more enormous budget of cases" in
Smith & Wife v. Chapman, tantamount to a "true case mania."
Tyler asked "Is not this a waste of time for which no
apology can be found? 11 118
Tyler reserved his full scorn, however, for those who
cited numerous precedents from the plethora of British
inferior courts.119
Some Gentlemen refer to the decisions of the inferior
Courts of England, and yet, I am told, to mention a
case which has been decided in any of our District
courts, would be a subject of ridicule, it would want
that genuine sterling constituent of being a British
decision. Under these circumstances can America be
Fairly said to be independent [of] England? 11 120
Tyler's argument nicely summarized the ambivalence of
Virginia's revolutionary settlement.

Specifically, he

illustrated how the over reliance on British tradition could
grossly inhibit justice in the new republic.

Although

Virginia's revolutionary legislators had done their best to
distinguish their government from what they perceived as
118rbid.; Bustar v. Wallace, 4 H & M, 82; Smith & Wife
v. Chapman, 1 H & M, 247.
119A good example of how such arguments could waste
precious time, see Pendleton's opinion in Thornton v. Smith
where he not only had to deal with British precedents, but
rendered a brief history and description of Britain's
inferior courts as well. Thornton v. Smith 1 Wash., 83-84.
120Tyler to the Speakers, 3 December 1810, Executive
Letterbooks.
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cv:L:Lupt British

pract~ices,

t~•-=i

had also created a neff

jurisdiction that both deviated from and depended on its
British heritage.

The Pendleton court had done a fine job

of protecting the tenets of the Revolution.

During the

Roane period the increasingly [many said unnecessarily]
erudite arguments of the Old Dominion's lawyers had forced
the judges to become long-winded and overly dependent upon
English jurisprudence.

The inherent paradoxes of the

Revolutionary settlement sponsored cumbrous practices in the
new judiciary.
The advent of these cumbersome practices led Tyler to
lament on the folly of the revolutionary legislature
It is much to be lamented that in the commencement of
our self-government, we had not selected a Code founded
on the ancient maxims and principles as far as they
applied to our government--this was certainly the
object of the convention which adopted the Common Law;
for it is so expressed--Yet are we going on looking for
the principles and maxims, to see if those decisions
W8re correct; for if this is necessary, we certainly
should not attempt to prove the axiom by the
proposition, but the very reverse: we should prove the
proposition by the axiom--so would old Euclid have
done. If a law is said to be unconstitutional, should
we apply for any man's opinion, or go to the letter of
the Constitution for its solution? I think the latter
would be the choice. surely then where as course is to
be determined on Common Law principles, ought we not to
seek out for those principles by which it is to be
governed? Why cannot those maxims and principles which
form the Common Law; be selected for our purpose, and
made the rules of decision in cases where they apply?
As to the written or statute Law, no Judge can be
fairly said to be independent or free who goes to a
British Judge to see how his Lordship has been pleased
to decide in a like case. Surely the Judges do not
recollect that those who made the law understood it,
and never expected that those who were to expand it
possessed less wisdom. This course of legal procedure
is too servile and humiliating for an American
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Citizen.l21
Until that point, Tyler had grounded his attack on the need
for commonsensical, procedural reforms.

With his attack on

the judges' dependence on British jurisprudence, he shifted
to a different combat arena.

By questioning the wisdom of

Virginia's revolutionaries in retaining their allegiance to
British precedents, Tyler was asking for nothing less than a
legal and judicial declaration of independence.

Yes, Tyler

argued, Americans owed allegiance to ancient British
principles of liberty and justice.
legal

tenets~

Commitment to English

however, did not necessarily equate with

committment to British law.
AGcording to Tyler, the Revolutionaries should have
codified the British common law in the way that they
redacted their revolutionary settlement in 1792.

If the

Revolutionaries had done so, American judges would have been
free of their British masters.

Instead, the Virginia

convention had enslaved the Old Dominion's lawyers and
judges to the entire corpus of British common law.
Part of the guilt, Tyler argued, rested in the hands
of Virginia's lawyers and judges themselves.

The men who

argued before and sat on the benches of the Old Dominion's
tribunals had taken up a false notion that "the length of
speeches and number of cases that are made and refered to"
determined the reasonability and cogency of an argument or

12lrbid.
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judgment.

Such a standard was tantamount to folly

I well r~member a celebrated case which was tried in
the General Court, where many cases were quoted from
Dumford and East, and when a gentlemen, high in the
profession proclaimed aloud that the court was bound by
such cases, that our rights, liberty and lives rested
on them--but presently an opposing case was adduced
from East, in contradiction to himself and his firm-but that professor replied, he was an unfledg'd
reporter! But a Judge then sitting; very properly
replied that they stood not upon the whim and caprice
of British Judges, that we had long since emancipated
ourselves from the shackles they imposed, and preferred
to stand upon the Bill of Rights Constitution and Laws;
principly to sacred to be shipwrecked on the British
ocean of uncertainty. As to the supposed difficulty
and labour of revising the Common Law, it is all a
bubble; who could have supposed that after a free
republican . • . government had been established, and
so many laws that hung upon the ancient system were
done away, viz:--the law of primogeniture, the law of
descents, survivorship, &c. &c. with the complete
change of the Criminal Code, so much would be left as
to render it impossible for a few wise and willing men
to accomplish the end proposed? After old Coka and
Littleton shall have been stripped of their antiquated
dress, what great matter would be left for us to do?
shall we forever administer our free republican
government on principles of a rigid and high ton'd
monarchy? I almost blush for my country when I think
of these things.
Let a stranger go into our courts, and he would almost
believe himself in the court of King's Bench. Can the
Judicial department be free from their Chains, but by a
revisal of the Common Law under Legislative authority?
It may be asked where a committee of revisors be found;
whose talents would be equal to the task? This is a
mortifying question indeed--but I answer, that among
the many wise and experienced Judges and Lawyers (some
of whom have retired from the labors of their
profession) two or three may be found, whom nature has
blessed with sufficient talents to accomplish the work
in as reasonable time, and with virtue and patriotism
to insure its performance in a manner auspicious to the
best interest of their country. Let us not therefore,
sit down in despair, under a mistaken impression that
this load of Common Law authorities cannot be shaken
off but resolutely attack it as we did the statutory
despotism, and no doubt but our endeavors will be
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assumed with success.l22
Tyler had brilliantly coupled his attack on legal delays
with a forceful appeal for codification.

Ironically, by

couching his argument in stinging republican discourse,
Tyler laid bare the paradoxes within the revolutionary
settlement.

At the same time, the governor's vitriolic

denouncement proposed a practical remedy.
Tyler had effectively challenged the legislature to
finish the Revolution in regard to the law.

Preservation of

British common law in the form that Jefferson and his fellow
statesmen had attempted had been a mistake.

True revolution

required more stringent separation from English legal
authorities.

Indeed, Tyler argued that the safety of the

republic depended on such a departure.

So much for the

Post-revolutionary reliance English common law.
In his remarks, Tyler had identified major problems
with the court and suggested possible remedies.
Institutionally, Tyler suggested adding judges, a timehonored reform, in order to relieve the burgeoning
dockets.l23

Procedurally, Tyler provided a comprehensive

plan to relieve the pressure on the bench.

Adaptation of

legal briefs, a practice that most American courts had yet
to embrace, represented a useful, time-saving innovation.
122Ibid.
123This was a simple matter and had been utilized in
the past, see Hening, statutes, " An Act for Establishing
District courts and for Regulating the General Court," v.
XII, 730-763.
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Giving judges discretion over deciding which cases were
worthy of appeal reflected a growing acceptance of the role
of the independent judiciary in the new republic.

Tyler's

plea to the legislature to police the antics of an
"unethical" bar echoed the sentiments of his fellow
Virginians toward the state's lawyers.

Labelling the bench

a "talking court" served two purposes.

First, the governor

used the example of a "talking court" to reprimand the
judges for their overzealous erudition.

More important,

Tyler remarks illustrated the type of cumbersome practices
associated with the loose application of English common law
and presented a forceful argument for codification.
Tyler's attack on the judiciary vividly articulated the
judicial problems that resulted from Virginia's ambivalent
revolutionary settlement.

Furthermore, Tyler effectively

combined the growing disatisfaction with corrupt lawyers
with his call for codification.

By combining the two

elements in one argument, Tyler made a forceful case for
legal revolution--he demonstrated that the current system
had become cumbersome and removed from social realities, and
he challenged the elite (the legislature) to use its power
to enact revolutionary change in the law.

Tyler's criticism

of the unnessary erudition of the legal profession,
moreover, tapped into an argument that was gaining in
popularity in the early decades of the nineteenth century,
one that would surely win support for the governor's
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proposal.124
In a further effort to promote large-scale reforms,
Tyler went on to criticize the operation of ·the county
courts.

In doing so, he also solicited the support of the

legal profession which had encouraged reform of the county
court system since before the Revolution.125
Tyler's argument for codification was successful.

A

nine-year quest for codification which culminated in the
Revised Code of 1819 had begun.

Even though it took nearly

a decade to complete the process, the legislature
immediately began the arduous process of collecting and
publishing Virginia's statutes in a more orderly fashion.
Just one month after he addressed the speakers Tyler happily
instructed William Waller Hening to begin his compilation of
the Statutes at Large.126
By the middle of the 1820s these suspicions combined
with the new national trend toward codification and the
reception of civilian forms of justice to invoke a call for
a new constitution.

If the Revised code of 1819 marked the

succeszful completion of the first phase of the codification
movement as it related to the drive for practical justice,
the Constitution of 1831 represented the ultimate victory of
124Roeber, Cook, et al.
125Tyler to the Speakers, 3 December 1810, Executive
Letterbooks; Roeber, et al.
126John Tyler to William Waller Hening, esq., 2 January
1811, Executive Letterbooks, 15 January 1810-24 August 1811.
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the codifiers.

Not only did the Old Dominion receive a new

constitution in the arrangement, but it received a new
supreme court as the judiciary article redefined the nature,
character, and membership of that august tribunal.

1831

thus marked the end of the era of republican justice in
Virginia.
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Chapter Five
Louisiana's Supreme Court, 1813-1840
Louisiana's early Supreme Court judges faced a more
difficult task than their brethren in the Old Dominion.
Unlike the Virginia court, Louisiana's high appellate
tribunal started almost from scratch.

Although the Superior

Court for the Territory of Orleans had settled some basic
organizational and jurisdictional problems, the supreme
court drew its definition from a brand new state
constitution that placed new restrictions on the judiciary.
Moreover, the court's justices, while using the model of the
Superior Court, still had to define the tribunal's role as
the state's first Supreme Court of Appeals.
juQ~es

Finally, the

had to wrestle with problems related to the

codification movement as politicians and some members of the
legal community sought not only to reinforce the civil law
through the creation of a new civil code in the 1820s, but
also to replace Anglo-American patterns of judicature with
more restrictive civilian practices.

Louisiana's

Americanized bench triumphed over these challenges by using
court rules and judicial decisions to adopt procedures which
ensured the continuation of the Anglo-American brand of
judicial administration, to emphasize the common law in the
curriculum of the state's prospective

lav~ers,

and to reduce

the power and influence of the Louisiana Code over judicial
expression.

By the 1840s, the judges of the Supreme Court
216
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of Louisiana had molded the state's judiciary into a
thoroughly American tribunal.
When Wilkinson and Claiborne took control of Louisiana
Territory in late 1803, they did so with the understanding
that the region would gain statehood as soon as possible.l
Congress, however, thwarted early petitions for statehood as
they originated in territorial political squabbles, and
because the governor, the president, and many congressmen
doubted the ability of Louisianians to govern themselves
within the American system.2
In 1809, however, Louisiana's memorialists managed to
convince the territorial legislature to renew their drive
for

statehood.

Despite Governor Claiborne's opposition--

"the people are not yet prepared for self government, and to
extend it to them would be a hazardous experiment" he
declared3--the memorialists succeeded.

By 1811, Claiborne

too had moved into the pro-statehood camp, and President
Madison signed legislation enabling Louisiana to enter the
Union.

In 1812 Louisianians held their first constitutional

lTreaty of Cession, 30 April 1803, Francis Newton
Thorpe, comp. The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial
Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories,
and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of
America, 7 vols., (Washington, D. c.: u. s. Government
Printing Offices, 1909), art. iii, III, 1376.
2For a good discussion of the political issues involved
with the first statehood petition, see George Darga,
Jefferson's Louisiana, 29; for congressional attitudes see
Winthrop Jordan, White over Black, 389.
3claiborne to Robert Smith, 18 May 1809, Rowland, OL,
val. IV, 211.
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convention.4
Surprisingly, debates over the judiciary article went
rather smoothly in the Louisiana constitutional convention.
The so-called "creole-American" clash of legal traditions
failed to present significant problems for the delegates.
Although the initial draft of the judiciary article drew
opposition from members of the committee of the whole for
its lack of specificity and failure to protect the ancien
population's traditional civilian legal customs, subsequent
debates in the judiciary committee dealt with less volatile
matters.
The original judiciary article proposed a
"hierarchical" judicial system based on American
institutions.

Insofar as the Supreme Court was concerned,

the convention proposed a three-man court led by a chief
judge.

Seeking to restrict the tribunal to cases of

financial significance, the committee proposed a monetary
floor of $300.00 on prospective appeals.
Actually, the proposal for the Supreme Court drew
scant criticism from the members of the committee of the
whole.
judges.

The most vexing problem concerned the selection of
Originally, the article

grant~d

the legislature the

right to appoint the judges; however, it provided no

4For the best discussion of the process and politics
involved in Louisiana's drive to statehood see Warren M.
Billings, "From this Seed: The Louisiana Constitution of
1812, 11 in Billings and Edward F. Haas eds., In Search of
Fundamental Law: Louisiana's Constitutions 1812-1974,
forthcoming.
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guidance regarding qualifications, terms of service, or
impeachment.

Orleanais members of the convention worried

that to include such vagaries would allow the American
faction in the legislature to control appointments to the
judiciary, thus negating civilian influence and threatening
ancient custom.
In order to smooth over the objections, the committee
of the whole appointed a sub-committee to deal with the
judicary article.

The five-man judiciary committee

consisted of prominent members of both factions--Allan B.
Magruder and John Watkins from the American side, Bernard
Marigny and Jean Noel Destrehan of the orleanais faction,
and the Irishman Alexander Porter whose role was to serve as
mediator and swing man.

If the committee confronted heated

debates over items in the judiciary act, both sides of the
political arena would be well represented.

No such tension,

however, developed over the institutional structure of the
Supreme Court.5
Nonetheless, the judiciary committee did not pursue
its task without some debate.

In fact, some disagreements

were so pronounced that when majority and minority reports
were filed on 30 December 1812, Destrehan managed to have
the majority recommendations tabled in order to allow the
minority to present its opinions to the committee of the
whole.

Destrehan's objections, however, once again centered

on apportionment rather than problems with the overall
5Billings, "From this Seed," forthcoming.
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construction and conception of the court.

Thus the article

passed rather easily with only minor amendations.6
The court finally created by the judiciary article of
the constitution represented a model of American judicial
organization.

The article vested judicial power in a three

to five man supreme court and inferior courts.?

It gave the

supreme court appellate jurisdiction in civil disputes
exceeding the sum of $300.00.8
salary of $5,000.00 annually.

Justices would receive a
As in Virginia, the

legislature divided the state into judicial districts and
required the judges to ride circuit.

New Orleans, German

Coast, Acadia, Lafourche, Iberville, and Point Coupee
comprised the Eastern District.

Attakapas, Opelousas,

Rapides, concordia, Natchitoches, and oauchita made up the
Western District.9
Louisiana's convention mandated that for five years
6Ibid.
7The matter of which branch of government should grant
judicial appointments proved to be a volatile issue within
the convention. As a result, the committee left the matter
unresolved. Governor Claiborne assumed the authority in
1813, however, and the legislature acquiesed and approved
his appointees with only minimum resistance. Pierre
Derbigny's appointment, however, was held up for nearly a
month. See "From this Seedn and The Historic Rules of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1813-1879, (Lafayette: Center
for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana,
1985) xii.
8Note that the monetary ceiling was the same as that of
the Superior Court for the Territory of Orleans.
9Francis Newton Thorpe, Federal and State
Constitutions, 1386-1387. Note that the district
organization roughly mirrored that of the superior Court for
the Territory of Orleans, supra, ch. III.
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the court hold eastern sessions in New Orleans from November
to July; and western sessions from August to through
October.lO

Judges would hold office during good behavior

with impeachment powers reserved for the governor with a
three-fourths confirming vote of both houses.

The

convention also empowered the judges of the court of appeals
to appoint and to remove clerks.ll
In respect to the laws-in-force, the convention
provided for the continuation of the system currently in
place "Provided however, that the Legislature shall never
adopt any system or code of laws, by a general reference to
the said system or code, but in all cases, shall specify the
several provisions of the laws it may enact."

Finally, the

judiciary article required all of the state's judges to
refer to the particular authority cited in any definitive
judgment and to adduce the reasons for the judgment in a
formal, written decision.l2
The convention had created a model American bench.

As

in Virginia, judges would meet at appropriate times and in
regulated districts, they would hear major civil appeals,
and regulate their own officers and administer justice.
Moreover, the clause pertaining to the laws-in-force
guaranteed that Louisiana would remain the mixed
lOThe legislature witheld the right to change session
sites every five years.
llThorpe, Federal and State constitutions, 1388.
12Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, 1388.
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jurisdiction that had been fleshed out in the territorial
period. 13
Even though Louisiana was a relative newcomer to the
republican system, its first judiciary article proved to be
an efficient, succinct, and representative example of
American patterns of court construction.

Unlike Virginia's

first constitutional builders 1 Louisiana's delegates were
able to borrow from the experience of other states.

Two

delegates, James Brown and Allan B. Macgruder, had even
served in Kentucky's constitutional convention.l4

Moreover,

American justice, in its appellate for1n, had been operating
elsewhere steadily since the American Revolution.

Thus

Louisiana's judicary article and the subsequent legislative
acts that followed were much less complicated than
Jefferson's early court bills as all civil appellate
litigation in Louisiana came under the ambit of one court
rather than individual admiralty, chancery, and appellate
benches.l5

Since Louisiana was smaller and less populous

than the Old Dominion, session provisions were simpler.
Furthermore, in the three decades since the Virginia
Assembly created its courts of appeals, Americans had
developed a stronger sense of their republican philosophy.
13This may be taken as a reaffirmation that the socalled "code of 1808 11 was never intended to be regarded as a
comprehensive code.
14Billings, "From this Seed," forthcoming.
15Although unlike the Old Dominion, the Louisiana
judicial system did not contain an equity court.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

223
Thus the Louisiana convention, unlike Virginia's delegates
earlier, placed little emphasis on oath-taking.

Indeed, the

simple oath for all of Louisiana's governmental officers-legislative, executive, and judicial--was the same "I (A.
B.) do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent
on me as--according to the best of my abilities and
understanding, agreeably to the rules and regulation of the
Constitution, and the laws of this state: so help me God!"l6
One advantage Louisianians had over their counterparts
in the Old Dominion stemmed from the fact that the Superior
Court for the Territory of Orleans had already explored some
of the legal landscape that would occupy the attention of
the supreme court.

Nonetheless, the superior court's

explorations were fraught with jurisdictional obstacles-issues which would continue to occupy the supreme court
throughout its early history.l7
Following the passage of the constitution in 1812,
Louisianians moved swiftly to establish a government under
its auspices.

In early 1813, the legislature met to begin

ordering the state's new government.

One of the first

orders of business before the legislature was the
16Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, 1388.
!?Although the compilation of the Digest of 1808 and
and various judicial decisions had solved the major problems
associated with interpreting the laws-in-force, the main
jurisdictional issues which confronted the superior court
were still pressing 'ivhen the supreme court assumed its
operation.
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organization and creation of the state's court system.

In

the Judiciary Act of 1813, Louisiana's legislature
implemented the constitution by opting for

?

three-man

supreme court and erecting a rudimentary system of inferior
courts.

The act provided for monthly sessions of the

supreme court.

Between November and August, the court would

convene at the seat of the eastern appellate district in New
Orleans.

For the rest of thG year, the court would reside

at Opelousas, the seat of the western district.l8
The Judiciary Act of 1813 vested the court with the
right to "make and issue all mandates," to punish "all
contempts," to preside over admissions to the bar, and to
create "all needful rules.nl9

Although the constitution

limited the judges's power to interpret their authority, the
judiciary act granted them the necessary powers to organize
the court and to regulate its proceedings.20

Power to "make

and issue" mandates and to punish contempts allowed the
court to act freely in the promulgation of its affairs.
Rule making power had proved necessary in fleshing out the
thorny jurisdiction of the superior Court, hence similar
authority was granted to the supreme court.

Admission of

attorneys was a standard feature of most American high
courts.

In Louisiana as in the Old Dominion, consequently,

18Acts, 1813, 18-34.
19Acts, 1813, 18-34.
20Thus the Judiciary Act lent a basic form to the
court, one which would essentially remain in place until
1879, see Billings, Historic Rules, xi.

--------
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the justices of the Supreme Court controlled not only bar
exams, but set the standards of admission.

While those

standards were relatively relaxed in the Old Dominion,
Louisiana's judges wielded their authority over the bar
admissions to inject an increasingly high level of common
law into the state's legal order.21
In reorganizing the Territory of Orleans into the
State of Louisiana, the voters of the new state sought to
attain a reasonable measure of stability.

The first

legislature drew most of its membership from the previous
territorial houses, and William
as governor.

c. c. Claiborne remained on

Governor Claiborne possessed first hand

knowledge of the difficulties that the new supreme court
would likely face.

As a judge in the Governor's Court,

Claiborne had wrestled with the all too difficult nuances
that comprised the territory's mixed jurisdiction.

During

his stint as territorial governor, Claiborne became
intimately aware both of the need to attract competent
judges and the difficulty of convincing qualified appointees

21E. Lee Shepard has characterized the early Virginia
bar requirements as almost non-existent. Although high
court judges were required to examine applicants to the bar,
usually only one judge tested the prospective lawyer and his
fellow judges accepted his conclusions; conversations with
E. Lee Shepard June 1989. In a letter to his son, one
Virginia supreme court justice, William H. Cabell, mentioned
that he planned to examine an aspirant to the bar if the
stage stopped for fifteen minutes in Charlottesville during
a trip to Lewisburg, William H. Cabell to Henry Coalter
Cabell, 22 April 1838, Cabell Family Papers, Virginia
Historical Society.

-------
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to accept seats on the bench.22
Keenly aware of the difficulties facing the new
supreme court, Claiborne sought to wield all of his
influence to attract qualified judges to the tribunal.
Accordingly, Claiborne's initial appointments to the bench
reveal the thoughtful nature of his decisions.

As

territorial governor Claiborne had earlier been unsuccessful
in enticing prominent American legal figures to the Orleans
court.

Pierre Duponceau had declined his appointment, and

Ephraim Kirby died en route to the Crescent City--only John
Prevost of New York arrived to claim his commission.

This

outcome delayed the organization of the terrritorial court
and forced Claiborne to draw upon the tiny pool of qualified
jurists in Louisiana and Mississippi Territory to fill
positions on the bench.

When Claiborne faced the task of

appointing judges to the supreme court, he avoided such
delays by limiting his search to the small group of legal
luminaries already residing in Louisiana.

In 1813 Dominick

A. Hall, George Mathews, and Pierre Derbigny emerged as the
leading candidates.23
Hall had served with distinction on the federal
district court for the Territory of Orleans.

Indeed, Hall

was widely recognized as one of the leading jurists of the
American southwest territory, a regard that led him to leave
22claiborne's experiences in this regard are chronicled
in Chapter Three above.
23 Ibid.
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the supreme bench only five months after his appointment for
a second federal appointment.24

George Mathews had

reluctantly accepted a seat on the superior Court for the
Territory of Orleans, hoping to parley that position into a
more lucrative judgeship in Mississippi territory.

Mathews,

however, became one of the more influential judges on the
territorial court, writing some of the more important
opinions after Prevost's resignation.

During I<Iathews 1

tenure on the territorial court, he participated in the
landmark decisions which interpreted the meaning of the
laws-in-force and the impact of the Digest of 1808.25
Pierre Derbigny had been one of the territory's leading
lawyers and legislators.

A native of Laon, France, Derbigny

had established himself as a successful lawyer and had
served in various official capacities in the Territory of
Orleans.

Derbigny's civilian background indicated that

Orleanais interests would be represented on the court.
Moreover, Derbigny's expertise in French law and knowlege of
the language stood to serve him well as a justice.
Nonetheless, neither Derbigny nor any of the justices that
sat on the early Louisiana supreme court were members of the
ancienne population.26
When the supreme court convened for the first time on
24Billings, Historic Rules, xii, 45.
25see Chapter Three above.
26rn fact a member of the ancienne population did not
sit on the court Zenon Lebauve assumed his seat in 1865,
Billings, Historic Rules.
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1 March 1813, only Hall and Mathews' appointments had been
approved by the legislature (Derbigny's had been held up by
American members of the legislature).

The first session of

the supreme court was merely ceremonial.

Shortly

thereafter, the court commenced its real work.

On 3 March

1813, Mathews and Hall asserted their rule-making power by
commmissioning Francois X. Martin, Edward Livingston,
Abraham Ellery, Etienne Mazureau, and Abner Duncan to a
"Committee to draw up Rules & Regulations for the Government
of the Court."

Martin had distinguished himself on the the

Superior Court for the Territory of Orleans; consequently,
his practical knowledge of Louisiana's judicial system would
serve him well in devising new rules.

Mazureau, Livingston,

Ellery, and Duncan represented the state's most able
practitioners.

These lawmakers were singularly well

equipped to draft the court's rules. Unfortunately, no copy
of their report survives.27
Supreme court historian Warren M. Billings writes that
"In all likelihood, Martin and his colleauges took as their
guide an 1805 act of the territorial legislature that had
established procedures for adjudicating causes in the
superior court, which they modified to meet the new high
court's needs." Billings' inference is supported by early
case records which closely resembled forms prescribed by the
1805 act.28

Billings is no doubt correct in this

27Billings, Historic Rules, xiii.
28Billings, Historic Rules, xiii.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

229
assumption: however, apart from the 1805 act, each
commissioner was intimately aware of the rules and practices
of the Superior Court, which they all either served on or
appeared before, and the various rules governing the
function of the territory's other courts.

Mazureau, for

instance, worked as the clerk of the Court of Pleas and
transcribed the rules governing its proceedings as
prescribed by the judges in its first session.29
Disappearance of the committee's report severely
limits modern scholarly analysis of the court's initial
exercise of its rulemaking discretion.

Moreover, future

rules were entered intermittantly only when need arose.

A

systematic rendition of the court's rules did not appear
until after the tribunal was reorganized under the 1845
state constitution.30

Nonetheless, an analysis of the

surviving rules demonstrates a good deal about the issues
concerning the court during its formative period.31
The twenty-nine rules issued by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana between 1813 and 1840 covered a variety of
29"An Act regulating the practice of the superior court
in civil causes," Acts, 1805, 219-260: see also chapter
three above and appendix four.
30For an analysis of the 1845 rev1s1on, see Mark F.
Fernandez, "From Chaos to Continuity: The First Reform of
the supreme Court of Louisiana, 1845-1852," Louisiana
History, (Winter 1987), v. XXVIII, 19-36.
31Another troubling aspect of the surviving rules of
court is that they represent only those rules governing the
Eastern District, therefore, there is no way to assess
differences between procedure in the two judicial districts.

--------
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practical and procedural matters.

Two important issues

which consistently cropped up, however, had an important
effect on the development of Louisiana as a representative
American jurisdiction--legal briefs and bar admissions.
In its first rulemaking session following the
committee's report on 13 May 1813, the court introduced a
requirement for counsel on both sides of an action to
furnish the judges with a brief of the case at least one day
in advance.32

Previous statute required parties to furnish

the justices with copies of transcripts from the original
cases.33

It is not clear whether the judges intended to

release the parties from the responsibility of furnishing
transcripts by requiring briefs, or whether the briefs were
to be supplied in addition to those documents.

Nonetheless,

the court's order represents an early expression of the
modern usage of the term "brief" and illustrates the
advanced understanding of American innovations that
Louisiana's justices brought to their tribunal.34
Less than a year after the court ordered the briefs,
it rescinded the regulation because it violated Section 18
of the Judiciary Act of 1813 which required the parties to
32Rule of court, 13 May 1813, Billings, Historic Rules,
1; previous rules in the Superior Court for the Territory of
Orleans required counsel to provide brief summaries of the
points of interest of each hearing, however, the term
"brief" had not yet crept into the discourse.
33Acts, 1813, 28.
34For an excellent analysis on the evolution of the
term "brief" see Billings, Rules, ln.
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present full transcripts of cases along with their requests
for appeal. 3 5

Undaunted, the court in 1821 once again

introduced briefs as part of the appellr.te process when it
required an applicant for a hearing to file "a note of the
points and authorities on which he intends to rely" with the
clerk at least three days before the hearing.

Opposing

counsel was then required to submit a similar "note" raising
the major point of its argument within three days of
scheduling. 3 6

The purposes of this rule were twofold: the

court wished tc impose some strict guidelines on
applications for rehearings;37 and the judges hoped to speed
up their preparation time by using the briefs as an
introduction to, perhaps even a substitute for,
cumbersome lower court transcripts.

the

This second attempt at

introducing appellate briefs demonstrates both the
predilection of the judges for such innovations as well as
the fact that the court's average caseload per year had
nearly doubled.38
35Billings, Historic Rules, 2.
36 Rule of court, 23 April 1821, Billings Historic
Rules, 5-6.
3 7 In its early years of operation the Louisiana court
was not faced with an overwhelming caseload. But by the
1820s, illness and resignations had encumbered the court's
proceedings. One of the more cumbersome aspects of the
appellate process are the frequent demands for rehearings.
By restricting motions for rehearings to the points covered
in the briefs, the court could limit the amount of motions
filed.
38This is demonstrated by a marked rise in the average
number of case per year before the supreme court. In the
six year period between 1813 and 1818, the court heard an
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Louisiana's lawyers quickly took advantage of the
loophole in the rehearing rule by arguing new points, not
mentioned in their briefs, during their hearings.

In order

to provide opposing counsel ample time to study such newly
introduced authorities, the court soon drafted a rule
allowing them four days to answer the new points in
writing.39
The institution of briefs represented a useful
administrative reform for the Supreme Court.

It also

represented a major step toward shaping Louisiana into a
distinctively American jurisdiction.

Louisiana's judges

introduced the state's bar to modern American practices of
bringing appeals, thus reinforcing a style of procedure that
was becoming a vital feature of the American appellate
system.

The rules relating to legal briefs in Louisiana

illustrate how procedural reforms in the supreme court
helped to facilitate the introduction of American judicial
practices.
Louisiana's judges employed a more direct method of
introducing American practices and common law to Louisiana's
judicial system in the rules governing bar admissions and
legal education.

Just as other state legislatures had done,

average number of 53.1 cases per year. Between 1819 and
1824, the court heard an average of 126.5 cases per year,
see Mark F. Fernandez, "From Chaos to Continuity: Early
Reforms of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1845-1852,"
Louisiana History, (Winter 1987), 19-36.
39Rule of Court, 6 July, 1821, Billings, Historic
Rules, 7.
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Louisiana's assembly charged its supreme court justices with
the duty of overseeing the training and admission of new
attorneys into the state bar.

Because the complicated

origins of Louisiana's jurisdiction required intensive
study, Louisiana's judges took their charge of overseeing
legal education much more seriously than their brethren in
other states. 40

In a series of court rules between 1813 and

1839 the Supreme Court created, fine-tuned, and systematized
the criteria for admission to the bar.

The judges ensured

that Louisiana's lawyers would be trained in American legal
practices, guaranteeing the further development of those
traditions in the Pelican State.
In June of 1813 the court issued the first strictures
governing the admission of lawyers to the state bar.

The

judges ruled that no one would be admitted as either
counsellor or attorney unless he could certify that he had
worked in the office of a practicing attorney for at least
three years prior to the application, could produce a
license to practice law from another American state or
territory, or had been admitted to the bar of the Territory
of orleans.41

Under this arrangement, the court not only

provided strict guidelines for admission, but also it
continued the graduated bar of the territorial period and
40James A. Padgett, ed., "Letters of James Brown to
Henry Clay, 1804-1835, 11 Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXIV
(1941), 1152.
41Rule of Court, 14 June 1813, Billings, Historic
Rules, 2-3.
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allowed reciprocity for advocates from other states or
territories.42
Two years later, the judges amended the rules for
admission to include lawyers trained in American legal
seminaries.

Relaxing the requirements slightly to

acknowledge the value of a formal education, the court
required these prospective candidates to apprentice for only
two years under the direction of a local attorney.

In this

vein, the court's provisions reflected the great strides in
legal education that were being made around the nation in
the early nineteenth century and ensured that attorneys
trained in other jurisdictions received a thorough
introduction to Louisiana's laws and practices.43
In 1819, the court eased up further on its
requirements by allowing applicants who could assure the
court of a good classical education, even though they might
not possess a college degree, to enter the bar after
practicing for two years
attorney.44

und~r

the tutelage of a local

Relaxation of the rules governing bar

admissions suggests that the court had begun to feel
comfortable that it had solved most of the complicated
42see chapter three above.
43Rule of court, Billings, Historic Rules, 3; an
example of how legal education developed in Virginia during
this time may be gleaned from the various entries in W.
Hamilton Bryson, Legal Education in Virginia, 1779-1979: A
Biographical Approach, (Charlotteville: University Press of
Virginia, 1982).
44Rule of Court, 27 February 1819, Billings, Historic
Rules, 4-5.

----------
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problems related to its mixed jurisdiction and, more
important, reflects the growing need for attorneys created
by the litigiousness of the state's population.
Two later rules governing bar admissions, however,
sought to restrict unsavory characters and members of
Louisiana's ancienne population from entering the state's
legal community.

In 1821, the court passed a requirment

forbiding admission to candidates "not aquainted with the
legal language [English] of the state."

This stricture

mainly sought to eliminate French influence from the state's
legal order.

Also, until the 1820s the court had followed

the costly practice of reporting cases in both English and
French.

With the judges moving more and more in the

direction of American jurisprudence restricting court
pleadings to English saved the state a good penny on
publishing costs.

Indirectly,

~he

rule made it more

difficult for members of the ancienne population to enter
the bar as it prohibited the use of their native tongue.45
These provisions were followed by an 1835 rule that
restricted unsuitable individuals (as well as members of the
Ancienne population), from entering the bar by providing for
a brief waiting period between application and admission.
The delay allowed publication of a list of candidates and
enabled persons with objections to applicants to come

45Rule of court, 7 r.fay 1821, Billings, Historic Rules,
6-7, 6n.
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forward and testify against their admission.46
Finally, in 1840 the court issued its most
comprehensive ruling concerning admissions to the bar.

The

rules also had a profound effect in shaping the course of
Louisiana legal education to favor the continued reception
of American legal and juridical principles.

The 1840

regulation required all candidates for admission "Whether
previously licensed in another state or not" to present
evidence of United States citizenship, good moral character,
and one year's residence in Louisiana.47

This portion of

the rule merely refined the requirements that had been
promulgated in previous regulations.48
A second section of the 1840 ruling, however,
represented a landmark in the history of legal education in
Louisiana as the court presented a syllabus for prospective
applicants and provided for an examination on the material.
The books contained in the syllabus demonstrate an effort to
bring Louisiana's brand of legal instruction in line with
those of other states.

Accordingly, the judges required

would-be attorneys to familiarize themselves with standard
works of civil law (authorities that were new gaining use in
other American jurisdictions), English common law, and
46Rule of Court, 8 December 1835, Billings, Historic
Rules, 7-Bn.
47An exception was made on the residency requirement
for attorney's licensed in other states.
48Rule of Court, 24 November 1840, Billings, Historic
Rules, 9-11.
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American treatises.

What is most striking about the

inclusion of civilian treatises in the syllabus is that the
titles are so few.

Conspicuously absent are references to

the Siete Partidas, Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis, the
Code Nair, the Code Napoleon, the Coutume de Paris, the
projets of Post-Revolutionary France, the

Compil~tion

of

Castille, the Febrero Adicionado, the Curia Philipica, royal
ordinances, and the Fuero Real, all traditionally considered
cornerstones of Louisiana's jurisdiction.

One might argue,

although no contemporary commentators did, that these
sources were included both in the Digest of 1808, and in the
Civil Code, but so were British treatises.

The meaning here

is implicitly clear--English and American authorities were
becoming more important to Louisiana's legal traditions than
civilian sources.

Thus in their "Course of studies" the

judges required prospective applicants, as a minimum
requirement, to familiarize themselves with the following
works:
Story on the constitution,49 The general laws of the
United States, Vattel's law of Nations,50 The Louisiana
Code,51 The Code of Practice,52 The Statutes of the
State, of a general nature, The Institutes of
49Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States, (Boston: 1833).
50Emmerich Vattel, The Law of Nations, or Principles of
the Law of Nature. Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of
Nations and Sovereigns, (London 1793).
51civil Code of The state of Louisiana,
1825).

(New Orleans:

52wheelock s. Upton, The Code of Practice in Civil
Cases for the State of Louisiana, (New Orleans 1839).
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Justinian,5 3 Domat's Civil laws,54 Pothier's Treatise
on Obligations ss Blackstone's Commentaries,56 Kent's
Commentaries,5 7 Chitt¥58 or Bayley59 on Bills,
Starkie60 or Phillips 1 on evidence, Russel [sic)62 on
crimes, and the Jurisprudence of Louisiana as Settled
53The most common translation available was Thomas
Cooper, trans., The Institutes of Justinian, (Philadelphia,
1812) •
~'

54Jean Domat, The Civil Laws in the Natural Order . .
(Paris: 1689, London: 1722).

55Robert Joseph Potier, A Treatise on Obligations
Considered from a Moral and Legal View, (Paris: 1722,
London: 1801, New Bern, North Carolina 1802). Most
candidates would have purchased Judge Martin's 1802, New
Bern, translation. But Martin's association with the
publication was not the sole criterion for its inclusion in
the syllabus. In fact, the entire area of obligations was
an element of civil law which greatly influenced American
jurists in the nineteenth century, thus copies of Pothier,
particularly the 1801 London version, circulated widely
throughout the American south and West, for a good example
of this, see Sandra K. VanBurkleo unpublished Ph.d. diss.
University of Minnesota, (1988). Therefore, the inclusion
of these civil law authorities in the syllabus ironically
assisted in the Americanization of the legal system by
reinforcing civilian works that had become influential in
American jurisdictions.
56sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England, (Oxford, 1765-1769).
57James Kent, Commentaries on American Law,
(Philadelphia, 1826).
5 8Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on Bills of
Exchange. Checks on Banks. Promissory Notes, Bankers Cash
Notes and Bank Notes, 1st American ed., (Philadelphia 1809}
59sir John Bayley, summary of the Law of Bills of
Exchange, Cash Bills and Promissory Notes, (London: 1789).
60Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise on the Law of
Evidence and Digest in Civil and Criminal Proceedings,
(London: 1824).
6lsamuel March Philipps, A Treatise of the Law of
Evidence, (London: 1814).
62william Oldnall Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and
Misdemeanors, (London: 1819).
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by the decisions of the Supreme Court.63
The import of the syllabus is obvious.

The court greatly

extended its prerogative to govern legal education by
specifying the authorities the states' aspiring lawyers
needed to master.

Moreover, the high number of common law

authorities included in the syllabus ensured consistent
intrusion of Anglo-American traditions of law into the
state's legal heritage by giving English and American
sources prominence over all other studies.

Inclusion of the

Louisiana Code, the state's statutes, and the jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court simply provided for the instruction of
prospective attorneys in legal areas peculiar to the state
of Louisiana.

Similar provisions could be found in many

other American states.

Emerich Vattel's Laws of Nations

played a fundamental role in influencing the revolutionaries
who created the nation, therefore, it too frequently entered
into legal syllabi around the nation.

Attention to

Justinian, Domat, and Pothier was needed because in the area
of property law--these civilian treatises were informing not
only Louisiana's law, but that of most jurisdictions around
the nation.64

In Louisiana, these works marked special

contributions since they formed the basis of the state's
land law as provided for in the territorial settlement, but
63The list is cited in Rule of Court, 24 November 1840,
Billings, Historic Rules, 10-11.
64sandra F, Van Burkleo, "'That our Pure Republican
Principles Might Not Whither•: Kentucky's Relief Crisis and
the Pursuit of Moral Justice," 1818-1826," Unpublished Ph.
D. diss. University of Minnesota, 1988.
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their inclusion in the syllabus in no way suggests that
Louisiana was a civil law jurisdiction.65

Indeed, the

exclusion of many important civilian authorities
demonstrates a conscious movement away from civil law
principles.
Inclusion of so many English and American treatises is
as significant as the decision to minimize the impact of
Civilian authorities.

Although any nineteenth-century

American jurisdiction would require its lawyers to master
such influential works as Story on the Constitution,
Blackstone, and Kent; the Louisiana judges' decision to
include Chitty, Bayley, starkie, Phillips, and Russel
represents a deliberate effort on the part of the justices
to institute Anglo-American legal forms regarding bank
notes, bills of exchange, and promissory notes; rules of
evidence; and criminal strictures as part of the court's
operations. 6 6

The syllabus closely resembled the type of

reading list that judges in other American jurisdictions
provided for their prospective lawyers.

In fact, the

syllabus is so similar to David Hoffman's 1805 "Course of
Studies" for Maryland attornies that it is quite possible

65see Chapter Three above.
66Although the court had no direct original or
appellate jurisdiction in criminal causes, criminal cases
could find themselves on the supreme court docket if the
ruling of the criminal court was challenged on
constitutional grounds.
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that the Louisiana judges simply copied his list.67
Finally, the judges provided for stringent quarterly
bar examinations and a board of seven examiners.

The

examiners--Etienne Mazureau, George Eustis, George
Strawbridge, Pierre Rost-Denis, John Grymes, and Levi
Pierce--all were leading members of the Louisiana bar.
Significantly, none of these examiners represented the
state's

~ncienne

population.

Eustis, Strawbridge, Grymes,

and Pierce were all Americans; Rost-Denis and Mazureau were
from France.68

Thus the judges ruled out the participation

of the ancienne population--the portion of the population
most strongly concerned with preserving the state's civilian
heritage--from the training and testing of applicants to the
state's bar.69
Other rules passed during this period governed such
diverse topics as return days, opening and closing
arguments, rehearings, filing costs, ex parte hearings,
assignments of error, meeting dates, trial regulations,
record management, and country dockets.70

Most of these

67warren M. Billings, "A 'Course of Studies•: Books
that Shaped Louisiana Law," unpublished typescript.
68The foreign French were frequently at odds with
Louisiana's creole French and Spanish citizens.
69Rule of court, 24 November 1840, Billings, Historic
Rules, 11.
70Rule of court, November 1813; Rule of Court, 18
January 1814; Rule of Court, 8 March 1814; Rule of Court, 11
April 1814; Rule of Court, 28 March 1816; Rule of Court, 17
February 1817; Rule of Court, 9 December 1817; Rule of
Court, December 1817; Rule of court, 11 May 1818; Rule of
Court, 5 July 1821; Rule of Court, 16 January 1822; Rule of
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were routine in nature; nonetheless, their cumulative effect
reinforced the Anglo-American predisposition to the court's
proceedings.
Although the court's rules represent an important
technical aspect of its judicial development, their
contribution to the creation of a representative American
jurisdiction pales in comparison to the role of individual
judges and their decisions.

Basically, between 1813 and

1846, two senior judges dominated the Supreme Court of
Louisiana.71

From 1813 to 1836, George Mathews served as

senior judge and from 1836 to 1846, Francois
the position.

x.

Martin held

Both the Mathews court and the Martin court

reflected the personalities and spirit of their senior
judges.
Under George Mathews, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
enjoyed a large measure of stability in personnel.

Pierre

Derbigny left the court in 1820 and was replaced by
Alexander Porter who served until 1834.

Upon Porter's

resignation in 1834, Henry Adams Bullard accepted a position
on the bench.
The Matthews' court grappled with the same
jurisdictional problems that plagued the Superior Court for
Court, 16 March 1836; Rule of Court, 11 April 1836; Rule of
court, 4 January 1837; Rule of Court, 16 January 1839; Rule
of Court, 11 March 1839; Rule of court, 23 December 1839;
Billings, Historic Rules, 1-9.
71The Supreme Court of Louisiana did not have an
official "Chief Justice" until after the constitutional
reorganization of 1845 when George Eustis was appointed to
the bench.
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the Territory of Orleans.

Although the Superior Court had

worked out a practical settlement to the problem of
interpreting Louisiana's laws in force within the context of
a mixed jurisdiction, many areas of uncertainty remained.
After publication of the Digest of 1808, the judges rendered
their decisions more efficiently.

Nonetheless, by the end

of the territorial period, Louisiana still hovered in a
jurisdictional limbo--it was not definitively a common law
or a civil law jurisdiction.

Such confusion confounded

efforts to render justice to a complicated and litigious
citizenry.

But in form, style, and the decision to embrace

stare decisis, Louisiana's supreme court judges ensured that
the state would move ever closer to American patterns of
justice.
Nonetheless, Louisiana's jurisdictional settlement was
incomplete, and the lack of definition raised problems for
Louisiana's supreme court in the ensuing decades.

As the

nation embraced an "Era of Good Feelings," Louisiana's
statesmen became embroiled in a parochial squabble for
political hegemony.

Edward Livingston, an ambitious lawyer

with ties to the corrupt New York political machine, sought
to insinuate himself into the inner corridors of power in
Louisiana.

Although Livingston had developed one of the

state's largest law practices and had served with
distinction in the assembly, he had failed to assume a
dominant position as a politician--a position he richly
desired.

Perpetually a political outsider, Livingston
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allied himself with representatives of the ancienne
population hoping to create a strong coalition of Orleanais
politicians that could dominate state politics.

Livingston

used the jurisdictional uncertainty of the region as his
chief weapon against the Claiborne administration.

By

portraying himself as the guardian of the civilian
tradition, Livingston sought to win votes from the Orleanais
population and to whip up a controversy which would lead
Claiborne and all of his allies and appointees to their
downfall.72
Before the War of 1812, Livingston had achieved mild
success in realizing his goals.

He was instrumental in

getting the jurisconsults appointed to redact the Digest and
he succeeded in winning the spectacular batture case against
the federal government--a case which firmly entrenched
civilian traditions as the basis for the territory's
property law.73

But these were qualified successes.

The

Digest failed to redact Louisiana's law into a comprehensive
civil code, and the batture controversy, while a great
personal victory for Livingston, merely

reinforc~d

already

accepted theories on the matter of property rights in
Louisiana and failed to have a lasting influence on the

72George Darga, Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the
plash of Legal Traditions, (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1975), passim.
73Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, passim.
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territory's judicial settlement.74

Accordingly, by the time

the Digest had been accepted, most of the ancienne
population were satisfied that their ancient property rights
would be respected.75

Any further animousity between

Americans and the ancienne population dissipated during the
war.
The breakdown of local hostility in Louisiana during
the war of 1812 stemmed from two sources.

Threat of enemy

invasion and the spectacular defeat of Pakenham's invading
army (a direct result of Orleanais and American cooperation)
presented the inhabitants of Louisiana with a wealth of
common interest and an opportunity for collaboration.
More important, in terms of the legal community, was
the public demonstration that Louisiana's American judges,
if pressed, would fight to protect the constitutional

interests of both their American and Orleanais constituents
against the arbitrary oppression of the United States Army.
In 1815, when Andrew Jackson arrived to defend New Orleans
from the threat of British invasion, he antagonized the
native population by arresting certain residents for fear
that they might betray the city to the enemy.
move outraged the citizens of New Orleans.

Jackson's

Old Hickory's

policies demonstrated a genuine distrust of Louisianians and
74rn its original organization of the territories,
congress guaranteed the anciene population the rights to
their properties and successions, see Chapter Three above.
75rbid., see above Chapter Three for a discussion of
the work of the jurisconsults and its relation to
Louisiana's judicial system.
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a profound disregard of their constitutional guarantees
against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment.

The Tennessean's

actions might have done irreparable damage to delicate
ethnic relationships within the state had it not been for
the direct intervention of Dominick A. Hall, then presiding
judge of the Federal District court.76

Hall had lived

among the Louisianians since his emigration to New Orleans
in the territorial period.
the Orleanais could be

Unlike Jackson, Hall knew that

reli~d

upon during a foreign attack--

after all, it was England, not France or Spain, that
threatened the port.

Shortly after Jackson ordered the

arrests, Hall issued writs of habeas corpus for the release
of the prisoners.77
Dominick Hall's allegiance to the Orleanais brought
the full weight of Jackson's wrath down upon the judge.
Jackson quickly refused to release the prisoners and
arrested Judge Hall.78

Although Hall had failed to secure

the release of the prisoners and the protection of their
constitutional rights, his actions did much to conciliate
relations between the Americans and their Orleanais
neighbors.

Generals could easily trample upon

constitutional and human rights; in fact, such actions had
foundations in ancient military traditions.

Hall's attempt

76Robert v. Remini, Andrew Jackson, (New York: Harper
and Row, Perennial Library, 1969), 76.
77rbid, 76.
7Srbid., 76.
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to protect his charges and his willingness to face Jackson's
persecution for doing so went a long way in winning the
ancienne population over to the belief that the judicial
process of the United States of America could and would
protect their interests in normal situations.

Judge Hall's

courageous actions and the triumphant victory over the
British at Chalmette Battlefield did much to soothe the
fears of native Louisianians that the American residents of
the state conspired to dispossess them of their land,
tradition, and creole way of life.
In the aftermath of the war, then, Livingston's
primary base of power had been lost.

To resurrect his

political ambitions, Livingston focused on the few remaining
residents who were disatisfied with the legal system once
again as a font of support.

During the 1820s, Louisiana, as

most jurisdictions around the nation, was swept up in a
billowy tide of litigiousness.

As in Virginia, lawyers,

jurists, and lawmakers puzzled over means to make the
judicial process more efficient.

By the 1820s, too, the

codification movement gained momentum around the nation.
Logically, Louisiana, as a bastion of civilian authority,
became caught up in the movement to codify state laws.79
The movement to redact a code in the early 1800s,
79cook, Codification; for a discussion of how Virginia
responded to the codification movement see above Chapter
Four; Richard Holcombe Kilbourne, Jr., A History of the
Louisiana Civil Code: The Formative Years, 1803-1839, (Baton
Rouge: Center of Civil Law studies, the Publications
Institute, Paul M. Hebert Law center, Louisiana state
University, 1987), passim.

--------

--------
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however, had steeled most of Louisiana's judges against
strict codification.

If the experience of the superior

Court of the Territory of Orleans taught the judges
anything, it instructed them that in such a complicated
jurisdiction, judicial discretion was crucial to their
ability to render justice.

An inflexible code, while

embodying logic and efficiency, simply could not provide for
the plethora of thorny questions that often arose before the
bench.

Thus even after the Digest had been presented to

them, neither Louisiana' judges nor the territory's
legislators invested it with the full authority of a formal
code.

By embracing the common law notion of stare decisis

as the basis for their decisions, Louisiana's judges
referred to the Digest, the 1806

~xposition

of the Criminal

Laws, various acts of the legislature, and traditional
common law and civil law authorities in the same manner in
which judges in other jurisdictions adhered to their own
local and traditional resources in rendering their
decisions. SO
Livingston's primary tactic was to renew a drive for a
Louisiana civil code.
willing allies.

In his quest, Livingston found many

The judges' lack of allegiance. to the

Digest was profound.

For the most part, Louisiana's jurists

referred to the Digest in the same fashion they would any
other law book.

One of the reasons for this lack cf

acceptance was that the redactors of the Digest failed to
BOsee Chapter Three above and Ap)Jendix I.
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collect all of Louisiana's laws in force.
incomplete.

The Digest was

The incomprehensive nature of the Digest raised

problems as Louisiana's judges could not rely on it as an
authoritative collection of the state's private laws.

As

most cases before any non-criminal tribunal deal with
property disputes, the deficiencies of the Digest created
significant problems for Louisiana's judges.

Magistrates

all too frequently cast aside the inefficient Digest in
favor of more complete Spanish authorities.

In a whole

series of cases, the judges disregarded the Digest in favor
of Spanish sources.81
Livingston pointed to the prevalent disregard of the
1808 Digest as a dangerous practice; he whipped up distrust
among the ancienne population over the regulations requiring
court proceedings to be conducted in English; and he

8lon the role of the judiciary in this matter, see
Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code, passim.;
Deshan v. Jennings, 5 Mart. (0. S.) 642 (1818); Grey v.
Laverty, 4 Mart. (0. s.) 464-468 (1816); Blangue v.
Peytavin, 4 Mart. (0. S.) 458 (1816); Bourcier v. Lanusse, 3
Mart. (0. S.) 461-463 (1815); Lebreton v. Nouchet, 3 Mart.
(0. S.) 159-163 (1813). For additional consideration of the
problem see Blake v. Morgan 3 Mart. (0. S.) 375-379 (1814);
Harrad v. Lewis, 3 Mart. (0. S.) 311 (1814); Lanusse v.
Massicot, 3 Mart. (0. S.) 261 (1814); Roussel v. DuKeylus, 4
Mart. (0. S.) 218 (1816); Enet v. His Creditors, 4 Mart. (0.
S.) 401-403 (1816-1817); Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (0. S.)
93 (1817); Whitsonv. Stodder, 8 Mart. (0. S.)?? (1820);
smith v. Kemper, 4 Mart. (0. S.) 409-419 (1816); Roper's
Heirs v. Yokum, 3 Mart. (0. S.) 424-441 (1814); Williamson
et al. v. Their creditors, 6 Mart. (0. S.) 431-441 (1819);
Zanico v. Habine, 5 Mart (0. S.) 372-375 (1818); Knight v.
Smith , 3 Mart. (0. S.) 156 (1813); Gardner v. Harbour, 5
Mart. (0. S.) 408 (1818); LeCesne v. Cottin, 2 Mart. (N. S.)
475 (1824); Syndics of Bermudez v. Ibanez & Milne, 3 Mart.
(0. S.) 17 (1813); Morgan's Admins. v. Voorhies, 3 Mart. (0.
s.) 462 (1814).
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enlisted the aid of other members of the legal community
such as his law partner John Grymes and legislator
Christobal De Armas to stir up criticism against the supreme
court and its current
authorities.

U"'t?.

of both Louisiana and foreign

In the early 1820s, Livingston managed to

convince the Louisiana legislature that the problems could
only be resolved by the creation of a new civil code.

In

this regard, Livingston's actions mirrored those of
lawmakers in other American states who were trying to limit
the discretion of judges and to bring a higher measure of
order to the law.82
In 1822, the Louisiana legislature responded to
Livingston's critism and adopted a resolution to revise the
Digest and created a panel of three jurisconsults.83

By

February 1823, the jurisconsults, Edward Livingston, Louis
Moreau-Lislet, and Peirre Derbigny, reported to the
legislature that a revision, indeed, was in order and
proposed a series of amendments to the 1808 Digest and
related repealing legislation to remedy the evils they found
in the existing system.

Substantively, the redactors relied

heavily on Spanish precepts for the bulk of Louisiana's
private laws.

The redactors• recommendations easily swayed

the legislature and their proposed amendments were adapted
hastily and with little debate.

It is important to note

82cook, American Codification Movement, passim;
Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code, 96-99.
83Louisiana Acts, 20, 1822., cf. Kilbourne, A History
of the Louisiana Civil Code, 108.
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that American members of the Louisiana assembly supported
the revisal as a routine process similar to the type of
practices that had been taking place in other American
states.

Alexander Porter pointed out that the revision

closely resembled the strictures passed by the Kentucky
legislature.

For the most part, the assembly accepted the

work of the redactors.

The only legislative addition to the

redactors' recommendations was an amendment repealing the
Spanish, Roman, and French laws that had been in force when
France transferred Louisiana to the United States.

The

legislature also repealed the acts of the Legislative
Council, the Orleans territorial legislature, and the
Louisiana state assembly that were expressly revised in the
report.

Finally, the legislature provided for the

publication of the emendations as the Louisiana Code of
1825.84
For Livingston and his supporters the revision seemed
a great success.

With a comprehensive code in place the

Louisiana Assembly sent a strong message to the judiciary-the practice of consulting outside authorities was at an
end.

In essence, it appeared as if Livingston had succeeded

in pulling off a major feat--the redefinition of judicial
practice from an Anglo-American common law style of decision

84Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code,
124-125-130; for a detailed analysis of Kentucky's
codification movement, see VanBurkleo, "'That Our Pure
Republican Principles might not Whither'," the repealing act
became Article 3521 of the Louisiana Code.

---------

-------
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making to a less creative civil law type of judicature.85
But neither Livingston nor his contemporaries nor modern day
critics and historians understood the power, determination,
independence, and resiliency of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana to establish and to maintain Anglo-American
patterns of justice.
Almost immediately, the supreme court began to reduce
the Louisiana Code to the less authoritative stance of a
digest of the laws.

In a series of cases the court

redefined the role of the code and attacked article 3521
(the repealing amendment) by pointing out defects in the
code and employing remedies that had been worked out prior
to 1825--remedies that often relied on foreign sources.86
In response, the legislature sought to maintain the
supremacy of the code with a new repealing statute in 1828.
Again the statute repealed all foreign laws in force at the
time of cession and the acts of the Legislative Council, the
territorial legislature, and the state assembly.87
Although the 1825 code and its repealing legislation
85Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code,
129-130.
86Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code,
136-139; Erwin v. Fenwick, 6 Mart. N. s., 229-232 (1827);
Pignatel v. Drouet, 6 Mart. N. s., 432, (1828); Cole's Widow
v. His Executors, 7 Mart., N. s., 41, (1828).
87Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code,
131-144. Kilbourne points out that some legislators felt
that the 1828 statute was defective, but attempts to draft
additional legislation failed. Unfortunately, the
legislative journals and other historical sources for this
period are too sketchy to provide a thorough analysis of the
reasons behind these failures.
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attempted to clarify what the legislature understood to be
the laws comprising the jurisdiction, the Matthews court
continued to peck at the legislature's accomplishments.

In

a series of cases the court questioned both the validity of
the repealing statute and the authority of the code.

On the

whole, the court managed to inflict minor damage on the code
and the repealing statute, but for the most part, the
legislation remained intact.

But the battle continued.88

By the time George Mathews died in 1836, battles over
the the manner in which the judges referred to the code and
civilian authorities remained unresolved.

Francois Martin,

a much more dominant personality than Mathews, assumed the
mantle of senior justice.

The Martin court continued the

battles and confronted other difficulties which made
Martin's time as senior judge one of the most intriguing and
important phases of the court's development.
When Martin took over the court in 1836, America had
already begun to feel the strain of President Jackson's
attack on the Second Bank of the United States.

By 1837, as

Jackson systematically withdrew federal support from the
bank, the nation's financial situation was in peril.
creditors called in notes, mortgages lapsed, wildcat banks

88saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. N. s., 569, (1828);
Heirs of Cole v. Cole's Executors, 7 Mart., N. s., 414,
(1829); State v. Wright's Administrators, 8 Mart. N. s.,
316, (1829); Williams v. Barrow, 3 La. Ann. 57, (1831);
Borie v. Borie, 5 La. Ann. 90, (1833); Duplessis v. Kennedy,
6 La. Ann., 231 (1834); Joyce v. Poydras De La Lande, 6 La.
Ann., 277, (1834); Psyche v. Paradol, 6 La. Ann. 366,
(1834).
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and fledgling businesses closed, and thousands of Americans
faced financial ruin.89

The economic chaos of the Panic of

1837 had an important side-effect--a wave of lawsuits.
Increased litigation paralyzed most state courts and
Louisiana's were no exception.90
Just as the Louisiana supreme court began operation
under Martin, the increased demands of a panic-sticken
populace created a docket crisis for the high court.

In the

midst of the docket crisis, illness and personnel
instability combined to complicate the court's proceedings.
Although hobbled by these hardships, the Martin court boldly
kept up the fight to ensure the continuation of AngloAmerican practices and procedures.
After Mathews' death, Henry carleton was appointed to
join Martin and Henry Adams Bullard on the supreme bench.

A

native of the Old Dominion and a former attorney general,
Carleton seemed particulary well-suited to sit on the
Louisiana court.

Shortly after his appointment to the

tribunal in 1837, however, Carleton fell ill.

His poor

health frequently kept him away from the court, and he was
forced to resign in 1839.91

Although Henry Adams Bullard

possessed excellent credentials and had served the court
with distinction, he spent most of his time in the late
89Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, 1828-1848,
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, The New American Nation
Series, 1959), 70-132.
90Fernandez, "From Chaos to Continuity," 19-36.
91Ibid.
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1830s pursuing a position in ·the United States Senate.

Thus

the inattention of Carleton and Bullard combined with
increased demands on the court's time to create a docket
crisis.92
Even more stifling to the court's ability to render
justice, however, were the personal styles of the jurists in
question.

Martin, Bullard, and Carleton each possessed

stong wills and well-defined legal opinions and like most
lawyers and judges of their day, were given to pompous
displays of their own legal abilities, a trend initiated
during Mathews• tenure as presiding judge.

Each of the

judges engaged in a common practice of the time--using their
decision-making prerogative and their bench as a forum for
showing off their own intimate knowledge of the law and for
publicly chastizing attorneys who did not share their
propensity.

As in John Tyler's Virginia, local critics

denounced these practices.

In Louisiana such criticism

surfaced in the Louisiana Law Journal when its editor,
Gustavus Schmidt, condemned the practice and labelled the
supreme court a "talking court."

If such public

condemnations were not enough, Bullard and carleton's
frequent absences forced Judge Martin, now quite blind, to
conduct the court's business by himself.

Consequently,

relatively few cases from the burgeoning dockets were

92Ibid.
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settled during the closing years of the 1830s.93
Judge Martin's irrascible nature compounded these
problems.

When Bullard finally won his long desired

senatorial seat and Carleton's failing health caught up with
him, they resigned from the bench.

In order to fill their

positions, the governor appointed two talented local
attorneys, George Eustis and Pierre Rost-Denis, to the
bench.

Eustis and Rost-Denis came to the bench wide-eyed,

naive, and eager to clear the docket.

Of a younger

generation and more reform minded than Martin, they explored
new juridical techniques and a more efficient docketing
system in hopes of clearing the court's crowded agenda.

But

Martin did everything in his power as presiding judge to
resist their changes.

Exasperated, the two young judges

gave up and resigned after serving only four short months;
although both were again appointed to the court after the
constitutional reorganization of 1846 (also after Martin's
death).

They then served admirably and instituted an

efficient system of judicial reform which cleared the docket
in only a few months.94

After Martin shooed Eustis and Rost-Denis away in the
1830s, George Strawbridge and Alonzo Morphy received
appointments to the bench.

Strawbridge quickly wearied of

93Ibid.; Gustavus Schmidt, "On the Administration of
Justice in Louisiana," The Louisiana Law Journal, I (1842),
151; above Chapter Four.
94For a detailed analysis of the contributions of both
Eustis and Rost-Denis see Fernandez, "From Chaos to
Continuity: 11 ),nni c::i:::~na History, 19-36.
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his post and, like Rost-Denis and Eustis, resigned after
only four months on the high court.

Morphy, however,

adjusted to Martin's demanding style of leadership and sat
on the court for over five years.95
In a last ditch effort to stablize the bench, the
governor appointed Rice Garland and Edward Simon in 184C.
By adding an extra judge, the governor acquiesced in
Martin's style of leadership, hoping that increased manpower
could serve the same purpose as docket clearing reforms.
Finally, the court's personnel stabilized, but Martin's
inefficent style of leadership, and his failing eyesight
limited the effectiveness of the court under his direction.
Although the number of cases decided by the court rose
slightly in the last five years of Martin's tenure, the
level of litigation also rose and the docket crisis
intensified.

The court stumbled through its tasks at a

snail's pace until the constitutional reorganization of 1846
which reinstated Eustis and Rost-Denis who streamlined the
court's operation with a new series of rules, set new
criteria for prospective members of the bar, and devised new
administrative techniques related to docketing, scheduling,
and trial procedure.
Despite these problems, the Martin court continued to
grapple with important issues related to the definition of
judicial power in Louisiana, especially in regard to the

95Fernandez, "From Chaos to Continuity," Louisiana
History, 19-36.
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role of the 1825 Louisiana Code and the 1828 repealing
statutes.96

In defining the role of the judiciary in

Louisiana's jurisprudence, no matter that came before the
Martin court is of more importance than the 1839 case of
Reynolds v. Swain et al.
In 1836, Reynolds rented a tenement on the corner of
Poydras and Magazine streets to

w. w.

and T. swain for the

purposes of starting an apothecary shop.

The terms of the

arrangement were negotiated verbally between Reynolds's
agent and W.

w.

swain who agreed to lease the building for

$1500.00 per year payable in twelve monthly installments of
$125.00 beginning 1

Nov~mber

1836.

About two weeks after

Swain & Co. occupied the property, Reynold's agent presented
the swains with a written lease.

When swain and his partner

refused to sign the lease, the agent informed them that he
intended to hold Swain & Co. to the terms of the verbal
agreement.

At the end of December Swain & Co. vacated the

premises without giving either Reynolds or his agent an
explanation and refused to pay the remaining ten months
rent.

The agent protested and would not receive the keys to

the property from swain.

Following their discussion, the

agent wrote a note to swain & Co. indicating that he still
intended to hold the apothecaries to the terms of the
lease. 97
on 26 April 1837, seven months before the terms of the
96see Gasguet v. Dimitry, 9 La. Ann., 592, (1836).
97Reynolds v. Swain et al., 13 La. Ann. 193.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

259
lease would have expired, Reynolds sued swain & Co. in the
First Judicial District of Louisiana for the rental payments
that the firm had failed to pay for the period between
January and April as well as the remaining rent due between
1 May and 1 October 1837.

Reynolds' agent testified in the

case and his testimony was corroborated by a witness and the
unsigned lease.

The district court judge ruled in favor of

Reynolds and rendered judgment for $875, the amount due on 1
June 1837 with an additional obligation of $125.00 per month
until the lease expired the following October.
The district judge's opinion rested upon a previous
decision in the supreme Court of Louisiana, Christy v.
Casanave (1824) which invoked a Roman convention that
required tenents who abandoned a property to pay the rent
for the entire term, even if the term of the lease had not
yet expired.98

Although such Roman laws had no force in

Louisiana, the supreme court held in Christy v. casanave
that such devices could be adapted to resolve analogous
cases.

The Swains nontheless appealed the decision in their

case to the state supreme court.99
In appealing the decision, the Swains engaged one of
Louisiana's most promising young attorneys and resident

98Thus even though the rent for the rema1n1ng months
was not yet due, the tenants would be forced to pay the rent
for the entire term.
See Christy v. Casanave 2 Mart. N. s.,
451.
99Reynolds v. Swain et al.
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expert in partnership law, Thomas Slidell.lOO

Slidell

argued two points: that neither a partnership nor its assets
could be held liable for a debt or contract incurred
separately on the responsibility of one of the partners; and
that the suit was brought prematurely since part of the rent
was not due at the time of the action.

on the second point

Slidell sought a reversal of the district court judgment for
the $375 due between August and September 1837.

Slidell's

second argument brought up a crucial issue--that Christy v.
CasanavG had been decided in 1824, before either the
adoption of the 1825 Louisiana Code or the 1828 act that
repealled all civil laws not contained in the code.

Since

the Roman remedy utilized in Christy v. Casanave was not
included in the 1825 code, Slidell contended that the
repealing act of 1828 precluded its use in Reynolds v.
Swain.
Slidell's argument raised a tricky point.

Since its

inception in 1825 the Louisiana Code had not functioned as a
binding code in traditional civil law fashion.

Rather, the

judges of the supreme court had used the Louisiana Code in
the same manner as they had utilized the Digest of 1808, as
a basic reference that could be supported or challenged by
other classic authorities and judicial decisions.

By

viewing the code in this manner, Louisiana's judges had
strengthened their judicial independence by functioning
lOOslidell would later become a justice of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana and pen all majority opinions involving
the laws of partnership.
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according to the practices and procedures of American courts
rather than as a civil law tribunal.

In this vein,

Louisiana's justices decided cases according to the common
law doctrine of stare decisis.

Moreover, their

interpretation of the code as a basic authority differed
drastically from the manner in which civil law judges refer
to their codes--the process that Livingston and the
legislature had attempted to inflict on the court in
1825.101

Thus the method of referring to code citations

that Louisiana's judges used closely paralleled the way
Virginia's justices employed foreign citations along with
the 1792 code, statutes of the General Assembly, and
judicial decisions.l02
Slidell's insistence that the Louisiana Code and the
1828 repea!ling act prohibited the judges from consulting
the Roman law challenged those judicial practices directly.
Essentially, Slidell reasoned that the passage of the 1825
code and the repealing act meant that Louisiana's judges
must adhere to the provisions of the Louisiana Code
exclusively, and that all other authorities had no force in
the state.

In other words, Slidell challenged the very role

of the judge in the state's judicial system--a process that
had not been addressed in any of the previous cases
regarding the 1825 code and its repealing statute.

If the

lOlsee Appendix I.
102see Chapter Four, especially the analyses of
Thornton v. Smith, Browne et al. v. Turberville et al.,
Baring v. Reeder, and Coleman v. Moody.
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court accepted Slidell's interpretation, it would cease to
function as a creative American court; judges would loose
much of their intellectual

indep~ndence

as finite codes

would replace judicial decisions and foreign authorities as
the sources of their opinions.l03
Thus the very foundations of Louisiana's judicial
system were at stake in Reynolds v. Swain et al .•

The

supreme court itself had to decide whether or not to
continue to render justice according to Anglo-American
patterns of justice or to revert to the type of civil law
court that characterized Louisiana's colonial era.

If the

court cast aside Slidell's argument, the decision would
represent a firm commitment to American judicial traditions;
if not, the judiciary would reject American juridical
patterns in favor of civilian practices.
In terms of defining the role of the judiciary in the
state, Reynolds v. swain et al. represented the single-most
important issue that ever came before the Martin court.

And

since the case appeared on the docket during one of Bullard
and Carleton's frequent absences, the decision in the case
was Martin's alone.

Martin met the challenge boldly.

l03It is ironic that Slidell took this approach as he
himself was an avid common lawyer and a staunch promoter of
the reception of common law in Louisiana. In later years as
a jurist, Slidell would set the standards for Louisiana's
jurisprudence in the area of partnership law--the aspect of
Louisiana's private law that completely eschews civil law in
favor of common law remedies, see F. Hodge O'Neal, "An
Appraisal of the Louisiana Law of Partnership," Louisiana
Law Review, IX (1949), 326-327; cf. Fernandez, "From Chaos
to Continuity," Louisiana History, 30.
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Indeed, Reynolds v. Swain et al. represents Martin's most
influential contribution to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Martin understood \'That was at stake in Reynolds v.
swain et al. and he crafted his opinion carefully and
succinctly.

He easily dismissed Slidell's first argument,

that the agreement of one partner could not bind the other,
by pointing out that the partnership had inhabited the
building for two months.

Citing section 2845 of the

Louisiana Code Martin opined that even if the contracts were
negotiated without the authority of the other partners, they
could be considered binding if the partnership had
benefitted from the arrangement.

As far as Martin was

concerned, the fact that the firm occupjed the premises for
two months provided sufficient proof that Swain's partners
had accepted and profitted from the agreement.104
Slidell's second point, that the case was brought
prematurely and that neither Christy v. Casanave nor the
Roman law that it relied on could no longer apply after
1828, occupied the major portion of Martin's decision.
addressing this issue, Martin proceeded cautiously.

In

He

pointed out that the Louisiana Code and its accompanying
repealing legislation indeed nullified the "Spanish, Roman,
and French laws, which were in force in this state when
Louisiana was ceded to the United states."

Martin also

cited section 3521 of the Louisiana Code which noted that
the acts of the Legislative Council, the former territorial
104Reynolds v. Swain et al.
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legislature, and the present state assembly had also been
repealed "in every case, which are specifically provided for
by that code."

But Martin went on to conclude that "the

repeal spoken of in the code and the act of 1828, cannot
extend beyond the laws which the legislature itself had
enacted [i. e., the laws in the 1825 Louisiana Code]; for it
is they alone which it may repeal."

Thus Martin concluded

that the 1825 code and the repealing legislation only
invalidated those older laws which it specifically
addressed.
Furthermore, in regard to the influence of foreign
laws on Louisiana's jurisprudence, Martin followed the
interpretation of the great English commentator Sir William
Blackstone in pointing out that "the civil or municipal law,
that is, the rule by which particular districts,
communities, or nations are governed" could only be confined
to positive or written lawl05 and that it could not be
extended to
those unwritten laws which do not derive their
authority from the positive institution of any people,
as the revealed law, the natural law, the law of
nations, the laws of peace and war, and those laws
which are founded in those relations of justice that
existed in the nature of things, antecedent to any
positive precept.
we, therefore, conclude, that the Spanish, Roman, and
French civil laws, which the legislature repealed, are
the positive, written or statute laws of those nations,
and of this state; and only such as were introductory
of a new rule, and not those which were merely
declaratory--that the legislature did not intend to
1051 Blackstone, 44.
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abrogate those principles of law which had been
established or settled by the decisions of courts of
justice.10 6
Thus Martin argued that the repealing act voided only the
positive, written laws that were in force in Louisiana prior
to 1828.

Judicial decisions, however, could not be repealed

by the 1828 act.

The judge agreed that the decision in

Christy v. Casanave was not grounded in Spanish or Louisiana
statutes.

Martin conceded that he knew of no Roman or

French statute that could have been considered in force in
Louisiana at the time ·of cession to which the repealing
measure of either the code or the 1828 act could extend.
Despite these facts, Martin went on to argue that
. • . it is the daily practice in our courts to resort
to the laws of Rome and France, and the commentaries on
those laws, for the elucidation of principles
applicable to analagous cases. Although the Roman law,
on which the case of Christy v. Cazanave was
determined, had no intrinsic authority here~ the reason
that dictated that law has great cogency.lOt
such cogency, according to Martin, in tandem with the daily
practice in Louisiana to resort to foreign authorities,
simply meant that the remedy provided by the district court
judge was sound.

Accordingly, Martin upheld the decision of

the district court.
Slidell's second argument failed and swain & Co. lost
their appeal.

But Slidell's contentions forced the supreme

Court of Louisiana to define its procedures in regard to
l06Reynolds v. swain et al.
l07rbid.
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foreign laws and the role of jurisprudence in Louisiana's
judicial system.

Speaking for the court, Francois Martin

rejected the civilian approach to judicial proceedings in
favor of the Anglo-American style of judicature.

Law cedes

and legislative statutes made up an important part of
Louisiana's legal heritage, but according to Martin the
rights of independent judges to consult precedent and
foreign authorities played an equally important role in the
deliberations of Louisiana's judges.

Thus Martin affirmed

the practices that had informed Louisiana's courts since the
territorial period and put to rest the notion that
Louisiana's high courts should function as civilian
tribunals--as slaves to an inflexible series of codes.lOS
Martin's decision meant that Louisiana's supreme court
could continue functioning in the manner it always had.

In

that regard, the judges of the Supreme court of Louisiana
worked in exactly the same fashion as their brethren on
Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals.

Louisiana's supreme

court could employ judicial decisions and consult foreign
authorities just as any other American tribunal.l09
Reynolds v. Swain et al. ensured that the AngloAmerican judicial style that Louisiana adopted in the
territorial period would continue to define the role of the
judiciary for the rest of the century.

Civil law remaint:!d

108Reynolds v. Swain et al.
109see Chapter Four for an analysis of how Virginia's
supreme court justices provided for the same procedures in
the Old Dominion.
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important to Louisiana's jurisprudence, indeed, civilian
doctrines were becoming important to many American
jurisdictions in the nineteenth century.

The judicial style

that Reynolds v. Swain et al. reaffirmed for Louisiana
ensured that the state's judges could continue to consult
and employ remedies other than the state's codes.

In that

regard foreign precepts as well as common law precepts
continued to invade Louisiana's legal discourse regularly
after 1839.110
As important as Martin's decision in Reynolds v. swain
et al .. was, however, the implications of the case evaded the
understanding of most Louisianians in the mid-nineteenth
century.

If the supreme court received any notice at all,

it came in the form of criticism about the long delays that
resulted from the docket crisis and in the cries for reform
that punctuated the drive for a new state constitutional
convention in the 1840s.

Critics, both in the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries, have focused on the impotency of
the Martin court as an expression of the difficulty related
to the interpretation of civilian traditions in the state's
legal system by a poorly-trained judiciary and bar.
could be further from the truth.

Nothing

Under both Mathews and

Martin, Louisiana attracted a competent pool of jurists
110on the matter of common law precepts invading
Lousiana•s jurisprudence, the evidence is profound. The
nu~ber of cases that were decided on the basis of English
and American common law authorities is so prominent that it
is impossible to display them here. Moreover, by midcentury entire areas of the law such as criminal law and
partnership law had become thoroughly Americanized.

----·- ---

····--
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trained in both the Anglo-American and civilian traditions.
Far from being well-intentioned boobs who mingled traditions
arbitrarily in order to do the "best they could for their
day," Louisiana's judges and lawyers moved easily within
both systems and adopted such measures from each which
insured the traditions most important to the state's
residents and most applicable to the American tradition of
justice.

Indeed the features of privc.t:e law which were

preserved in Louisiana became the model for similar codesponsored legislation thoughout the American south and West.
In all other matters and in terms of judicial
behavior, Louisiana's legal system exhibited the same
traditions and trends related to other American
jurisdictions.

The role of the Supreme Court of Louisiana

in dictating this style and policing its continuation by
establishing precise rules of procedure, interpreting both
the Digest and the 1825 code (especially in Reynolds v.
swain et al.) as foundations for stare decisis, and by
setting the standard's for the state's bar, played a
fundamental role in this development.
The streamlined reforms which bolstered the court
after Martin's death did nothing to alter the basic
jurisdictional orientation of the state's judicial system
which was established in the territorial period and matured
under the direction of Mathews and Martin.111

They merely

111For an analysis of those reforms see Fernandez,
"From Chaos to Continuity," Louisiana History, 19-36.
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strengthened the efficiency of the jurisdiction by
introducing more modern aspects of judicial administration
and by freeing the state's judges to pursue the creative,
Anglo-American style of rendering justice.
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Chapter six
Conclusion:
Interpreting the Dance
If historical investigation is at all capable of
interpreting the dance between law and society, discussion
of the rise of high appellate courts in Virginia and
Louisiana can only provide a summary of the opening
movements of a complicated ballet.

such an introduction,

however, sets the mood for the performance and forecasts its
outcome.

Thus the judicial history of both states

represents a major aspect of the legal and political culture
of the American South.
Although traditional interpretations suggest that the
two jurisdictions are vastly different, in-depth
investigation demonstrates that both Virginia and Louisiana
shared remarkably similar experiences in their quests to
create their supreme courts.

Study of those experiences

reveals a great deal not only about the individual issues
that informed the judicial history of both states, but also
about the origin and development of the American court
system in general.

An analysis of the historical and

procedural development of the two courts reveals striking
similarities.

Both tribunals relied heavily on colonial

antecedents to define their jurisdiction.

Both tribunals

eschewed aspects of their colonial antecedents when better
270
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remedies presented themselves.

Both tribunals embraced the

American doctrine of judicial independence to take an active
role in fleshing out their position in their respective
state governments.

And both tribunals participated in, and

perhaps led, a legal revolution that transformed the
judiciary of the early American nation from dependent
colonial bodies into independent Areerican tribunals.
From 1776 to 1792, Virginia's law revisors borrowed
heavily from traditional English practices and newfound
American liberties to create an ambivalent republic.

The

supreme court that owed its origins to the law revisal often
dealt with the paradoxes that informed the state's
revolutionary settlement, particularly those that arose from
the reception of the pre-1607 English common law and
exclusion of post-1607 statutes and decisions.

At first,

the Old Dominion's supreme bench took great pains to adhere
to the guidelines set down by the revolutionary conventions,
but by the end of the eighteenth century, legal innovations,
a more activist judiciary, and common sense led the court to
abandon its traditionalism in favor of more practical and
more efficient patterns of justice.
Louisiana's supreme court went through a similar
transformation.

Despite unprecedented jurisdictional

confusion at the time of the territory's cession to the
United states, Louisiana's appellate judges in the Superior
Court for the Territory of Orleans and later on the Supreme
Court of Louisiana fused the legal traditions of both the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

272

ancienne population and the state's new American residents
into a representative model of American justice.
For the judges of both courts, the ability to define
their jurisdictions depended on the emerging American
conception of judicial independence.

During the

Revolutionary period, such independence simply signified the
concern of the patriots to divorce judicial power from
executive prerogative.

But when individual states created

independent courts, the judges of those tribunals began to
act independently as well, something that even the most
committed republican at the time of the Revolution could not
have foreseen.

Virginia's judges first tested their

independence in Caton v. Commonwealth when they articulated
their powers of judicial review.

But Caton v. Commonwealth

marked only a tentative first step toward true judicial
independence.
bolder.

Gradually, the Old Dominion's justices grew

In the Remonstrance of the Judges (1788) the court

dictated the conditions for the legislative reform of the
court system.

And the procedural rules and jurisprudence of

the Pendleton Court and during the Roane era illustrated an
increasingly independent and activist style of judicature.
Evolution of an independent judiciary in Louisiana
followed a more intennittent, but equally effective, course
than in the Old Dominion.

Although the courts created

during the territorial period had to ensure the protection
of American constitutional guarantees, congress did not
expressly endorse the notion of an independent judiciary.

------
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Two basic choices, then, presented themselves to governor
Claiborne and his officers: they could establish a court
system based on the more restrictive civil law tribunals
that had served Louisiana in the colonial period, or they
could erect courts that adhered to the more creative AngleAmerican model.

Jefferson and Claiborne's own prefcreiice

for the American brand of justice and the domination of
Louisiana's bench and bar by Americans ensured that the
territory's courts (and the state courts that they
influenced) would follow the latter of the two options.
Nonetheless, on two significant occasions during their early
history, Louisiana's tribunals faced challenges from
citizens who demanded the implementation of restrictive
codes, a measure that would force the courts revert to a
civil law oriented pattern of judicature.
threats

we~e

Ironically, both

masterminded by an American--Edward Livingston-

-to forward his own political ambitions.

In both instances

the thoroughly Americanized and independent Louisiana
judiciary utilized its control over the court's practices,
procedures, legal education, and jurisprudence to quash the
power and influence of the codes.

Although Livingston's

maneuverings have historically been interpreted as a "clash
of legal traditions," the relative ease in which the
American elements that controlled the bench and bar cast
aside the codes (something they could not have done without
significant social turmoil had the ancienne population not
accepted the Anglo-American form of justice) suggests that
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the "clash" represented little more than a case of hiccups.
Such encounters certainly bothered Louisiana's judges, but
the problems resolved themselves naturally as the AngloAmerican committment to stare decisis and the predisposition
of the independent judiciary to regard the codes as nothing
more than guides that could be supported, contradicted, and
assisted by outside authorities, prevailed over Livingston's
political tricks.

By using rules of procedure,

jurisprudence, and education to make Anglo-American judicial
practices systemic to Louisiana's legal culture, its judges
guaranteed the continuation of the American form of judicial
procedure.
In both jurisdictions the independence of the
judiciary owed its origins to legislative innovation,
strong-minded judges, the courts' ability to manipulate
their practices and procedures via court rules, and the
peculiarly Anglo-American prerogatives of judge-made law.
Virginia's constitutional conventions and subsequent
judiciary acts of the General Assembly separated the
judicial system from the legislative and executive branches
of government.

The separation proved to be a truly

revolutionary innovation on judicial procedure as the judges
of Virginia's Court of Appeals and later the Supreme Court
of Appeals took on an activism that the legislators had not
envisioned.l

Once the court established an independent and

lsee Caton v. commonwealth and the "Remonstrance of the
Judges" for early expressions of judicial independence.
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activist stance, the trend toward true separation of powers
gained momentum.

The judges utilized their legislatively

granted rights to set up their own rules to streamline and
to reform procedure and to regulate practices in the state's
inferior courts.

Moreover, through a series of decisions,

beginning with the articulation of judicial review in Caton
v. Commonwealth, the court assumed a greater measure of
control over defining its own prerogatives and its role in
the new state government.

Once the court established its

positio11, practical concerns related to the efficient and
equitable administration of justice forced it to eschew the
republican regard for the legislative will in favor of
judicial innovation.

With Thornton v. Smith the court

tentatively challenged legislative prohibitions on its
ability to apply post-1607 English decisions to resolve
cases.

By the end of the Pendleton era, the challenge was

restated in bolder terms in Browne et al. v. Turberville et
al.

After Pendleton's death, despite st. GP.orge Tucker's

traditionalism, the court embraced the liberal leadership of
Spencer Roane.

In Baring v.

Reeo~r,

Coleman v. Moody, and

Findlay v. Smith, Virginia's supreme court, at Roane's
insistance, systematically destroyed the prohibitions on
post-1607 English precedent and legitimated the practice of
consulting foreign decisions once and for all.2

Thus by

2caton v. Commonwealth,
;Thornton v.Smith, 1 Wash. 8384; Browne et al. v. Turberville et al., 2 Call 390-409;
Baring v. Reeder, 1 H&M, 154-176; Coleman v. Moody, 4 H&M,
1-23; Findlay v. Smith et ux. et al., 6 Munf., 148.
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combining legislative prescriptions for separation of powers
and rulemaking descretion with an Anglo-American
predisposition to consult English precedent, the Supreme
court of Appeals for Virginia

emerg~d

as a truly independent

and creative tribunal.
Louisiana's judges employed the same tools as
Virginia's justices to establish and to solidify their
judicial independence.

With the blessing of the territorial

legislature, American judges mingled Roman, French, Spanish,
English, and American private law with Anglo-American
criminal law and judicial practice to create a mixed
jurisdiction that was overseen by a thoroughly American
judiciary.

After Louisiana became a state, the supreme

court continued the trend by adopting court rules,
regulations for bar membership, and Anglo-American legal
procedures such as briefs and common law writs.

A healthy

dose of creative jurisprudence allowed for the continuation
of the trend toward Americanization.

Livingston's

machinations only strengthened the resolve of the court to
preserve its Anglo-American flavor via judicial decisions
and rules related to legal

educa~ion.

The preservation

attempt climaxed in 1839 and 1840 with the decision in
Reynolds v. Swain et al. and in the syllabus passed for
prospective applicants to the state bar.3
Thus in both Virginia and Louisiana, the independent
judiciaries seized upon the authority their legislatures
3see Chapters Three and Five above.
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granted them and increased their prerogatives to ensure
their continued independence and to define their role within
the governmental power structure.
flirted with legal revolution.

In doing so, both states

Such innovation, however,

should not be surprising since the four classic
preconditions for legal revolution--that the law had become
"cumbrous and remote from social realities," that "realistic
borrowing" from foreign jurisdictions had become possible,
that a climate of "political and social revolution" existed,
and that "a forceful ruling elite" was willing to use law to
as the instrument for the revolutionary reshaping of
society--wer~

inception. 4

present in both jurisdictions at their
A look at how each jurisdiction responded to

those preconditions is illustrative.
In Virginia the law had become "cumbrous and remote
from social realities" shortly after the Revolution.

The

reception statute that Virginia's Revolutionary convention
passed meshed well with the whig ideology that informed the
war for independence as it prohibited the use of "corrupt,"
recent English decisions.

But the Virginian's traditional

reliance on English guidance in things legal created a
difficult paradox--some dependence on English tradition was
invaluable while more current, and sometimes more
commonsensical, British innovations were taboo.

By the mid-

1790s, those paradoxes created such problems for the supreme
4Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law, (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) see especially,
110-114.
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court that it began to attack the Revolutionary prohibition
on consulting modern English sources in favor of the more
expedient legal remedies that ·the contemporary decisions
provided.

Beginning with Thornton v. Smith and culminating

in Findlay v. Smith, Virginia's supreme court judges made
laws that circumscribed the restrictions of the
Revolutionary convention.

Furthermore, when the court's own

practices of overly lengthy and erudite consultations of
British cases encumbered the docket and paralyzed justice in
the first decade of the nineteenth-century, governor John
Tyler stepped in with an eloquent plea for codification--a
measure that further revolutionized the Old Dominion's legal
system.
Louisiana's laws proved "cumbersome and remote from
social realities'' from the beginning of the territorial era.
Laussat's suspension of the Cabildo threw any assessment of
the laws in force into hopeless confusion.

The Prevost

court put some order to the law in a revolutionary fashion
as it employed both civilian and common law remedies in
common sensical fashion and as it

e~braced

Anglo-American

court procedures to govern its daily business.

From 1806 to

1808, the legislature assisted the court in defining the
limits of the jurisdiction by commissioning Lewis Kerr's
Exposition of the Criminal Laws and James Brown and MoreauLilset's Digest of 1808.

Those authorities endorsed the

commonsensical borrowing from outside civil law and common
law sources and formed the core of the mixed jurisdiction
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until the legislature sought to replace them with a new code
in the 1820s.

But the legislative attempt at codification

ultimately reaffirmed the revolution that brought AngloAmerican law and court procedures to Louisiana when Thomas
Slidell forced judge Martin to reconsider the role of the
court in Reynolds v. swain et al.
The long colonial heritage shared by both states
facilitated the "realistic borrowing" from foreign systems.
Virginia's long association with England provided the most
obvious possibility for such borrowing, and the task was
concluded when the state's judiciary began to reconsider the
1776 reception statute.

In the jurisprudence that followed,

the judges' also asserted their rights to consult other
foreign, and non-British, sources as well.

Finally, the

codification movement, a national trend that included a
romance with civilian authorities on matters of land law 6
offered another possibility for the state's judges and
legislators to borrow ideas from alien sources.

"Realistic

borrowing," was a simple fact of life in Louisiana as
jurisdictional uncertainty coincided with the rise of a
multi-ethnic legal culture.
In an indirect sense, both states were informed by
political and social revolution.

The American Revolution

provided that opportunity for the Old Dominion as patriots
sloughed off British rule and created a new political and
social order for themselves.

Louisiana;s flirtation with

political and social revolution was less spectacular, yet
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nonetheless profound.

When Laussat suspended the Cabildo,

he threw the state into legal and political chaos.

Thus the

cession and the creation of an American government in
Louisiana signifies nothing short of a political revolution.
Moreover, the Louisiana Purchase touched off a wave of
American immigration that influenced great changes in the
social order, particularly in regard to American domination
of the legal community.5
Finally, each state possessed a ''forceful ruling
elite" that was willing to use the law as its instrument for
the revolutionary reshaping of society.

The work of that

ruling elite is evident both in Virginia's law revisal and
in the later operations and jurisprudence of the independent
judiciary.

In Louisiana, the legal community was dominated

by American lawyers and judges who created a representative
American court system to oversee their hybrid jurisdiction.
Thus in both states, judicial independence combined and
interacted with opportunities for legal revolution to
transform the court systems of the early national era from
models of colonial justice to American courts that followed
a basic

co~~on

law pattern, but allowed for a good deal of

borrowing from foreign systems and judicial innovation.

By

the middle of the nineteenth century, the supreme courts of
both systems had evolved into remarkably similar tribunals
in terms of judicial practice and procedure as well as in

5oargo, Jefferson's Louisiana; Newton, The
Americanization of Louisiana.
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regard to the diversity which marked American justice in the
antebellum period.

Although the dance between law and

society in each jurisdiction moved to slightly different
rhythms, it embraced a common melody to provide continuity
to its opening movement.

----------Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix I
Civil Law and Common Law

A central point of this dissertation is that Louisiana
under American rule, because of the background of its judges
and lawyers, developed an important common law tradition to
accompany its civilian heritage in the creation of a mixed
jurisdiction and is not so alien to the American system of
justice as has been previously suggested.

In order to

understand the implications of the interaction between civil
law and common law in such a mixed jurisdiction, it is
necessary to define each term, and to discuss what the
intermingling of the two systems means in regard to legal
change and development.
Civil law has two precise definitions.

The first

distinguishes the "municipal law" of a given community, that
is, its "civil or private rights and remedies as contrasted
with criminal laws" which derive from the "Laws of Nature"
or "International Law."l

This definition applies to all

modern jurisdictions, and does not concern this study.
The second definition of civil law refers to a system of
law pioneered by the Romans.

Written codes represent the

most important authorities of the civil law; however,
judicial decisions sometimes play a minor role in resolving
civil law disputes.

civil law judges are rigidly restricted

to apply appropriate code citations in order to arrive at
lBlack's Law Dictionary, 223.
282
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their decisions.

Accordingly, the duties of the civil law

judge leave little room for judicial interpretation of
precedent, and the concept of "judge-made" law is alien to
the bystem.

After the fall of the Roman empire, civil law

remained a popular tool for conflict resolution in Europe
and became the backbone of the legal systems of many
European countries including France and Spain.2

Since both

France and Spain once controlled colonial Louisiana, the
colony developed a strong civilian heritage by the time
Thomas Jefferson purchased it for the United States in 1803.
Common law found its most profound expression in
England and its colonies.

The common law is comprised of an

infinite number of principles and social rules that have
developed from time-honored customs and usages, judicial
decisions that are based on those customs, all statutory and
case law made in England and pre-Revolutionary America, and
the positive law and juristic theory of any country of a
general and universal nature.3

In common law jurisdictions,

emphasis on custom and usage and judicial decisions
distinguishes common law judges from their civilian brethren
as the ability to interpret those decisions and customs
allows them greater flexibility.

Moreover, once a common

law judge renders a decision, his or her judgment becomes a
part of the common law as well.

Rather than functioning as

a mere technician, the common law judge actually "makes law"
2 rbid.
3rbid., 251.
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every time he or she decides a case.
Since civil law and common law developed in different
regions under varied circumstances, they occasionally differ
greatly over certain substantive issues.

For instance, in

regard to the laws of descents the English showed a strong
preference for the convention of primogeniture.

Under civil

law, descents were settled by a policy of "forced heirship"
which simply meant that a man's estate was divided equally
among all of his survivors.
in the realm of criminal law.

Another distinction may be seen
In common law jurisdictions,

municipal statutes as well as an infinite variety of
customs, usages, theories, and precedent all figure into a
judge's decision.

In civil law jurisdictions, municipal

regulations alone offer remedies to the judge.

Moreover, in

common law the accused in a criminal case is presumed
innocent and the burden to prove guilt falls on the state.
Criminal defendants in civilian jurisdictions are considered
guilty and must prove their innocence beyond a shadow of a
doubt.
Neither Virginia nor Louisiana represents a purely
common law or purely civil law jurisdiction.4

Louisiana

4one further distinction must be :Jade he:re--"English
law" does not necessarily mean "common law." Although
common law in the form of statutes and judicial decisions
formed the foundation of the British legal system, other
forms of law, for instance equity, as seen in the Court of
Chancery, combined with the common law to comprise the
British judicial system. Thus when the term common law is
used to describe English or American judicial practices, it
is done so in a general and imprecise fashion, referring to
a general acceptance of precedent in the absence of statutes
as a basis for legal decisions and to the binding nature of

-----·--Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

285

adopted the common law, both the Anglo-American and the
theoretical versions as well as French and Spanish civil
laws, at an early period in its judicial development under
American rule.

This may be seen in the procedural

discussion of the Superior Court for the Territory of
Orleans in Chapter III.

Virginia's lawmakers flirted with

civil law theory in the early phases of their postRevolutionary reorganization.

The revisal of the laws,

sought to establish a comprehensive code for the Old
Dominion while at the same time preserving pre-1607 common
law.

Although this early example of codification failed to

provide the state with a comprehensive code, it does
demonstrate an appreciation of the civil law on the part of
the revolutionaries.

Moreover, Jefferson's attack on

primogeniture and entail in the law revisal reflected a
general American movement away from primogeniture.

Thus

both Virginia and Louisiana may be viewed as mixed
jurisdictions in their early stages of statehood.
But to state that each jurisdiction shared certain
common features hardly scratches the surface of the
importance of Louisiana's common law tradition to its legal
development.

The real question is to what extent did common

law inform the discourse of Louisiana's legal system?

The

answer is quite simple: common law traditions entered
those decisions. Judicial decisions are not nearly as
binding in civil law jurisdictions where judges act merely
as technicians in applying code citations and where judicial
decisions are only rarely invoked to resolve disputes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

286
Louisiana's judicial discourse in three ways--through
legislation, court rules, and judicial decisions.
The legislation which regulated judicial procedure and
empowered the court to make its own rules in the territorial
period continued in effect in Louisiana after it entered the
Union.

Subsequently, the writs that were established under

these auspices bore the prescription that they be employed
"according to the common law."

Moreover, both the Digest of

1808 and the 1825 Civil Code contained sections gleaned from
the work of English authorities such as sir Edward Coke's
Institutes and Sir William Blackstone's commentaries.
Finally, Kerr's Exposition of the Criminal Laws originated
in the works of English commentators, particularly
Blackstone and Sir Matthew Hale.

Thus the common law

entered Louisiana via legislation and the redaction of the
state's various digests, expositions, and codes.5
5"An Act Regulating the Practice of the Superior Court
in Civil Causes," Orleans Acts, 10 April 1805. A brief
historiographi~al explanation must be considered here in
regard to the contribution of Louisiana's redactors. The
main redactor of both the Digest and the 1825 Civil Code was
Louis Moreau Lislet, a French resident of New Orleans and
one of the period's most prominent attorneys. Contemporary
legal scholarship in Louisiana regards the 1808 Digest as
the sole contribution of Moreau Lislet, offering no credit
to Lislet's fellow jurisconsult, James Brown. Thus
Louisiana's legal scholars often react with surprise when
citations from English commentators (Blackstone is by far
the most common) are noted in studies of Louisiana's civil
law. In order to understand why these references should not
be surprising, it is necessary to probe the origins of the
historiographical tradition that excludes common law as an
element in Louisiana's legal settlement. These origins may
be traced to a single source--see Rodolfo Batiza, "Crigins
of Modern Codification of the Civil Law: The French
Experience and Its Implications for Louisiana Law," Tulane
Law Review 56 (February 1982), 583. Batiza, in the midst of

---

.

-----

--------
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a v~c~ous historiographical debate over the origins of
Louisiana's civil code with Robert A. Paschal, was seeking
to uncover the French sources of Louisiana's early codes.
For the most part, Batiza•s essay depends on a masterfully
executed comparison of the Digest with various French and
Spanish sources. As evidence for the importance of French
sources, Batiza sought to emphasize Moreau Lislet's
influence on the development of the Digest. Here Batiza
argued that James Brown had nothing to do with the drafting
of the Digest, basing his argument on an 1823 report to the
Louisiana legislature that was designed to engineer a new
compilation of the state's law. In the report, Moreau
Lislet stated that he alone drafted the 1808 Digest. But
this evidence is flimsy, and at best, specious. In the
first place, Moreau Lislet never protested the inclusion of
James Brown's name on the published Digest. Certainly, if
Moreau Lislet had done all of the work on the compilation,
he would have coi.tplained to the legislature when Brown
received half of the credit. Second, Moreau Lislet's
statement is not substantiated in any way. Moreover, James
Brown was never given an opportunity to respond to the
claim. Finally, there is enough evidence to suggest that
Moreau Lislet's claim may have been politically motivated.
In the early 1820s Louisiana, like many American states 1 was:
swept by a codification movement. Not only was the 1808
Digest inadequate for the state's legal needs, but it lacked
the authority of an official code. As preparations to
draft a new code began in the legislature, partisan
political divisions crept up as they did over any piece of
legislation. When the legislature assigned a committee to
study the possibilities of preparing a new code, a group of
legislators identified with the 'creole faction' of the
legislature seized control of the committee. In the first
place, this cabal was not solely comprised of members of
Louisiana's ancienne pop~lation. In fact, the leading
figure of the interest group was Edward Livingston, an
aggressive New York lawyer and entrepreneur. Livingston had
long utilized the problem of integrating civil law and
common law in Louisiana to his personal advantage. In the
territorial period Livingston led the forces in favor of
civilian reception and the drive for statehood. In both
cases, he did so in order to oppose the forces loyal to
Governor Claiborne, a group which often opposed Livingston's
aggressive entrepreneurial schemes. A political outsider,
Livingston tied his fortune to the so-called civilian
faction of the legislature in order to ensure a measure of
political prominence. For the most part he succeeded. As
his junto postured to control the codification bill,
Livingston managed to get himself appointed to the committee
along with Moreau Lislet and another prominent Frenchman,
Pierre Derbigny. Accordingly, the unsubstantiated statement
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Court rules likewise allowed for common law reception
as judges regulated their tribunal's proceedings under the
guidelines laid out in enabling legislation.

Attending to

the various fOLmS of writs and summonses issued by the
judges was by far the most common way in which court rules
allowed for common law reception.

Jury trials, provided for

in the Practice Act of 1805, also forced the judges to
devise their rules witcin the limits of common law practice.
Finally, the responsibility of regulating a bar that relied
on such common law devices allowed for further reception.6
As a matter of juristic theory, common law application
in Louisiana has a more complicated background.

In order to

understand the implications of judicial contributions, it is
first necessary to distinguish between the role of judges in
civilian courts and in common law courts.
In the British and American traditions of common law
judges review litigants' petitions, hear viva voce
examinations of witnesses, and, when appropriate, consider
the recommendations of a jury in rendering their decisions.
Often in deciding cases or pronouncing sentences, common law
judges employ codified maxims and statute law.

Since the

in the committee's report must be taken with a grain of
salt. Also, the utilization of common law authorities in
the early codes must also be viewed in terms of the
historical evidence. Even if Moreau Lislet's claim was
true, he was a prominent member of the legal community and a
frequent litigator before the supreme bench. Accordingly,
Moreau Lislet, through years of practice, had become quite
familiar with Anglo-American legal conventions. Why would
he not use them when redacting the codes?
6see Chapter Three and Chapter Five.
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common law is only partially codified, judges are often
forced to look elsewhere for solutions to the cases before
their benches.

Often a case will be settled on the basis of

a single decision rendered in a previous trial.

When a case

is decided as such, it is considered settled by the
principle of stare decisis, one of the cornerstones of
English and American judicial theory.

Accordingly, in

common law jurisdictions, the reputation of a court rests on
the judge's ability to master mountains of jurisprudence.
To achieve such mastery, judges are expected to hone their
legal research skills and scholarship during lengthy
apprenticeships as practicing attorneys.

Theoretically,

only the best lawyers are offered opportunities to ascend to
the revered position of judge.?
In civilian jurisdictions, however, judges operate
chiefly as

judicial administrators.

For the most part,

judges are presented with written petitions from each
litigant--the plaintiff makes his complaint and the
defendant answers it.

The judges will then search the

various codes which comprise the jurisdiction's laws in
force and apply appropriate citations in order to render
their decisions.

In rare instances when the codes fail to

present clear solutions, judges will then turn to previous
judicial decisions to inform their judgments.

Unlike common

?Jean Baudouin, "The Impact of the Common Law on the
Civilian Systems of Louisiana and Quebec," in Joseph Dainow,
The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil Law and
in Mixed Jurisdictions, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1974), 15-22.

------------
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law judges, civilian magistrates must uncover a long strain
of consistent decisions in order to use them as the basis of
a judgment.

This procedure, known as jurisprudence

constante, represents a lengthy and exhaustive process, and
is rarely used in civilian courts.

Moreover, jurisprudence

constante, by requiring an immense string of consistent
decisions deemphasizes the importance individual decisions.
And since no single decision of any civilian judge may be
used to decide a case, the role of the individual judge is
far less powerful and creative in civil law jurisdictions
than in common law jurisdictions.

Because the method of

rendering judgment in civilian systems requires such strict
documentation and skills largely unnecessary to the
advocate's practice of constructing and refuting complaints,
prospective judges train for their positions in law school
and assume the bench shortly after graduation.

Thus judges

in civilian jurisdictions assume the role of trained
technicians in a tightly restricted legal environment.S
The contrast between stare decisis (regarded widely as
"judge made law") in common law jurisdictions and the rarely
used civilian doctrine of jurisprudence constante marks the
salient difference between the role of the judge in civilian
and common law jurisdictions.

Common law judges are viewed

as a trusted lav1givers, seasoned by years of hard study and
practical experience, and invested with power to interpret
and to create crucial portions of their society's legal
srbid., 15-22.
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discourse.

Civilian judges, as specialized technocrats,

lack the creative power of common law magistrates and play
less spectacular roles in their legal systems.
Laussat's suspension of the Cabildo, which cast doubt
on the Louisiana's laws in force; the lack of a
comprehensive code; and the Practice Act of 1805's
provisions for jury trials, common law writs, and viva voce
examinations forced Louisiana's judges to embrace the common
law style of judicature.

Moreover, the fact that from the

territorial period to the Federal Occupation of Louisiana in
1862 the overwhelming majority of Louisiana's most powerful
magistrates--its appellate judges--were Americans9 (most
sporting American legal educations) ensured the perpetuation
of the judicial style of common law juridictions.

9warren M. Billings, ed., The Historic Rules of the
supreme Court of Louisiana, 1813-1879, (Lafayette: Center
For Louisiana studies, University of Southern Louisiana
History Series, No. 15, 1985), Appendix I 43-50.

----------
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Appendix II
Alexander campbell to Robert Carter of Nomini Hall
Plan to Revise County Courts ca. 1790
15 September 17901
The present County Court establishment seems to be highly
inconvenient to the people.

The constant succession of the

quarterly & monthly courts takes the people from their
labour and their plantations at all seasons of the year, and
at those particularly, when their presence at heme is most
necessary.

Experience too evinces that the system tho this

inconvenient is by nc means calculated to produce expidition
and order in the administration of Justice.

The concurrent

jurisdicition of the quarterly and monthly sessions, with
respect to a variety of subjects; such as Injunctions in
Chancery, petitions for small debts, & motions of different
kinds, produces confusion in the first Place--employs a
greater part of the time which ought to be employ 1 d in the
trial of Regular causes--and by the frequent attendance of
witnesses, and other charges attending a delay of justice,
burden to the suitors with excessive debts.

These

considerations have induced me to project a plan on whc I
mean to consult the intelligent gentm. of the district I
know beg leave to submit it to Mr. Carter for his perusal &

1carter Family Papers, 1651-1861, Mss. 12468al45-98l,
(sect. 22), Virginia Historical Society.

-----------------------
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opinion.

The plan is:

The Council are to Elect 9 gentlemen in each of the
counties Each county is to be divided into 3 Districts.

3

of those Nine gentlemen are to be Judges of the court of
Pleas.

This court is to sit twice a year.

12 days at each

session.

The sessions to begin on the first of March & the

15 Novr.

They may extend their session to 15 days if that

time be necessary in order to go thro their Docket.
Their Jurisdiction is to be all cases where the title or
bounds of Land came into Question.

In all actions of

Detinue Traver, and in all actions of Debt &c where the Debt
exceeds LlO.

And there are confined entirely to pleas of

this nature.
Three other of the above mention'd 9 are to be Justices of
a Court to be call'd an Orphan's Court, for Examg into
Orphan's business &c. & to receive appeals on Caviats
entered before a District Magistrate respecting the preobate
of Wills &c.

This Court to sit twice a year The days each

term in the month of [

] & [

]

& to try

petitions for Debts of the value of L 10, & not exceedg L5.
The remaining 3 are to be District Magistrates one to
reside in each of the three Districts.

Their business will

be to try warrants of the value of L5 downwards -- to
receive the probat of Deeds & Wills (wch will be very
convent. to the people) unless an objection be made [to]
such probat; and in that case he is to Certify it to the
Orphan's court (in the Case of Wills, there to be

-·-

----

--~
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Determined) and transmit together with his Certificate the
will to be produced to him for probat.
This plan will require Correction.
general outlines.

THese are it's [sic]

I divides and distributes the different

duties of the Court and from this distribution it seems to
me that order and expedition will ensue.
The plan in its present rough state is Submitted to Mr.
Carter with this one additional observation--that tho' the
court of pleas will sit but twice a year, when it will be
most convt. for the people to attend, it will in one Case
sit as many days at the Quarterly Courts now sit--business,
will [g]o thro' it's [sic] Docket twice a year; Whch now it
does not do, once in four years.

Add to this the

respectability wch the system will give to those who will be
chosen Judges of this Court.
sept. 15 1790
Robert Cart Esq. N. Hall

[signed] Alex Campbell
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APPENDIX III
EDITORIAL NOTE
The following writs demonstrate the similarities between
writs of habeas corpus in Louisiana and Virginia.

Writ #1

is the earliest surviving example of a writ of habeas corpus
in Louisiana.

Writ #2 is a copy of the form of a writ of

habeas corpus as prescribed in Lewis Kerr's An Exposition of
the Criminal Laws of the Territory of Orleans: The Practice
of the Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, the Duties of their
Officers. with a Collection of Forms for the Use of
Magistrates and Others,

(New Orleans: Bradford & Anderson,

1806; rept. Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, 1986), XLVII.

Finally,

writ #3 is a copy of the form of a writ of habeas corpus as
prescribed in William Waller Hening's The Virginia Justice,
Comprising the Office and Authority of a Justice of the
Peace in the Commonwealth of Virginia together with a
Variety of Useful Precedents, Adapted to the Laws now in
Force to which is Added An Appendix. Containing all the most
Approved Forms in Conveyancing: Deeds of Bargain and Sale,
of Lease and Release, of Trust, Mortgages, Bills of Sale,
etc.

Also the Duties of A Justice of the Peace; Arising

under the Laws of the United States, 4th ed., Revised,
corrected, greatly enlarged, and adapted to the Revised Code
of 1819 and the laws subsequently passed,

(Richmond:

Shepherd & Pollard, 1825), 325-326.
296
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WRIT #1
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR

] WAKEFIELD, 19 APRIL 1806

* * * *
The Honorable John B. Prevost, Judge of the Superior Court
in and for the Territory of Orleans.
To George T. Ross Esquire, Sheriff of the County of Orleans
in the said Territory.

Greeting,
We command you that you have the body of [

) Wakefield

now in prison, under your custody confined, as is said,
under safe and secure conduct, together with the day and
cause of his commitment and detention, by whatsoever name he
is known in the same before us at ten Oclock in the forenoon
of this nineteenth day of April at the Hotel de ville in the
city of New Orleans to receive and submit to all and
singular those things, which we may then and there in this
behalf, consider and determine, and have yo1, then and there
this writ.
Witness John B. Prevost Judge
of the Superior Court of the
Territory of Orleans this
nineteenth day of April in the
Year 1806.
[seal]

[signed) J.

w.

Smith Clk.

[over)
Habeas Corpus

----------

··-
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I allow this writ of Habeas Corpus to issue
Dated
19 April 1806
(signed] J. B. Prevostl
EDITORIAL NOTE
The writ is hand written and folded on docket sized
paper.
WRIT #2
No. 15.

Fonn of a Writ of Habeas Corpus. issuing out of and

returnable instanter to the Superior Court in Session.2

* * * *
"The Territory of Orleans, to the Sheriff of the County of
Orleans, or other person in charge of the Public Prison of
the said county,
Greeting:
"You are hereby commanded that you forthwith have the body
of A B, now in your prison detained, and in your custody, as
is said, together with the day and cause of his caption and
detention, by whatever name he may be known, before the
honorable the superior court in and over this territory, to
do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the said court Ehall
consider in that behalf.

And have you then and there this

writ.

lsuperior Court for the Territory of Orleans, NOPL,
City Archives, Box #1171-1303.
2use of underline in the following transcriptions
signifies the use of italics in the original.

- - - - - - - - - - - ---
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"Witness the honorable J B P,3 senior judge
of the said Superior Court, at the City
of
(L. S.)

New-Orleans, this sixth day of, &c. in

the

year one thousnad, &c.
J

w T,4

Clerk of the Court."

When this writ is issued by a judge, the court not being in
session,m neither the seal of the court, nor the signature
of the clerk is necessary.

It is sufficient that the writ

be tested in the name of the judge who allows it, and that
his allowance of it be certified by endorsement on it with
his own hand.5
WRIT #3
(A) Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum.

* * * *
The commonwealth of Virginia, to (the person having the
prisoner in custody.)
We command you, that the body of H. D. detained in your
custody, as it is said, together with the day and cause of
his being taken and detained, by whatsoever name he may be
called in the same, you

hav~

under safe and secure conduct

3John B. Prevost.
4This is a typographical error. Kerr meant to write J
W S in reference to J. W. Smith the clerk of the Superior
Court, this is evidenced by the use of the correct initials
in the French draft, Kerr, Exposition, XLVIII.
5Kerr's use of the initials of Prevost and Smith in his
samples suggest that he was following forms already
established in the Superior Court.
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before the judge of our (describe the court) immediately
after the receipt of this writ, or before any judge of a
superior court of chancery, or of the general court, to do,
submit to and receive, all and singular those things, which
shall then and there be considered of him, in this behalf.
Witness

c.

day of

T. judge of our (describe the court) at
in the year of our Lord

and in the

year of the commonwealth.
T.

this

(seal.)
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Appendix IV
EDITORIAL NOTE
All definitions of legal terms contained in this appendix
are quoted from Henry Campbell Black, Law Dictionary, fifth
ed., (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1979).
Rules of Court for the Court of Pleas, 1804.1

* * * *
At a court of Pleas held at the Hotel de Ville on tuesday
evening the lOth of January 1804. Present
Anthony Argotte
Beverley Chew
Benjamin Morgan
William Kenner
Paul Lanusse
Francis M. Guerin
Gaspard Debuys
William Garland
Eugene Dorsiere
The Court, after mature deliberation, have adopted, and do
order that the following Regulations be observed for the
Government of the Court and its officers to wit:
Art. 1
All suits shall commence in this court by writs of
summons,2 capias,3 or attachment.4
1Minute Book, Court of Pleas for the Territory of
Orleans, NOPL, City Archives.
2A writ by which, under the English judicature acts,
all actions are commenced, Black, Law Dictionary, 1445.
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Art. 2

A writ of Summons shall be issued, as a matter of course,
by the clerk, at the request of any plaintiff, commanding
the sheriff to require the attendance of a defendant at a
time therein mentioned [page] not more than ten nor less
than [blank] days after the date thereof, unless the court
shall for special reasons direct otherwise.
Art. 3
A writ of capias shall be issued in like manner by the
clerk, at the request of any plaintiff, when a defendant is
about to depart of the jurisdiction of the court, or
[conceal] himself, commanding the sheriff to arrest such
defendant, and have him before the court at anytime therein
mentioned not more than ten nor less than [blank] days after
the date thereof, unless the court shall for special reasons
direct otherwise.

But no writ of capias shall be issued

unless the Plaintiff or some other creditable person, will
make oath that the Defendant is, as the deponent believes,
likely to depart out of the Jurisdiction of the Court, or
conceal himself, before the final judgment shall be rendered
3The general term for several species of writs, the
common characteristic of which is that they require the
officer to take the body of the defendant into custody,
Black, Law Dictionary, 188.
4A writ employed to enforce obedience to an order or
judgment of the court. It may take the form of commanding
the sheriff to attach the disobedient party and to have him
before the court to answer his contempt. In its generic
sense, any mesne civil process in the nature of a writ on
which property may be attached, including trustee process,
Black, Law Dictionary, 1443.
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in the suit.
Art. 4
After the appearence of the parties, the court will proceed
to trial immediately, or at some particular time thereafter,
to be agreed upon by the parties, or appointed by the Court.
Art. 5
A writ of attachment shall in like manner be issued, at a
plaintiff's request, when a defendant shall be beyond the
jurisdiction of the court, or so concealed that he cannot be
found; but before such writ issues, it shall be necessary
that the plaintiff, or some other creditable person, shall
make affidavit that such defendant is really indebted to the
plaintiff in a specific sum, naming the same; and the said
writ shall command the sheriff to sequester so much property
of the said defendant as will be sufficient to satisfy the
debt and costs likely to be recovered.
(page]
Art. 6
Any defendant arrested on a writ of capias may be set at
large on giving a bond in double the amount of the debt,
with good and sufficient security to the sheriff conditioned
for his appearance in court at the time appointed, and that
he will either perform and fufill such judgment as may be
rendered against him, [torn] deliver himself up to the
sheriff, which bond shall, in case of forfeiture be put in
suit by the sheriff, to the use of the said Plaintiff and
the satisfaction of costs.
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Art. 7
On the return of the attachment, the court will give time
to the defendant to appear, at their discretion, no less
than four nor more than twelve months, and the same shall be
nine times advertised in a public paper.

And if within the

time given, the defendant shall appear and deliver himself
up to the sheriff, or give bail as is required of persons
arrested on a capias, then the property which may have been
seized shall be released, and the suit shall proceed as if
commenced by capias.

But if the defendant shall no appear

within the time given, the Plaintiff shall on proof of his
demand be entitled to a judgment and execution of the
property of the defendant.
Art. 8
All parties shall be entitled to have from the Clerk, on
application, as many subpenas as they may require to command
the appearance and testimony of witness, on their behalf
respectively.
Art. 9
The party, against whom judgment shall go, shall also be
adjudged to pay the costs, unless the Court shall otherwise
specifically direct.
(page]
Art. 10
All writs or process shall be advanced to the Clerk by
parties applying for the same.
Art. 11
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After judgment shall have been obtained, a writ of
execution5 shall issue, commanding the sheriff to take or
retain (as the case may be)in his custody the party against
Whom judgment shall have gone, and also to seize and sell
such property of said party as he can find, and after
satisfaction of all costs and charges occuring thereon, pay
the next proceeds of such sales to the party who shall have
recovered; but if the proceeds of the sales shall be
r~turned

insufficient to satisfy the judgment, costs and

charges, the party against whom such execution shall have
gone, shall be committed to prison without bail, till such
judgment be satisfied.
Art. 12
The Court shall be attended by one crier to be appointed by
the sd Court, as soon as the Municipality shall make some
provisions for his maintenance.
Art. 13
The Court will likewise appoint for each ward or division
of the City and its environs, one or more Constables, as
soon as the Municipality shall make provision for their
maintenance; and it shall be the duty of sd. constables to
attend the Court while sitting and any magistrate thereof
who shall require their attendance, and execute the orders
of the Magistrate, and in all things to assist them and the
sheriff and other civil officers, where called on, in the

5A writ to put in force the judgment or decree of a
court, Black, Law Dictionary, 1444.
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due execution of the law.
Art. 14
All process shall issue in the name of the Governor, and be
attested by the Clerk of Court.
(page]
Art. 15
The Clerk of court shall administer all oaths required on
behalf of the court.
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